Online scams continue to cause substantial financial and personal harm. As a result, detection systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have been integrated into security products ranging from email gateways and browser extensions to fraud-monitoring dashboards. As this adoption accelerates, a common belief has taken hold: that these models are broadly suitable for scam detection. In this work, we investigate whether LLMs, with their strong capabilities in understanding intent, context, and reasoning, can effectively detect scams across diverse scenarios without task-specific fine-tuning. We curate and release a unique benchmark dataset of real-world scams spanning multiple formats and topics. We evaluate nine LLMs of varying sizes and architectures, examining their performance under different prompting strategies and comparing them to a fine-tuned BERT-based classifier. Our results show that while larger LLMs generally outperform smaller ones, effective prompting substantially boosts the performance of smaller models. Moreover, LLMs are better at generalizing to unseen scams compared to fine-tuned models, suggesting that pre-trained knowledge contributes meaningfully to scam detection. We release our dataset and evaluation framework to facilitate future research in robust scam detection using language models.

The human visual system evolved in environments with statistical regularities. Binocular vision is adapted to these such that depth perception and eye movements are more precise, faster, and performed comfortably in environments consistent with the regularities. We measured the statistics of eye movements and binocular disparities in virtual-reality (VR) - gaming environments and found that they are quite different from those in the natural environment. Fixation distance and direction are more restricted in VR, and fixation distance is farther. The pattern of disparity across the visual field is less regular in VR and does not conform to a prominent property of naturally occurring disparities. From this we predict that double vision is more likely in VR than in the natural environment. We also determined the optimal screen distance to minimize discomfort due to the vergence-accommodation conflict, and the optimal nasal-temporal positioning of head-mounted display (HMD) screens to maximize binocular field of view. Finally, in a user study we investigated how VR content affects comfort and performance. Content that is more consistent with the statistics of the natural world yields less discomfort than content that is not. Furthermore, consistent content yields slightly better performance than inconsistent content.

Crowd workers are distributed and decentralized. While decentralization is designed to utilize independent judgment to promote high-quality results, it paradoxically undercuts behaviors and institutions that are critical to high-quality work. Reputation is one central example: crowdsourcing systems depend on reputation scores from decentralized workers and requesters, but these scores are notoriously inflated and uninformative. In this paper, we draw inspiration from historical worker guilds (e.g., in the silk trade) to design and implement crowd guilds: centralized groups of crowd workers who collectively certify each other's quality through double-blind peer assessment. A two-week field experiment compared crowd guilds to a traditional decentralized crowd work model. Crowd guilds produced reputation signals more strongly correlated with ground-truth worker quality than signals available on current crowd working platforms, and more accurate than in the traditional model.

Paid crowdsourcing platforms suffer from low-quality work and unfair rejections, but paradoxically, most workers and requesters have high reputation scores. These inflated scores, which make high-quality work and workers difficult to find, stem from social pressure to avoid giving negative feedback. We introduce Boomerang, a reputation system for crowdsourcing platforms that elicits more accurate feedback by rebounding the consequences of feedback directly back onto the person who gave it. With Boomerang, requesters find that their highly-rated workers gain earliest access to their future tasks, and workers find tasks from their highly-rated requesters at the top of their task feed. Field experiments verify that Boomerang causes both workers and requesters to provide feedback that is more closely aligned with their private opinions. Inspired by a game-theoretic notion of incentive-compatibility, Boomerang opens opportunities for interaction design to incentivize honest reporting over strategic dishonesty.