Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Kristy Milland
dblp:161/3081
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 6
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
5 papers |
Collaborative and social computing · 75% Design research and methods · 9% Learning and educational technologies · 8% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computational finance and economics · 100% |
Topics — the 12 heaviest of 12, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Collaborative and social computing
crowdsourcing |
1.0 | 3 | 2020 | Creativity on Paid Crowdsourcing Platforms · CHI 2020 Crowd Guilds: Worker-led Reputation and Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · CSCW 2017 Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · UIST 2016 |
Collaborative and social computing › crowdsourcing
crowd work |
0.6 | 3 | 2018 | A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers' Earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk · CHI 2018 We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction in Collective Action for Crowd Workers · CHI 2015 Crowd Guilds: Worker-led Reputation and Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · CSCW 2017 |
Collaborative and social computing
creative work |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Creativity on Paid Crowdsourcing Platforms · CHI 2020 |
Design research and methods › product design
platform design |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers' Earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk · CHI 2018 |
Learning and educational technologies › educational assessment
peer assessment |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Crowd Guilds: Worker-led Reputation and Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · CSCW 2017 |
Ubiquitous computing and smart environments
incentive mechanism |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · UIST 2016 |
Collaborative and social computing › socio-technical systems
reputation systems |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · UIST 2016 |
Collaborative and social computing › civic engagement
collective action |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction in Collective Action for Crowd Workers · CHI 2015 |
Computational finance and economics › platform economics
online labor markets |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers' Earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk · CHI 2018 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
incentive compatibility |
0.1 | 1 | 2016 | Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms · UIST 2016 |
Collaborative and social computing
online communities |
0.1 | 1 | 2015 | We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction in Collective Action for Crowd Workers · CHI 2015 |
Collaborative and social computing › civic engagement
publics |
0.1 | 1 | 2015 | We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction in Collective Action for Crowd Workers · CHI 2015 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
field experiment · 0.8wage distribution analysis · 0.7task-level data analysis · 0.7game theory · 0.5questionnaire · 0.4quantitative analysis · 0.4qualitative analysis · 0.4double-blind peer assessment · 0.3platform design · 0.2ethnographic fieldwork · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Creativity on Paid Crowdsourcing PlatformsabstractCrowdsourcing platforms are increasingly being harnessed for creative work. The platforms' potential for creative work is clearly identified, but the workers' perspectives on such work have not been extensively documented. In this paper, we uncover what the workers have to say about creative work on paid crowdsourcing platforms. Through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of a questionnaire launched on two different crowdsourcing platforms, our results revealed clear differences between the workers on the platforms in both preferences and prior experience with creative work. We identify common pitfalls with creative work on crowdsourcing platforms, provide recommendations for requesters of creative work, and discuss the meaning of our findings within the broader scope of creativity-oriented research. To the best of our knowledge, we contribute the first extensive worker-oriented study of creative work on paid crowdsourcing platforms. Jonas Oppenlaender, Kristy Milland, Aku Visuri, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Simo Hosio |
CHI | 2 |
| 2019 | The Perpetual Work Life of Crowdworkers: How Tooling Practices Increase Fragmentation in CrowdworkabstractCrowdworkers regularly support their work with scripts, extensions, and software to enhance their productivity. Despite their evident significance, little is understood regarding how these tools affect crowdworkers' quality of life and work. In this study, we report findings from an interview study (N=21) aimed at exploring the tooling practices used by full-time crowdworkers on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our interview data suggests that the tooling utilized by crowdworkers (1) strongly contributes to the fragmentation of microwork by enabling task switching and multitasking behavior; (2) promotes the fragmentation of crowdworkers' work-life boundaries by relying on tooling that encourages a 'work-anywhere' attitude; and (3) aids the fragmentation of social ties within worker communities through limited tooling access. Our findings have implications for building systems that unify crowdworkers' work practice in support of their productivity and well-being. Alex C. Williams, Gloria Mark, Kristy Milland, Edward Lank, Edith Law |
Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact. | 3 |
| 2018 | A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers' Earnings on Amazon Mechanical TurkabstractA growing number of people are working as part of on-line crowd work. Crowd work is often thought to be low wage work. However, we know little about the wage distribution in practice and what causes low/high earnings in this setting. We recorded 2,676 workers performing 3.8 million tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our task-level analysis revealed that workers earned a median hourly wage of only ~$2/h, and only 4% earned more than $7.25/h. While the average requester pays more than $11/h, lower-paying requesters post much more work. Our wage calculations are influenced by how unpaid work is accounted for, e.g., time spent searching for tasks, working on tasks that are rejected, and working on tasks that are ultimately not submitted. We further explore the characteristics of tasks and working patterns that yield higher hourly wages. Our analysis informs platform design and worker tools to create a more positive future for crowd work. Kotaro Hara, Abi Adams, Kristy Milland, Saiph Savage, Chris Callison-Burch, Jeffrey P. Bigham |
CHI | 3 |
| 2017 | Crowd Guilds: Worker-led Reputation and Feedback on Crowdsourcing PlatformsabstractCrowd workers are distributed and decentralized. While decentralization is designed to utilize independent judgment to promote high-quality results, it paradoxically undercuts behaviors and institutions that are critical to high-quality work. Reputation is one central example: crowdsourcing systems depend on reputation scores from decentralized workers and requesters, but these scores are notoriously inflated and uninformative. In this paper, we draw inspiration from historical worker guilds (e.g., in the silk trade) to design and implement crowd guilds: centralized groups of crowd workers who collectively certify each other's quality through double-blind peer assessment. A two-week field experiment compared crowd guilds to a traditional decentralized crowd work model. Crowd guilds produced reputation signals more strongly correlated with ground-truth worker quality than signals available on current crowd working platforms, and more accurate than in the traditional model. Mark E. Whiting, Dilrukshi Gamage, Snehalkumar (Neil) S. Gaikwad, Aaron Gilbee, Shirish Goyal, Alipta Ballav, Dinesh Majeti, Nalin Chhibber, Angela Richmond-Fuller, Freddie Vargus, Tejas Sarma, Varshine Chandrakanthan, Teógenes Moura, Mohamed Hashim Salih, Gabriel B. T. Kalejaiye, Adam Ginzberg, Catherine A. Mullings, Yoni Dayan, Kristy Milland, Henrique Orefice, Jeff Regino, Sayna Parsi, Kunz Mainali, Vibhor Sehgal, Sekandar Matin, Akshansh Sinha, Rajan Vaish, Michael S. Bernstein |
CSCW | 19 |
| 2016 | Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing PlatformsabstractPaid crowdsourcing platforms suffer from low-quality work and unfair rejections, but paradoxically, most workers and requesters have high reputation scores. These inflated scores, which make high-quality work and workers difficult to find, stem from social pressure to avoid giving negative feedback. We introduce Boomerang, a reputation system for crowdsourcing platforms that elicits more accurate feedback by rebounding the consequences of feedback directly back onto the person who gave it. With Boomerang, requesters find that their highly-rated workers gain earliest access to their future tasks, and workers find tasks from their highly-rated requesters at the top of their task feed. Field experiments verify that Boomerang causes both workers and requesters to provide feedback that is more closely aligned with their private opinions. Inspired by a game-theoretic notion of incentive-compatibility, Boomerang opens opportunities for interaction design to incentivize honest reporting over strategic dishonesty. Snehalkumar (Neil) S. Gaikwad, Durim Morina, Adam Ginzberg, Catherine A. Mullings, Shirish Goyal, Dilrukshi Gamage, Christopher Diemert, Mathias Burton, Sharon Zhou, Mark E. Whiting, Karolina R. Ziulkoski, Alipta Ballav, Aaron Gilbee, Senadhipathige S. Niranga, Vibhor Sehgal, Jasmine Lin, Leonardy Kristianto, Angela Richmond-Fuller, Jeff Regino, Nalin Chhibber, Dinesh Majeti, Kamila Mananova, Dinesh Dhakal, William Dai, Victoria Purynova, Samarth Sandeep, Varshine Chandrakanthan, Tejas Sarma, Sekandar Matin, Ahmed Nasser, Rohit Nistala, Alexander Stolzoff, Kristy Milland, Vinayak Mathur, Rajan Vaish, Michael S. Bernstein |
UIST | 34 |
| 2015 | We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction in Collective Action for Crowd WorkersabstractBy lowering the costs of communication, the web promises to enable distributed collectives to act around shared issues. However, many collective action efforts never succeed: while the web's affordances make it easy to gather, these same decentralizing characteristics impede any focus towards action. In this paper, we study challenges to collective action efforts through the lens of online labor by engaging with Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Through a year of ethnographic fieldwork, we sought to understand online workers' unique barriers to collective action. We then created Dynamo, a platform to support the Mechanical Turk community in forming publics around issues and then mobilizing. We found that collective action publics tread a precariously narrow path between the twin perils of stalling and friction, balancing with each step between losing momentum and flaring into acrimony. However, specially structured labor to maintain efforts' forward motion can help such publics take action. Niloufar Salehi, Lilly Irani, Michael S. Bernstein, Ali Alkhatib, Eva Ogbe, Kristy Milland, Clickhappier |
CHI | 6 |