With the increasing availability of large-scale spatiotemporal data from location-based services, trajectory publishing has become essential for data-driven analysis and intelligent applications. However, insufficient protection of trajectory location data may result in the disclosure of user privacy and social relationship information. To address this issue, we propose a semantic-aware privacy-preserving trajectory data publishing scheme (SAPP). First, a sliding-window algorithm is employed to extract stay points as key semantic locations and to generate a uniformly sampled set of candidate obfuscation points. Then, a semantic-aware scoring function is designed to probabilistically select candidate points that preserve semantics while avoiding sensitive regions. Furthermore, SAPP computes the sensitivity of each location based on semantic frequency and dynamically allocates the privacy budget. Finally, random noise is added to candidate trajectories using the Laplace mechanism. Through a dual-perturbation mechanism, spatial correlations in sensitive regions are weakened. Security analysis and experimental results further demonstrate that, compared with existing approaches, SAPP reduces TPPS and SFRR by up to 18% and 14%, respectively, indicating stronger resistance against trajectory inference and semantic leakage attacks while maintaining high data utility and time efficiency.

In numerous data application scenarios, various data can be represented in the form of data sets, and the intersection is often the common concern of multiple users. Using private set intersection (PSI) protocol, users can securely compute the intersection of their sets without disclosing their private input and other additional information. At the same time, there is also a strong practical demand for statistical analysis of intersection data. However, when multiple parties are involved, the efficiency of the multiparty PSI protocol decreases dramatically as the number of users increases. In this paper, we construct a novel server-aided multiparty PSI protocol, which can transform the complex multiparty computation problem into an efficient two-party computation problem. In addition, we design a series of server-aided party PSI statistical protocols to compute the statistics of the intersection elements, such as the sum, average, variance, range (maximum, minimum), and the cardinality of intersection (the size of intersection). In our protocol, the clients only need to upload their private data to the servers in blinded form and do not need to keep online during server computing. Experiments show that our protocol has high computation and communication efficiency and is suitable for lightweight clients. In addition, we also introduce an application of our protocols in the field of intelligent logistics.

With the rapid development of Internet and the widespread application of distributed computing, people enjoy various conveniences while at the same time their privacy has also been threatened. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) can solve the problem of how data owners who do not trust each other jointly compute in distributed scenarios. Using MPC technique, people can not only realize data joint computing, but also ensure data privacy. In most data application scenarios, private data held by different parties can often be represented by sets. To complete the relevant statistical computations of the intersection of two private sets, we propose a suite of protocols based on MPC. These protocols can compute the statistical functions of the associated data of the intersection, including cardinality, sum, average, variance, range, and so forth, without revealing any additional information other than the result. To achieve these functions, we design a private membership test protocol with the result as the arithmetic sharing value, called the arithmetic shared private membership test (ASPMT) protocol. On the basis of the ASPMT protocol, the size and other statistics of the intersection can be computed securely and efficiently. All fundamental computations are constructed based on secret sharing and oblivious transfer techniques. Thanks to the use of precomputation technique, all protocols are highly efficient.

Secure wildcard pattern matching (WPM) allows the pattern holder to obtain the matched positions without revealing pattern and text information about both parties. However, standard secure WPM may have limitations in practical applications, as users may prefer to have access to the actual data of the match in many scenarios. Fortunately, secure wildcard pattern matching with query (SWMQ) extends standard secure WPM by allowing the pattern holder to obtain the matched positions and the actual data, which has important applications in many scenarios, such as electronic healthcare and gene matching. This also motivates the research of SWMQ in this paper. In this study, we focus on the efficient construction of SWMQ in the semihonest adversary setting. First, we propose two new primitives, hereafter referred to as shared wildcard pattern matching (Sh-WPM) and choice-sharing oblivious transfer (CSOT). Furthermore, we propose an SWMQ protocol via Shared WPM and CSOT. In addition, we evaluate the performance of SWMQ. More specifically, the running time in local area network and wide area network settings is less than 0.4 and 2 s, respectively, when the text length is 2 16 ${2}^{16}$ and the pattern length is 2 12 ${2}^{12}$ . In fact, our evaluation results suggest that SWMQ is not only more broadly functional, but also comparable in efficiency to state-of-the-art approaches.

Convolutional neural network (CNN) is one of the representative models of deep learning, commonly used to analyze visual images. CNN model is more accurate when trained on large amounts of data from multiple sources, and the huge training cost makes the model much more valuable. However, data from various sources is often privacy-sensitive. Therefore, the privacy of these data should be protected during CNN model training and inference. In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure two-party computation (2PC) framework PPCNN for privacy-preserving CNN training and inference. Specifically, we use a new secret sharing technique introduced in ABY2.0 to securely compute various computational tasks involved in the CNN training and inference processes. This secret sharing technique can significantly reduce the communication overhead. Meanwhile, we assign these computationally intensive tasks to cloud servers to reduce the computational burden on local devices. We demonstrate the security of these protocols in the semihonest model. In addition, we use the MP-SPDZ library to simulate our PPCNN framework, and the experiments prove its high efficiency and accuracy.

Logistic Regression (LR) is the most widely used machine learning model in industry for its efficiency, robustness, and interpretability. Due to the problem of data isolation and the requirement of high model performance, many applications in industry call for building a secure and efficient LR model for multiple parties. Most existing work uses either Homomorphic Encryption (HE) or Secret Sharing (SS) to build secure LR. HE based methods can deal with high-dimensional sparse features, but they incur potential security risks. SS based methods have provable security, but they have efficiency issue under high-dimensional sparse features. In this paper, we first present CAESAR, which combines HE and SS to build secure large-scale sparse logistic regression model and achieves both efficiency and security. We then present the distributed implementation of CAESAR for scalability requirement. We have deployed CAESAR in a risk control task and conducted comprehensive experiments. Our experimental results show that CAESAR improves the state-of-the-art model by around 130 times.