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Aqib Nisar

dblp:172/9088 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 77% Privacy and data protection · 23%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network measurement and analytics · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
censorship measurement
0.312018
Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention · SIGCOMM 2018
Network security › anonymity networks
censorship circumvention
0.312018
Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention · SIGCOMM 2018
Privacy and data protection › privacy compliance › consent
user consent
0.112018
Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention · SIGCOMM 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

page load time optimization · 0.7crowdsourcing · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Incentivizing censorship measurements via circumvention
abstract
We present C-Saw, a system that measures Internet censorship by offering data-driven censorship circumvention to users. The adaptive circumvention capability of C-Saw incentivizes users to opt-in by offering small page load times (PLTs). As users crowdsource, the measurement data gets richer, offering greater insights into censorship mechanisms over a wider region, and in turn leading to even better circumvention capabilities. C-Saw incorporates user consent in its design by measuring only those URLs that a user actually visits. Using a cross-platform implementation of C-Saw, we show that it is effective at collecting and disseminating censorship measurements, selecting circumvention approaches, and optimizing user experience. C-Saw improves the average PLT by up to 48% and 63% over Lantern and Tor, respectively. We demonstrate the feasibility of a large-scale deployment of C-Saw with a pilot study.
Aqib Nisar, Aqsa Kashaf, Ihsan Ayyub Qazi, Zartash Afzal Uzmi
SIGCOMM1
2015 A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with Circumvention
abstract
Existing research on Internet censorship primarily focuses on either measurements or circumvention. Considering these two in isolation often leads to designs with limited capabilities: Circumvention is not driven by measurement data and end users find little incentive to help gather such data. We present the preliminary design and implementation of C-Saw, a platform that offers both. The circumvention capability of C-Saw incentivizes consumers to opt-in. As more and more consumers crowdsource, the monitoring data gets richer. This, in turn, offers greater insights into the censorship mechanisms over a wider region, offering even better circumvention capabilities. C-Saw is a browser-based platform set up as a lightweight client-side proxy. C-Saw adapts its circumvention approach to the particular censorship mechanism deployed by a user's ISP, achieving a better balance of circumvention effectiveness and performance. In addition, it can also leverage the heterogeneity in filtering mechanisms across ISPs to achieve better circumvention performance. We demonstrate this using page load times across various ISPs and locations in a censored region. Unlike previous measurement approaches, C-Saw does not require the knowledge of a target URL to be tested. In fact, as URLs get blocked, their information can be monitored in real time.
Aqib Nisar, Aqsa Kashaf, Zartash Afzal Uzmi, Ihsan Ayyub Qazi
HotNets1