Large Language models are among the most exciting technologies developed in the last few years. While the model's capabilities continue to improve, researchers, practitioners, and the general public are increasingly aware of some of its shortcomings. What will it take to build trustworthy large language models?

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become integral to numerous domains, significantly advancing applications in data management, mining, and analysis. Their profound capabilities in processing and interpreting complex language data, however, bring to light pressing concerns regarding data privacy, especially the risk of unintentional training data leakage. Despite the critical nature of this issue, there has been no existing literature to offer a comprehensive assessment of data privacy risks in LLMs. Addressing this gap, our paper introduces LLM-PBE, a toolkit crafted specifically for the systematic evaluation of data privacy risks in LLMs. LLM-PBE is designed to analyze privacy across the entire lifecycle of LLMs, incorporating diverse attack and defense strategies, and handling various data types and metrics. Through detailed experimentation with multiple LLMs, LLM-PBE facilitates an in-depth exploration of data privacy concerns, shedding light on influential factors such as model size, data characteristics, and evolving temporal dimensions. This study not only enriches the understanding of privacy issues in LLMs but also serves as a vital resource for future research in the field. Aimed at enhancing the breadth of knowledge in this area, the findings, resources, and our full technical report are made available at https://llm-pbe.github.io/, providing an open platform for academic and practical advancements in LLM privacy assessment.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely applied to various applications, including image classification, text generation, audio recognition, and graph data analysis. However, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Though there are several works about adversarial attack and defense strategies on domains such as images and natural language processing, it is still difficult to directly transfer the learned knowledge to graph data due to its representation structure. Given the importance of graph analysis, an increasing number of studies over the past few years have attempted to analyze the robustness of machine learning models on graph data. Nevertheless, existing research considering adversarial behaviors on graph data often focuses on specific types of attacks with certain assumptions. In addition, each work proposes its own mathematical formulation, which makes the comparison among different methods difficult. Therefore, this review is intended to provide an overall landscape of more than 100 papers on adversarial attack and defense strategies for graph data, and establish a unified formulation encompassing most graph adversarial learning models. Moreover, we also compare different graph attacks and defenses along with their contributions and limitations, as well as summarize the evaluation metrics, datasets and future trends. We hope this survey can help fill the gap in the literature and facilitate further development of this promising new field We also have created an online resource to keep track of relevant research on the basis of this survey athttps://github.com/safe-graph/graph-adversarial-learning-literature.

Learning on graphs (LOG) plays a pivotal role in various high-impact application domains. The past decades have developed tremendous theories, algorithms, and open-source systems in answering what/who questions on graphs. However, recent studies reveal that the state-of-the-art techniques for learning on graphs (LOG) are often not trustworthy in practice with respect to several social aspects (e.g., fairness, transparency, security). A natural research question to ask is: how can we make learning algorithms on graphs trustworthy? To answer this question, we propose a paradigm shift, from answering what and who LOG questions to understanding how and why LOG questions. The TrustLOG workshop provides a venue for presenting, discussing, and promoting frontier research on trustworthy learning on graphs. Moreover, TrustLOG will serve as an impulse for the LOG community to identify novel research problems and shed new light on future directions.

Adversarial learning methods and their applications such as generative adversarial network, adversarial robustness, and security and privacy, have prevailed and revolutionized the research in machine learning and data mining. Their importance has not only been emphasized by the research community but also been widely recognized by the industry and the general public. Continuing the synergies in previous years, this third annual workshop aims to advance this research field. The AdvML'22 workshop consists of four tracks: (i) open-call paper submissions; (ii) invited speakers; (iii) rising star awards and presentations; and (iv) panel discussion on AdvML. The full details about the workshop can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/advml.

Despite their tremendous success in various machine learning tasks, deep neural networks (DNNs) are inherently vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are maliciously crafted inputs to cause DNNs to misbehave. Intensive research has been conducted on this phenomenon in simple tasks (e.g., image classification). However, little is known about this adversarial vulnerability for object detection, a much more complicated task, which often requires specialized DNNs and multiple additional components. In this paper, we present DetectSec, a uniform platform for robustness analysis of object detection models. Currently, DetectSec implements 13 representative adversarial attacks with 7 utility metrics and 13 defenses on 18 standard object detection models. Leveraging DetectSec, we conduct the first rigorous evaluation of adversarial attacks on the state-of-the-art object detection models. We analyze the impact of the factors including DNN architecture and capacity on the model robustness. We show that many conclusions about adversarial attacks and defenses in image classification tasks do not transfer to object detection tasks, for example, the targeted attack is stronger than the untargeted attack for two-stage detectors. Our findings will aid future efforts in understanding and defending against adversarial attacks in complicated tasks. In addition, we compare the robustness of different detection models and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses. The platform DetectSec will be open source as a unique facility for further research on adversarial attacks and defenses in object detection tasks.

Adversarial learning methods and their applications such as generative adversarial network, adversarial robustness, and security and privacy, have prevailed and revolutionized the research in machine learning and data mining. Their importance has not only been emphasized by the research community but also been widely recognized by the industry and the general public. Continuing the synergies in previous years, this third annual workshop aims to advance this research field. The AdvML'21 workshop consists of three tracks: (i) open-call paper submissions; (ii) invited speakers; and (iii) rising star awards and presentations. The full details about the workshop can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/advml.

Mining from graph-structured data is an integral component of graph data management. A recent trending technique, graph convolutional network (GCN), has gained momentum in the graph mining field, and plays an essential part in numerous graph-related tasks. Although the emerging GCN optimization techniques bring improvements to specific scenarios, they perform diversely in different applications and introduce many trial-and-error costs for practitioners. Moreover, existing GCN models often suffer from oversmoothing problem. Besides, the entanglement of various graph patterns could lead to non-robustness and harm the final performance of GCNs. In this work, we propose a simple yet efficient graph decomposition approach to improve the performance of general graph neural networks. We first empirically study existing graph decomposition methods and propose an automatic connectivity-ware graph decomposition algorithm, DeGNN. To provide a theoretical explanation, we then characterize GCN from the information-theoretic perspective and show that under certain conditions, the mutual information between the output after l layers and the input of GCN converges to 0 exponentially with respect to l. On the other hand, we show that graph decomposition can potentially weaken the condition of such convergence rate, alleviating the information loss when GCN becomes deeper. Extensive experiments on various academic benchmarks and real-world production datasets demonstrate that graph decomposition generally boosts the performance of GNN models. Moreover, our proposed solution DeGNN achieves state-of-the-art performances on almost all these tasks.

Network embedding has demonstrated effective empirical performance for various network mining tasks such as node classification, link prediction, clustering, and anomaly detection. However, most of these algorithms focus on the single-view network scenario. From a real-world perspective, one individual node can have different connectivity patterns in different networks. For example, one user can have different relationships on Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn due to varying user behaviors on different platforms. In this case, jointly considering the structural information from multiple platforms (i.e., multiple views) can potentially lead to more comprehensive node representations, and eliminate noises and bias from a single view. In this paper, we propose a view-adversarial framework to generate comprehensive and robust multi-view network representations named VANE, which is based on two adversarial games. The first adversarial game enhances the comprehensiveness of the node representation by discriminating the view information which is obtained from the subgraph induced by neighbors of that node. The second adversarial game improves the robustness of the node representation with the challenging of fake node representations from the generative adversarial net. We conduct extensive experiments on downstream tasks with real-world multi-view networks, which shows that our proposed VANE framework significantly outperforms other baseline methods.

Routine operational use of sensitive data is often governed by law and regulation. For instance, in the medical domain, there are various statues at the state and federal level that dictate who is permitted to work with patients' records and under what conditions. To screen for potential privacy breaches, logging systems are usually deployed to trigger alerts whenever a suspicious access is detected. However, such mechanisms are often inefficient because 1) the vast majority of triggered alerts are false positives, 2) small budgets make it unlikely that a real attack will be detected, and 3) attackers can behave strategically, such that traditional auditing mechanisms cannot easily catch them. To improve efficiency, information systems may invoke signaling, so that whenever a suspicious access request occurs, the system can, in real time, warn the user that the access may be audited. Then, at the close of a finite period, a selected subset of suspicious accesses are audited. This gives rise to an online problem in which one needs to determine 1) whether a warning should be triggered and 2) the likelihood that the data request event will be audited. In this paper, we formalize this auditing problem as a Signaling Audit Game (SAG), in which we model the interactions between an auditor and an attacker in the context of signaling and the usability cost is represented as a factor of the auditor's payoff. We study the properties of its Stackelberg equilibria and develop a scalable approach to compute its solution. We show that a strategic presentation of warnings adds value in that SAGs realize significantly higher utility for the auditor than systems without signaling. We perform a series of experiments with 10 million real access events, containing over 26K alerts, from a large academic medical center to illustrate the value of the proposed auditing model and the consistency of its advantages over existing baseline methods.

In this paper we propose a new membership attack method called co-membership attacks against deep generative models including Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Specifically, membership attack aims to check whether a given instance x was used in the training data or not. A co-membership attack checks whether the given bundle of n instances were in the training, with the prior knowledge that the bundle was either entirely used in the training or none at all. Successful membership attacks can compromise the privacy of training data when the generative model is published. Our main idea is to cast membership inference of target data x as the optimization of another neural network (called the attacker network) to search for the latent encoding to reproduce x. The final reconstruction error is used directly to conclude whether x was in the training data or not. We conduct extensive experiments on a variety of datasets and generative models showing that: our attacker network outperforms prior membership attacks; co-membership attacks can be substantially more powerful than single attacks; and VAEs are more susceptible to membership attacks compared to GANs.

Given a data set D containing millions of data points and a data consumer who is willing to pay for $ X to train a machine learning (ML) model over D , how should we distribute this $X to each data point to reflect its "value"? In this paper, we define the "relative value of data" via the Shapley value, as it uniquely possesses properties with appealing real-world interpretations, such as fairness, rationality and decentralizability. For general, bounded utility functions, the Shapley value is known to be challenging to compute: to get Shapley values for all N data points, it requires O (2 N ) model evaluations for exact computation and O ( N log N ) for ( ϵ , δ)-approximation. In this paper, we focus on one popular family of ML models relying on K -nearest neighbors ( K NN). The most surprising result is that for unweighted K NN classifiers and regressors, the Shapley value of all N data points can be computed, exactly , in O ( N log N ) time - an exponential improvement on computational complexity! Moreover, for ( ϵ , δ)-approximation, we are able to develop an algorithm based on Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) with only sublinear complexity O ( N h ( ϵ , K ) log N ) when ϵ is not too small and K is not too large. We empirically evaluate our algorithms on up to 10 million data points and even our exact algorithm is up to three orders of magnitude faster than the baseline approximation algorithm. The LSH-based approximation algorithm can accelerate the value calculation process even further. We then extend our algorithm to other scenarios such as (1) weighed K NN classifiers, (2) different data points are clustered by different data curators , and (3) there are data analysts providing computation who also requires proper valuation. Some of these extensions, although also being improved exponentially, are less practical for exact computation (e.g., O ( N K ) complexity for weigthed K NN). We thus propose an Monte Carlo approximation algorithm, which is O ( N (log N ) 2 /(log K ) 2 ) times more efficient than the baseline approximation algorithm.

A wide variety of mechanisms, such as alert triggers and auditing routines, have been developed to notify administrators about types of suspicious activities in the daily use of large databases of personal and sensitive information. However, such mechanisms are limited in that: 1) the volume of such alerts is often substantially greater than the auditing capabilities of budget-constrained organizations and 2) strategic attackers may disguise their actions or carefully choose which records they touch, thus evading auditing routines. To address these problems, we introduce a novel approach to database auditing that explicitly accounts for adversarial behavior by 1) prioritizing the order in which types of alerts are investigated and 2) providing an upper bound on how much budget to allocate for auditing each alert type. We model the interaction between a database auditor and potential attackers as a Stackelberg game in which the auditor chooses an auditing policy and attackers choose which records in a database to target. We further introduce an efficient approach that combines linear programming, column generation, and heuristic search to derive an auditing policy, in the form of a mixed strategy. We assess the performance of the policy selection method using a publicly available credit card application dataset, the results of which indicate that our method produces high-quality database audit policies, significantly outperforming baselines that are not based in a game theoretic framing.

The success of classification learning has led to numerous attempts to apply it in adversarial settings such as spam and malware detection. The core challenge in this class of applications is that adversaries are not static, but make a deliberate effort to evade the classifiers. We investigate both the problem of modeling the objectives of such adversaries, as well as the algorithmic problem of accounting for rational, objective-driven adversaries. We first present a general approach based on mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) with constraint generation. This approach is the first to compute an optimal solution to adversarial loss minimization for two general classes of adversarial evasion models in the context of binary feature spaces. To further improve scalability and significantly generalize the scope of the MILP-based method, we propose a principled iterative retraining framework, which can be used with arbitrary classifiers and essentially arbitrary attack models. We show that the retraining approach, when it converges, minimizes an upper bound on adversarial loss. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the mixed-integer programming approach significantly outperforms several state-of-the-art adversarial learning alternatives. Moreover, the retraining framework performs nearly as well, but scales significantly better. Finally, we show that our approach is robust to misspecifications of the adversarial model.

Cheap ubiquitous computing enables the collection of massive amounts of personal data in a wide variety of domains. Many organizations aim to share such data while obscuring features that could disclose personally identifiable information. Much of this data exhibits weak structure (e.g., text), such that machine learning approaches have been developed to detect and remove identifiers from it. While learning is never perfect, and relying on such approaches to sanitize data can leak sensitive information, a small risk is often acceptable. Our goal is to balance the value of published data and the risk of an adversary discovering leaked identifiers. We model data sanitization as a game between 1) a publisher who chooses a set of classifiers to apply to data and publishes only instances predicted as non-sensitive and 2) an attacker who combines machine learning and manual inspection to uncover leaked identifying information. We introduce a fast iterative greedy algorithm for the publisher that ensures a low utility for a resource-limited adversary. Moreover, using five text data sets we illustrate that our algorithm leaves virtually no automatically identifiable sensitive instances for a state-of-the-art learning algorithm, while sharing over 93% of the original data, and completes after at most 5 iterations.

Cheap ubiquitous computing enables the collection of massive amounts of personal data in a wide variety of domains. Many organizations aimto share such data while obscuring features that could discloseidentities or other sensitive information. Much of the data now collected exhibits weak structure (e.g., natural language text) and machine learning approaches have been developed to identify andremove sensitive entities in such data. Learning-based approaches are never perfect and relying upon them tosanitize datacan leak sensitive information as a consequence. However, a small amount of risk is permissible in practice, and, thus, our goal is to balance the value of datapublished and the risk of an adversary discovering leaked sensitiveinformation. We model data sanitization as a game between1) a publisher who chooses a set of classifiers to apply to data andpublishes only instances predicted to be non-sensitive and 2) an attackerwho combines machine learning and manual inspection to uncover leakedsensitive entities (e.g., personal names). We introduce aniterative greedy algorithm for the publisher that provablyexecutes no more than a linear number of iterations, and ensures a lowutility for a resource-limited adversary. Moreover, using several real world natural language corpora, weillustrate that our greedy algorithm leaves virtually no automaticallyidentifiable sensitive instances for a state-of-the-art learningalgorithm, while sharing over 93% of the original data, and completesafter at most 5 iterations.