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Michael A. Specter

dblp:169/8186 · DBLP profile ↗
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10ranked-venue papers
4as first author
8since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 8 · 4 first-author · 7 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
6 papers
Web and mobile security · 18% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 17% Network security · 16%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 12, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control › identity management
age verification
1.012026
Papers, Please: A First Look at Age Verification on the Web · SP 2026
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
electronic voting security
0.922021
Security Analysis of the Democracy Live Online Voting System · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections · USENIX Security Symposium 2020
Network security › traffic analysis
device fingerprinting
0.912025
Fingerprinting SDKs for Mobile Apps and Where to Find Them: Understanding the Market for Device Fingerprinting · CCS 2025
Web and mobile security
mobile application security
0.912025
Fingerprinting SDKs for Mobile Apps and Where to Find Them: Understanding the Market for Device Fingerprinting · CCS 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
digital signatures
0.512021
KeyForge: Non-Attributable Email from Forward-Forgeable Signatures · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Web and mobile security
web security
0.312026
Papers, Please: A First Look at Age Verification on the Web · SP 2026
Privacy and data protection
online tracking
0.312025
Fingerprinting SDKs for Mobile Apps and Where to Find Them: Understanding the Market for Device Fingerprinting · CCS 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
electronic voting
0.112021
Security Analysis of the Democracy Live Online Voting System · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Network security
email security
0.112021
KeyForge: Non-Attributable Email from Forward-Forgeable Signatures · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › blockchain applications
blockchain voting
0.112020
The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections · USENIX Security Symposium 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

survey · 1.0security analysis · 0.9static analysis · 0.9threat modeling · 0.5non-attributability · 0.5forward-forgeable signatures · 0.5reverse engineering · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Uncovering Relationships Between Android Developers, User Privacy, and Developer Willingness to Reduce Fingerprinting Risks
abstract
The major mobile platforms, Android and iOS, have introduced changes that restrict user tracking to improve user privacy, yet apps continue to covertly track users via device fingerprinting. We study the opportunity to improve this dynamic with a case study on mobile fingerprinting that evaluates developers’ perceptions of how well platforms protect user privacy and how developers perceive platform privacy interventions. Specifically, we study developers’ willingness to make changes to protect users from fingerprinting and how developers consider trade-offs between user privacy and developer effort. We do this via a survey of 246 Android developers, presented with a hypothetical Android change that protects users from fingerprinting at the cost of additional developer effort.
Alex Berke, Güliz Seray Tuncay, Michael A. Specter, Mihai Christodorescu
CHI3
2026 A Real-World Law-Enforcement Hack: The Case of Encrochat
Martin R. Albrecht, Sunoo Park, Michael A. Specter, Douglas Stebila
CRYPTO (10)3
2026 Papers, Please: A First Look at Age Verification on the Web
Shreyas Minocha, Isaac Sheridan, Harry Oppenheimer, Paul Pearce, Michael A. Specter
SP5
2026 SoK: Offline Finding Protocols for Lightweight Location Tracking
abstract
Offline finding (OF) protocols---such as Apple's Find My, Google's Find Hub, Samsung’s SmartThingsFind, and Tile---enable hundreds of millions of users to track their belongings via Bluetooth-based tracker tags. However, their scale and tracking capabilities give rise to privacy risks for tag owners and bystanders, as well as safety risks for victims of tag-facilitated stalking. In response, academics and practitioners have suggested cryptographic and non-cryptographic mitigations to improve privacy and anti-stalking protections, working to navigate complex and subtle tensions between these goals. The result is a large landscape of privacy goals, threat models, protocol designs, implementations, and analyses. In this work, we systematize the OF protocol landscape. We gather and analyze a corpus of 49 research papers and OF protocol technical specifications, and use it to develop a taxonomy capturing the functionality, security, and privacy goals of OF protocols. We use the taxonomy to guide a focused assessment of the four major OF deployments along with six academic constructions, comparing design choices, consolidating known attacks, and analyzing the designs' trade-offs between privacy, security, abusability, and efficiency. We provide a simple OF protocol that achieves most security goals, and which clarifies the essential cryptographic components underlying OF protocols. We also provide a survey of physical layer attacks and usability issues that undermine protections in practice. Finally, we discuss open problems and potential research directions towards secure, interoperable, and abuse-resistant OF systems.
Akshaya Kumar, Carolina Ortega Pérez, Joseph Jaeger, Thomas Ristenpart, Michael A. Specter
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.5
2025 Fingerprinting SDKs for Mobile Apps and Where to Find Them: Understanding the Market for Device Fingerprinting
abstract
This paper presents a large-scale analysis of fingerprinting-like behavior in the mobile application ecosystem. We take a market-based approach, focusing on third-party tracking as enabled by applications' common use of third-party SDKs. Our dataset consists of over 228,000 SDKs from popular Maven repositories, 178,000 Android applications collected from the Google Play store, and our static analysis pipeline detects exfiltration of over 500 individual signals. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the largest-scale analysis of SDK behavior undertaken to date.
Michael A. Specter, Mihai Christodorescu, Abbie Farr, Bo Ma 0013, Robin Lassonde
CCS1
2024 Cryptography in the Wild: An Empirical Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Cryptographic Libraries
abstract
The security of the Internet and numerous other applications rests on a small number of open-source cryptographic libraries: A vulnerability in any one of them threatens to compromise a significant percentage of web traffic. Despite this potential for security impact, the characteristics and causes of vulnerabilities in cryptographic software are not well understood. In this work, we conduct the first systematic, longitudinal analysis of cryptographic libraries and the vulnerabilities they produce. We collect data from the National Vulnerability Database, individual project repositories and mailing lists, and other relevant sources for all widely used cryptographic libraries.
Jenny Blessing, Michael A. Specter, Daniel J. Weitzner
AsiaCCS2
2021 Security Analysis of the Democracy Live Online Voting System
Michael A. Specter, J. Alex Halderman
USENIX Security Symposium1
2021 KeyForge: Non-Attributable Email from Forward-Forgeable Signatures
Michael A. Specter, Sunoo Park, Matthew Green 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1
2020 The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections
Michael A. Specter, James Koppel, Daniel J. Weitzner
USENIX Security Symposium1
2018 Explaining Explanations: An Overview of Interpretability of Machine Learning
abstract
There has recently been a surge of work in explanatory artificial intelligence (XAI). This research area tackles the important problem that complex machines and algorithms often cannot provide insights into their behavior and thought processes. XAI allows users and parts of the internal system to be more transparent, providing explanations of their decisions in some level of detail. These explanations are important to ensure algorithmic fairness, identify potential bias/problems in the training data, and to ensure that the algorithms perform as expected. However, explanations produced by these systems is neither standardized nor systematically assessed. In an effort to create best practices and identify open challenges, we describe foundational concepts of explainability and show how they can be used to classify existing literature. We discuss why current approaches to explanatory methods especially for deep neural networks are insufficient. Finally, based on our survey, we conclude with suggested future research directions for explanatory artificial intelligence.
Leilani H. Gilpin, David Bau, Ben Z. Yuan, Ayesha Bajwa, Michael A. Specter, Lalana Kagal
DSAA5