Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Nicolas Lidzborski
dblp:169/8817
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 75% Authentication and access control · 25% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network measurement and analytics · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Authentication and access control › authentication
email authentication |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM...: An Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery Security · Internet Measurement Conference 2015 |
Network security
email security |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM...: An Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery Security · Internet Measurement Conference 2015 |
Network security
protocol state fuzzing |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM...: An Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery Security · Internet Measurement Conference 2015 |
Network security
traffic analysis |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM...: An Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery Security · Internet Measurement Conference 2015 |
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
internet-wide measurement |
0.1 | 1 | 2015 | Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM...: An Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery Security · Internet Measurement Conference 2015 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Neither Snow Nor Rain Nor MITM...: An Empirical Analysis of Email Delivery SecurityabstractThe SMTP protocol is responsible for carrying some of users' most intimate communication, but like other Internet protocols, authentication and confidentiality were added only as an afterthought. In this work, we present the first report on global adoption rates of SMTP security extensions, including: STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. We present data from two perspectives: SMTP server configurations for the Alexa Top Million domains, and over a year of SMTP connections to and from Gmail. We find that the top mail providers (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo, and Outlook) all proactively encrypt and authenticate messages. However, these best practices have yet to reach widespread adoption in a long tail of over 700,000 SMTP servers, of which only 35% successfully configure encryption, and 1.1% specify a DMARC authentication policy. This security patchwork---paired with SMTP policies that favor failing open to allow gradual deployment---exposes users to attackers who downgrade TLS connections in favor of cleartext and who falsify MX records to reroute messages. We present evidence of such attacks in the wild, highlighting seven countries where more than 20% of inbound Gmail messages arrive in cleartext due to network attackers. Zakir Durumeric, David Adrian, Ariana Mirian, James Kasten, Elie Bursztein, Nicolas Lidzborski, Kurt Thomas, Vijay Eranti, Michael D. Bailey, J. Alex Halderman |
Internet Measurement Conference | 6 |