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Dominik Hartmann

dblp:176/5361 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
1as first author
5since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-0379-7903ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 7 · 1 first-author · 5 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
4 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 65% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 35%

Topics — the 13 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography › public-key encryption
multi-recipient encryption
0.712023
Post-Quantum Multi-Recipient Public Key Encryption · CCS 2023
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
post-quantum cryptography
0.712023
Post-Quantum Multi-Recipient Public Key Encryption · CCS 2023
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
public-key encryption
0.712023
Post-Quantum Multi-Recipient Public Key Encryption · CCS 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
communication complexity
0.612022
Server-Aided Continuous Group Key Agreement · CCS 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › group key agreement
continuous group key agreement
0.612022
Server-Aided Continuous Group Key Agreement · CCS 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging
end-to-end encryption
0.612022
Server-Aided Continuous Group Key Agreement · CCS 2022
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography
key encapsulation mechanism
0.612022
Group Action Key Encapsulation and Non-Interactive Key Exchange in the QROM · ASIACRYPT (2) 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key exchange
0.612022
Group Action Key Encapsulation and Non-Interactive Key Exchange in the QROM · ASIACRYPT (2) 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange
non-interactive key exchange
0.612022
Group Action Key Encapsulation and Non-Interactive Key Exchange in the QROM · ASIACRYPT (2) 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging
secure group messaging
0.612022
Server-Aided Continuous Group Key Agreement · CCS 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
0.412020
Shorter Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments and ZAPs for Algebraic Languages · CRYPTO (3) 2020
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs › non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
zaps
0.412020
Shorter Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments and ZAPs for Algebraic Languages · CRYPTO (3) 2020
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.412020
Shorter Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments and ZAPs for Algebraic Languages · CRYPTO (3) 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

post-quantum construction · 0.7server-aided protocol design · 0.6quantum random oracle model · 0.6group actions · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Post-Quantum Multi-Recipient Public Key Encryption
abstract
A multi-message multi-recipient PKE (mmPKE) encrypts a batch of messages, in one go, to a corresponding set of independently chosen receiver public keys. The resulting ''multi-recipient ciphertext'' can be then be reduced (by any 3rd party) to a shorter, receiver specific, ''invidual ciphertext.'' Finally, to recover the i-th message in the batch from their indvidual ciphertext the i-th receiver only needs their own decryption key. A special case of mmPKE is multi-recipient PKE (mPKE) where all receivers are sent the same message. By treating (m)mPKE and their KEM counterparts as a stand-alone primitives we allow for more efficient constructions than trivially composing individual PKE/KEM instances. This is especially valuable in the post-quantum setting, where PKE/KEM ciphertexts and public keys tend to be far larger than their classic counterparts.
Joël Alwen, Dominik Hartmann, Eike Kiltz, Marta Mularczyk, Peter Schwabe
CCS2
2023 Limits in the Provable Security of ECDSA Signatures
Dominik Hartmann, Eike Kiltz
TCC (4)1
2022 Group Action Key Encapsulation and Non-Interactive Key Exchange in the QROM
Julien Duman, Dominik Hartmann, Eike Kiltz, Sabrina Kunzweiler, Jonas Meers, Doreen Riepel
ASIACRYPT (2)2
2022 Server-Aided Continuous Group Key Agreement
abstract
Continuous Group Key Agreement (CGKA) -- or Group Ratcheting -- lies at the heart of a new generation of scalable End-to-End secure (E2E) cryptographic multi-party applications. One of the most important (and first deployed) CGKAs is ITK which underpins the IETF's upcoming Messaging Layer Security E2E secure group messaging standard. To scale beyond the group sizes possible with earlier E2E protocols, a central focus of CGKA protocol design is to minimize bandwidth requirements (i.e. communication complexity).
Joël Alwen, Dominik Hartmann, Eike Kiltz, Marta Mularczyk
CCS2
2021 On the Impossibility of Purely Algebraic Signatures
Nico Döttling, Dominik Hartmann, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, Sven Schäge, Bogdan Ursu
TCC (3)2
2020 Shorter Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments and ZAPs for Algebraic Languages
Geoffroy Couteau, Dominik Hartmann
CRYPTO (3)2
2017 Practical and Robust Secure Logging from Fault-Tolerant Sequential Aggregate Signatures
Gunnar Hartung, Björn Kaidel, Alexander Koch 0001, Jessica Koch, Dominik Hartmann
ProvSec5