The success of online social networks has attracted a constant interest in attacking and exploiting them. Attackers usually control malicious accounts, including both fake and compromised real user accounts, to launch attack campaigns such as social spam, malware distribution, and online rating distortion. To defend against these attacks, we design and implement a malicious account detection system called SynchroTrap. We observe that malicious accounts usually perform loosely synchronized actions in a variety of social network context. Our system clusters user accounts according to the similarity of their actions and uncovers large groups of malicious accounts that act similarly at around the same time for a sustained period of time. We implement SynchroTrap as an incremental processing system on Hadoop and Giraph so that it can process the massive user activity data in a large online social network efficiently. We have deployed our system in five applications at Facebook and Instagram. SynchroTrap was able to unveil more than two million malicious accounts and 1156 large attack campaigns within one month.

How can web services that depend on user generated content discern fraudulent input by spammers from legitimate input? In this paper we focus on the social network Facebook and the problem of discerning ill-gotten Page Likes, made by spammers hoping to turn a profit, from legitimate Page Likes. Our method, which we refer to as CopyCatch, detects lockstep Page Like patterns on Facebook by analyzing only the social graph between users and Pages and the times at which the edges in the graph (the Likes) were created. We offer the following contributions: (1) We give a novel problem formulation, with a simple concrete definition of suspicious behavior in terms of graph structure and edge constraints. (2) We offer two algorithms to find such suspicious lockstep behavior - one provably-convergent iterative algorithm and one approximate, scalable MapReduce implementation. (3) We show that our method severely limits "greedy attacks" and analyze the bounds from the application of the Zarankiewicz problem to our setting. Finally, we demonstrate and discuss the effectiveness of CopyCatch at Facebook and on synthetic data, as well as potential extensions to anomaly detection problems in other domains. CopyCatch is actively in use at Facebook, searching for attacks on Facebook's social graph of over a billion users, many millions of Pages, and billions of Page Likes.