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Dmitry Moor

dblp:143/0794 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-4658-3489ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Knowledge graphs · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.312018
Financing the Web of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions · WWW 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › truthful mechanism
VCG mechanism
0.312018
Financing the Web of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions · WWW 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
combinatorial auction
0.212016
Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods · IJCAI 2016
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › combinatorial auction
core-selecting payment rule
0.212016
Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods · IJCAI 2016
Knowledge graphs › semantic web
linked data
0.112018
Financing the Web of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions · WWW 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
mechanism design with uncertainty
0.112016
Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods · IJCAI 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

mechanism design · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Financing the Web of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions
abstract
The World Wide Web is a massive network of interlinked documents. One of the reasons the World Wide Web is so successful is the fact that most content is available free of any charge. Inspired by the success of the World Wide Web, the Web of Data applies the same strategy of interlinking to data. To this point, most of data in the Web of Data is also free of charge. The fact that the data is freely available raises the question of financing these services, however. As we will discuss in this paper, advertisement and donations cannot easily be applied to this new setting. To create incentives to subsidize data providers, we propose that sponsors should pay the providers to promote sponsored data. In return, sponsored data will be privileged over non-sponsored data. Since it is not possible to enforce a certain ordering on the data the user will receive, we propose to split up the data into different batches and deliver these batches with different delays. In this way, we can privilege sponsored data without withholding any non-sponsored data from the user. In this paper, we introduce a new concept of a delayed-answer auction, where sponsors can pay to prioritize their data. We introduce a new model which captures the particular situation when a user access data in the Web of Data. We show how the weighted Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction mechanism can be applied to our scenario and we discuss how certain parameters can influence the nature of our auction. With our new concept, we build a first step to a free yet financial sustainable Web of Data.
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
WWW3
2017 Challenges of Source Selection in the WoD
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
ISWC (1)3
2016 Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods
Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken, Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein
IJCAI1