Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Wei-Lin Tseng

dblp:119/7715 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Web and mobile security · 44% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 44% Network security · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security
early warning system
0.112012
Context-aware web security threat prevention · CCS 2012
Web and mobile security › phishing
phishing prevention
0.112012
Context-aware web security threat prevention · CCS 2012
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection
user behavior profiling
0.012012
Context-aware web security threat prevention · CCS 2012

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

hidden markov model · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 Mining browsing behaviors for objectionable content filtering
abstract
This article explores users' browsing intents to predict the category of a user's next access during web surfing and applies the results to filter objectionable content, such as pornography, gambling, violence, and drugs. Users' access trails in terms of category sequences in click‐through data are employed to mine users' web browsing behaviors. Contextual relationships of URL categories are learned by the hidden Markov model. The top‐level domains (TLDs) extracted from URLs themselves and the corresponding categories are caught by the TLD model. Given a URL to be predicted, its TLD and current context are empirically combined in an aggregation model. In addition to the uses of the current context, the predictions of the URL accessed previously in different contexts by various users are also considered by majority rule to improve the aggregation model. Large‐scale experiments show that the advanced aggregation approach achieves promising performance while maintaining an acceptably low false positive rate. Different strategies are introduced to integrate the model with the blacklist it generates for filtering objectionable web pages without analyzing their content. In practice, this is complementary to the existing content analysis from users' behavioral perspectives.
Lung-Hao Lee, Yen-Cheng Juan, Wei-Lin Tseng, Hsin-Hsi Chen, Yuen-Hsien Tseng
J. Assoc. Inf. Sci. Technol.3
2012 Context-aware web security threat prevention
abstract
This paper studies the feasibility of an early warning system that prevents users from the dangerous situations they may fall into during web surfing. Our approach adopts behavioral Hidden Markov Models to explore collective intelligence embedded in users' browsing behaviors for context-aware category prediction, and applies the results to web security threat prevention. Large-scale experiments show that our proposed method performs accuracy 0.463 for predicting the fine-grained categories of users' next accesses. In real-life filtering simulations, our method can achieve macro-averaging blocking rate 0.4293 to find web security threats that cannot be detected by the existing security protection solutions at the early stage, while accomplishes a low macro-averaging over-blocking rate 0.0005 with the passage of time. In addition, behavioral HMM is able to alert users for avoiding security threats by 8.4 hours earlier than the current URL filtering engine does. Our simulations show that the shortening of this lag time is critical to avoid severe diffusions of security threats.
Lung-Hao Lee, Yen-Cheng Juan, Kuei-Ching Lee, Wei-Lin Tseng, Hsin-Hsi Chen, Yuen-Hsien Tseng
CCS4