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Kun Wang 0025

dblp:05/1958-25 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0005-5214-7156ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 48% Biometric security · 45% Usable security · 7%
Artificial intelligence
3 papers
Speech recognition and synthesis · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Biometric security
speaker recognition
1.622025
From One Stolen Utterance: Assessing the Risks of Voice Cloning in the AIGC Era · SP 2025
FraudWhistler: A Resilient, Robust and Plug-and-play Adversarial Example Detection Method for Speaker Recognition · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.012026
Hijacking Large Audio-Language Models via Context-Agnostic and Imperceptible Auditory Prompt Injection · SP 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial defense
adversarial example detection
0.812024
FraudWhistler: A Resilient, Robust and Plug-and-play Adversarial Example Detection Method for Speaker Recognition · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis
audio-language model
0.312026
Hijacking Large Audio-Language Models via Context-Agnostic and Imperceptible Auditory Prompt Injection · SP 2026
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis › speech synthesis
voice cloning
0.312025
From One Stolen Utterance: Assessing the Risks of Voice Cloning in the AIGC Era · SP 2025
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis
speaker recognition
0.212024
FraudWhistler: A Resilient, Robust and Plug-and-play Adversarial Example Detection Method for Speaker Recognition · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Hijacking Large Audio-Language Models via Context-Agnostic and Imperceptible Auditory Prompt Injection
Meng Chen 0011, Kun Wang 0025, Li Lu 0008, Jiaheng Zhang, Tianwei Zhang 0004
SP2
2025 From One Stolen Utterance: Assessing the Risks of Voice Cloning in the AIGC Era
abstract
The advent of voice cloning has fundamentally threatened the role of voice as a unique biometric. Many criminal incidents have already been reported to demonstrate its significant risks of identity forgery. Previous works explored the risks of voice cloning in constrained settings, which require victim speakers to either be already seen in the training data of voice cloning models, or leak dozens of minutes of their speech samples to adversaries. However, with the rapid progress of voice cloning in AIGC (Artificial Intelligence Generated Content) era, these requirements have largely been released, leaving the exact risks of state-of-the-art (SOTA) voice cloning techniques shrouded in a dense fog. To uncover it, this paper conducts a large-scale study in real-world scenarios to assess the risks of advanced voice cloning techniques. This study involves 5 SOTA voice cloning techniques (open-source and commercial), across 8 SOTA voice authentication systems (open-source and real-world) and 30 human listeners, using voice data of over 7,000 speakers (public and custom). By experimental and theoretical analysis, this study reveals that 1) state-of-the-art voice cloning techniques pose severe threats in spoofing voice authentication systems and human listeners; 2) demographic factors such as age and gender of victim speakers have a subtle impact on voice cloning attacks; 3) human listeners' subjective opinions and background about voice cloning play an important role in their susceptibility to attacks; 4) advanced detection methods still fail to identify voice cloning samples as expected.
Kun Wang 0025, Meng Chen 0011, Li Lu 0008, Jingwen Feng, Qianniu Chen, Zhongjie Ba, Kui Ren 0001, Chun Chen 0001
SP1
2024 FraudWhistler: A Resilient, Robust and Plug-and-play Adversarial Example Detection Method for Speaker Recognition
Kun Wang 0025, Xiangyu Xu 0001, Li Lu 0008, Zhongjie Ba, Feng Lin 0004, Kui Ren 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1