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Briland Hitaj

dblp:163/1902 · DBLP profile ↗
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11ranked-venue papers
2as first author
8since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0001-5925-3027ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 8 · 2 first-author · 5 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 48% Malware analysis · 19% Privacy and data protection · 17%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Efficient and distributed learning · 100%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
Do You Trust Your Model? Emerging Malware Threats in the Deep Learning Ecosystem · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2025
Network security
covert channel
0.812024
FedComm: Federated Learning as a Medium for Covert Communication · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
federated learning
0.812024
FedComm: Federated Learning as a Medium for Covert Communication · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning › collaborative learning
collaborative deep learning
0.312017
Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning · CCS 2017
Privacy and data protection
information leakage
0.312017
Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning · CCS 2017
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference
0.312017
Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning · CCS 2017
Security and privacy of machine learning
privacy attack
0.312017
Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning · CCS 2017
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning
0.312025
Do You Trust Your Model? Emerging Malware Threats in the Deep Learning Ecosystem · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2025
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning
federated learning privacy
0.212024
FedComm: Federated Learning as a Medium for Covert Communication · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

spread-spectrum channel coding · 1.7error correction · 1.7steganography · 0.8payload embedding · 0.8generative adversarial network · 0.3deep learning · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Do You Trust Your Model? Emerging Malware Threats in the Deep Learning Ecosystem
abstract
Training high-quality deep learning models is a challenging task due to computational and technical requirements. A growing number of individuals, institutions, and companies increasingly rely on pre-trained, third-party models made available in public repositories. These models are often used directly or integrated in product pipelines with no particular precautions, since they are effectively just data in tensor form and considered safe. In this paper, we raise awareness of a new machine learning supply chain threat targeting neural networks. We introduce MaleficNet 2.0, a novel technique to embed self-extracting, self-executing malware in neural networks. MaleficNet 2.0 uses spread-spectrum channel coding combined with error correction techniques to inject malicious payloads in the parameters of deep neural networks. MaleficNet 2.0 injection technique is stealthy, does not degrade the performance of the model, and is robust against removal techniques. We design our approach to work both in traditional and distributed learning settings such as Federated Learning, and demonstrate that it is effective even when a reduced number of bits is used for the model parameters. Finally, we implement a proof-of-concept self-extracting neural network malware using MaleficNet 2.0, demonstrating the practicality of the attack against a widely adopted machine learning framework. Our aim with this work is to raise awareness against these new, dangerous attacks both in the research community and industry, and we hope to encourage further research in mitigation techniques against such threats.
Dorjan Hitaj, Giulio Pagnotta, Fabio De Gaspari, Sediola Ruko, Briland Hitaj, Luigi V. Mancini, Fernando Pérez-Cruz
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.5
2024 TATTOOED: A Robust Deep Neural Network Watermarking Scheme based on Spread-Spectrum Channel Coding
abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) trained on proprietary company data offer a competitive edge for the owning entity. However, these models can be attractive to competitors (or malicious entities), who can copy or clone these proprietary DNN models to use them to their advantage. Since these attacks are hard to prevent, it becomes imperative to have mechanisms in place that enable an affected entity to verify the ownership of its DNN models with very high confidence. Watermarking of deep neural networks has gained significant traction in recent years, with numerous (watermarking) strategies being proposed as mechanisms that can help verify the ownership of a DNN in scenarios where these models are obtained without the owner’s permission. However, a growing body of work has demonstrated that existing watermarking mechanisms are highly susceptible to removal techniques, such as fine-tuning, parameter pruning, or shuffling.In this paper, we build upon extensive prior work on covert (military) communication and propose TATTOOED, a novel DNN watermarking technique that is robust to existing threats. We demonstrate that using TATTOOED as their watermarking mechanism, the DNN owner can successfully obtain the watermark and verify model ownership even in scenarios where 99% of model parameters are altered. Furthermore, we show that TATTOOED is easy to employ in training pipelines and has negligible impact on model performance.
Giulio Pagnotta, Dorjan Hitaj, Briland Hitaj, Fernando Pérez-Cruz, Luigi V. Mancini
ACSAC3
2024 FedComm: Federated Learning as a Medium for Covert Communication
abstract
Proposed as a solution to mitigate the privacy implications related to the adoption of deep learning, Federated Learning (FL) enables large numbers of participants to successfully train deep neural networks without revealing theactualprivate training data. To date, a substantial amount of research has investigated the security and privacy properties of FL, resulting in a plethora of innovative attack and defense strategies. This paper thoroughly investigates the communication capabilities of an FL scheme. In particular, we show that a party involved in the FL learning process can use FL as a covert communication medium to send an arbitrary message. We introduce FedComm, a novel covert-communication technique that enables robust sharing and transfer of targeted payloads within the FL framework. Our extensive theoretical and empirical evaluations show that FedComm provides a stealthy communication channel, with minimal disruptions to the training process. Our experiments show that FedComm successfully delivers 100% of a payload in the order of kilobits before the FL procedure converges. Our evaluation also shows that FedComm is independent of the application domain and the neural network architecture used by the underlying FL scheme.
Dorjan Hitaj, Giulio Pagnotta, Briland Hitaj, Fernando Pérez-Cruz, Luigi V. Mancini
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.3
2023 PassGPT: Password Modeling and (Guided) Generation with Large Language Models
Javier Rando, Fernando Pérez-Cruz, Briland Hitaj
ESORICS (4)3
2023 An Augmented MetiTarski Dataset for Real Quantifier Elimination Using Machine Learning
John Hester, Briland Hitaj, Grant Olney Passmore, Sam Owre, Natarajan Shankar, Eric Yeh
CICM2
2023 CoProver: A Recommender System for Proof Construction
Eric Yeh, Briland Hitaj, Sam Owre, Maena Quemener, Natarajan Shankar
CICM2
2023 Adversarial scratches: Deployable attacks to CNN classifiers
Loris Giulivi, Malhar Jere, Loris Rossi, Farinaz Koushanfar, Gabriela F. Ciocarlie, Briland Hitaj, Giacomo Boracchi
Pattern Recognit.6
2022 MaleficNet: Hiding Malware into Deep Neural Networks Using Spread-Spectrum Channel Coding
Dorjan Hitaj, Giulio Pagnotta, Briland Hitaj, Luigi V. Mancini, Fernando Pérez-Cruz
ESORICS (3)3
2019 PassGAN: A Deep Learning Approach for Password Guessing
Briland Hitaj, Paolo Gasti, Giuseppe Ateniese, Fernando Pérez-Cruz
ACNS1
2017 Deep Models Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collaborative Deep Learning
abstract
Deep Learning has recently become hugely popular in machine learning for its ability to solve end-to-end learning systems, in which the features and the classifiers are learned simultaneously, providing significant improvements in classification accuracy in the presence of highly-structured and large databases.
Briland Hitaj, Giuseppe Ateniese, Fernando Pérez-Cruz
CCS1
2015 No Place to Hide that Bytes Won't Reveal: Sniffing Location-Based Encrypted Traffic to Track a User's Position
Giuseppe Ateniese, Briland Hitaj, Luigi V. Mancini, Nino Vincenzo Verde, Antonio Villani
NSS2