Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Bo Peng 0023
dblp:03/5954-23
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-0910-9267ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Theory of computation · 3 · 3 first-author · 3 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Approximation and online algorithms · 61% Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 25% Algorithms and data structures · 14% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Approximation and online algorithms
online algorithms |
1.4 | 2 | 2025 | Revisiting Ranking for Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: the Primal-Dual Analysis · EC 2025 Order Selection Prophet Inequality: From Threshold Optimization to Arrival Time Design · FOCS 2022 |
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
competitive analysis |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Revisiting Ranking for Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: the Primal-Dual Analysis · EC 2025 |
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms › online matching
online bipartite matching |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Revisiting Ranking for Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: the Primal-Dual Analysis · EC 2025 |
Algorithms and data structures › ranking
ranking algorithm |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Revisiting Ranking for Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: the Primal-Dual Analysis · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
contract design |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Optimal Robust Contract Design · EC 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › contract design
linear contracts |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Optimal Robust Contract Design · EC 2024 |
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
prophet inequality |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Order Selection Prophet Inequality: From Threshold Optimization to Arrival Time Design · FOCS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
primal-dual analysis · 0.9worst-case analysis · 0.8mechanism design · 0.8threshold optimization · 0.6arrival time design · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Revisiting Ranking for Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: the Primal-Dual AnalysisabstractWe revisit the celebrated Ranking algorithm by Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (STOC 1990) for online bipartite matching under the random arrival model, that is shown to be 0.696-competitive for unweighted graphs by Mahdian and Yan (STOC 2011) and 0.662-competitive for vertex-weighted graphs by Jin and Williamson (WINE 2021). Bo Peng 0023, Zhihao Gavin Tang |
EC | 1 |
| 2024 | Optimal Robust Contract DesignabstractWe consider the robust contract design problem when the principal only has limited information about the actions the agent can take. The principal evaluates a contract according to its worst-case performance caused by the uncertain action space. Carroll (AER 2015) showed that a linear contract is optimal among deterministic contracts. Recently, Kambhampati (JET 2023) showed that the principal's payoff can be strictly increased via randomization over linear contracts. In this paper, we characterize the optimal randomized contract, which remains linear and admits a closed form of its cumulative density function. The advantage of randomized contracts over deterministic contracts can be arbitrarily large even when the principal knows only one non-trivial action of the agent. Furthermore, our result generalizes to the model of contracting with teams, by Dai and Toikka (Econometrica 2022). Bo Peng 0023, Zhihao Gavin Tang |
EC | 1 |
| 2022 | Order Selection Prophet Inequality: From Threshold Optimization to Arrival Time DesignabstractIn the classical prophet inequality, a gambler faces a sequence of items, whose values are drawn independently from known distributions. Upon the arrival of each item, its value is realized and the gambler either accepts it and the game ends, or irrevocably rejects it and continues to the next item. The goal is to maximize the value of the selected item and compete against the expected maximum value of all items. A tight competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$ is established in the classical setting and various relaxations have been proposed to surpass the barrier, including the i.i.d. model, the order selection model, and the random order model. In this paper, we advance the study of the order selection prophet inequality, in which the gambler is given the extra power for selecting the arrival order of the items. Our main result is a 0.725-competitive algorithm, that substantially improves the state-of-the-art 0.669 ratio by Correa, Saona and Ziliotto (Math. Program. 2021), achieved in the harder random order model. Recently, Agrawal, Sethuraman and Zhang (EC 2020) proved that the task of selecting the optimal order is NP-hard. Despite this fact, we introduce a novel algorithm design framework that translates the discrete order selection problem into a continuous arrival time design problem. From this perspective, we can focus on the arrival time design without worrying about the threshold optimization afterwards. As a side result, we achieve the optimal 0.745 competitive ratio by applying our algorithm to the i.i.d. model. Bo Peng 0023, Zhihao Gavin Tang |
FOCS | 1 |