Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Aqib Nisar
dblp:172/9088
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 2 · 2 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 77% Privacy and data protection · 23% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network measurement and analytics · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
censorship measurement |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention · SIGCOMM 2018 |
Network security › anonymity networks
censorship circumvention |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention · SIGCOMM 2018 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy compliance › consent
user consent |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention · SIGCOMM 2018 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
page load time optimization · 0.7crowdsourcing · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumventionabstractWe present C-Saw, a system that measures Internet censorship by offering data-driven censorship circumvention to users. The adaptive circumvention capability of C-Saw incentivizes users to opt-in by offering small page load times (PLTs). As users crowdsource, the measurement data gets richer, offering greater insights into censorship mechanisms over a wider region, and in turn leading to even better circumvention capabilities. C-Saw incorporates user consent in its design by measuring only those URLs that a user actually visits. Using a cross-platform implementation of C-Saw, we show that it is effective at collecting and disseminating censorship measurements, selecting circumvention approaches, and optimizing user experience. C-Saw improves the average PLT by up to 48% and 63% over Lantern and Tor, respectively. We demonstrate the feasibility of a large-scale deployment of C-Saw with a pilot study. Aqib Nisar, Aqsa Kashaf, Ihsan Ayyub Qazi, Zartash Afzal Uzmi |
SIGCOMM | 1 |
| 2015 | A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with CircumventionabstractExisting research on Internet censorship primarily focuses on either measurements or circumvention. Considering these two in isolation often leads to designs with limited capabilities: Circumvention is not driven by measurement data and end users find little incentive to help gather such data. We present the preliminary design and implementation of C-Saw, a platform that offers both. The circumvention capability of C-Saw incentivizes consumers to opt-in. As more and more consumers crowdsource, the monitoring data gets richer. This, in turn, offers greater insights into the censorship mechanisms over a wider region, offering even better circumvention capabilities. C-Saw is a browser-based platform set up as a lightweight client-side proxy. C-Saw adapts its circumvention approach to the particular censorship mechanism deployed by a user's ISP, achieving a better balance of circumvention effectiveness and performance. In addition, it can also leverage the heterogeneity in filtering mechanisms across ISPs to achieve better circumvention performance. We demonstrate this using page load times across various ISPs and locations in a censored region. Unlike previous measurement approaches, C-Saw does not require the knowledge of a target URL to be tested. In fact, as URLs get blocked, their information can be monitored in real time. Aqib Nisar, Aqsa Kashaf, Zartash Afzal Uzmi, Ihsan Ayyub Qazi |
HotNets | 1 |