Entanglement distribution is a core function of quantum networks, and the paths used for this purpose are composed of quantum and conventional network components and are routed through physical facility sites. A game theoretic model is formulated for the defense of entanglement paths in a quantum network infrastructure by modeling the correlations and probabilities of reinforcement and failure of its components. A sum-form utility function is used to capture the cost-benefit trade-offs in reinforcing the entanglement path components to defend against their failures and attacks. Under Nash Equilibrium criteria, estimates of survival probabilities of entanglement paths are derived using the parameters and correlations of quantum, conventional, hybrid, and facility components. They provide insights into the dependencies of entanglement paths on its components, including cross-boundary effects of conventional, quantum, and facility components.

We consider a monitoring scenario of phenomenon using three different streams of measurements whose quality is proportional to their constant inter-arrival times. Each measurement of a stream needs to be binary-classified to reflect the state of interest of the phenomenon. A set of classifiers is separately trained and fused for each stream at its time resolution using measurements collected under known states. We present a machine learning method to fuse the outputs of these fusers to provide a final classification at the finest time resolution. We show that this fused-fusers method provides decisions with likely superior classification probability compared to the best individual classifiers and fused-classifiers. We derive generalization equations that guarantee a superior classification probability of fused-fusers with a confidence probability specified by the classifiers’ generalization equations. We apply these results to study a practical problem of classifying $\mathrm{Pu} / \mathrm{Np}$ target dissolution events at a radiochemical processing facility using gamma spectral measurements of effluent flows.

Fundamentally and practically, quantum networks and conventional networks are inextricably tied, since the basic quantum protocols such as teleportation require both networks and the conventional network fiber is also used for the quantum network. A Recursive System of Systems (RSOS) model is developed for quantum-conventional (QC) networks by modeling the correlations at various levels based on the failure and attack modes of quantum, conventional and hybrid components and the propagative effects across QC boundaries. A game-theoretic formulation is developed to capture the cost-benefit trade-offs of the provider in defending against component attacks, using sum-form utility functions. By applying the Nash Equilibrium results, the conditions and sensitivity functions of the survival probabilities of a QC network at different levels are derived using the strong dependencies between quantum and conventional infrastructures. The results provide insights into the dependencies between conventional and quantum networks, including cross QC boundary effects in terms of disruption impact of conventional networks on quantum networks, and vice versa.

This research studies defense strategies of an interdependent system in the face of rational attacks. We propose a sequential game between an attacker and a defender for an interdependent System of Systems (SoS) to explore the effect of interdependency on an optimal defense strategy. We develop an algorithm of backward induction to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game. The attacker is the first mover as he applies an attack strategy on constituent systems that maximizes his utility. The defender observes and responds by a defense strategy that maximizes her utility. Both players' utilities are expressed as the difference between a player's reward due to SoS functionality (dysfunctionality) and the cost of the action. The sensitivity analysis compares the effects of different parameters on the attacker's and defender's strategies such as the effectiveness of defense (attack), the unit cost of defense (attack) and the interdependency level of constituent systems.

We consider a class of Recursive System of Systems (RSoS), wherein systems are recursively defined and the basic systems at finest level are composed of discrete cyber and physical components. This formulation captures the models of systems that are adaptively refined to account for their varied structure, such as sites of a heterogeneous distributed computing infrastructure. The components can be disrupted by cyber or physical means, and can also be suitably reinforced to survive the attacks. We characterize the disruptions at each level of recursion using aggregate failure correlation functions that specify the conditional failure probability of RSoS given the failure of an individual system at that level. At finest levels, the survival probabilities of basic systems satisfy simple product-form, first-order differential conditions using the multiplier functions, which generalize conditions based on contest success functions and statistical independence of component survival probabilities. We formulate the problem of ensuring the performance of RSoS as a game between an attacker and a provider, each with a utility function composed of a survival probability term and a cost term, both expressed in terms of the number of basic system components attacked and reinforced. We derive sensitivity functions at Nash Equilibrium that highlight the dependence of survival probabilities of systems on cost terms, correlation functions, and their partial derivatives. We apply these results to a simplified model of distributed high-performance computing infrastructures.

Large-scale infrastructures are critical to economic and social development, and hence their continued performance and security are of high national importance. Such an infrastructure often is a system of systems, and its functionality critically depends on the inherent robustness of its constituent systems and its defense strategy for countering attacks. Additionally, interdependencies between the systems play another critical role in determining the infrastructure robustness specified by its survival probability. In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models between a defender and an attacker for a generic system of systems using inherent parameters and conditional survival probabilities that characterize the interdependencies. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions for the cases of interdependent and independent systems of systems under sum-form utility functions. We derive expressions for the infrastructure survival probability that capture its dependence on cost and system parameters, and also on dependencies that are specified by conditional probabilities. We apply the results to cyber-physical systems which show the effects on system survival probability due to defense and attack intensities, inherent robustness, unit cost, target valuation, and interdependencies.

We consider an infrastructure consisting of a network of systems each composed of discrete components that can be reinforced at a certain cost to guard against attacks. The network provides the vital connectivity between systems, and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. We characterize the system-level correlations using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network. The survival probabilities of systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between an attacker and a provider, using the sum-form and product-form utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a cost term. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions which provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities, and also the expected capacity specified by the total number of operational components. These expressions differ only in a single term for the sum-form and product-form utilities, despite their significant differences. We apply these results to simplified models of distributed cloud computing infrastructures.