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Jeremiah Onaolapo

dblp:178/1987 · DBLP profile ↗
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6ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0003-1162-4110ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Web and mobile security · 54% Systems and software security · 18% Privacy and data protection · 12%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Web and social media mining · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › online fraud
account takeover
0.822021
SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
What Happens After You Are Pwnd: Understanding the Use of Leaked Webmail Credentials in the Wild · Internet Measurement Conference 2016
Web and social media mining › social media analysis
social media measurement
0.312017
What's in a Name?: Understanding Profile Name Reuse on Twitter · WWW 2017
Systems and software security
credential leakage
0.212016
What Happens After You Are Pwnd: Understanding the Use of Leaked Webmail Credentials in the Wild · Internet Measurement Conference 2016
Usable security
user behavior
0.112021
SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Network security
traffic analysis
0.112016
What Happens After You Are Pwnd: Understanding the Use of Leaked Webmail Credentials in the Wild · Internet Measurement Conference 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

statistical correction · 1.1interview study · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Stick It to The Man: Correcting for Non-Cooperative Behavior of Subjects in Experiments on Social Networks
Kaleigh Clary, Emma Tosch, Jeremiah Onaolapo, David D. Jensen
USENIX Security Symposium3
2021 SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts
Jeremiah Onaolapo, Nektarios Leontiadis, Despoina Magka, Gianluca Stringhini
USENIX Security Symposium1
2017 Kek, Cucks, and God Emperor Trump: A Measurement Study of 4chan's Politically Incorrect Forum and Its Effects on the Web
Gabriel Emile Hine, Jeremiah Onaolapo, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nicolas Kourtellis, Ilias Leontiadis, Riginos Samaras, Gianluca Stringhini, Jeremy Blackburn
ICWSM2
2017 What's in a Name?: Understanding Profile Name Reuse on Twitter
abstract
Users on Twitter are commonly identified by their profile names. These names are used when directly addressing users on Twitter, are part of their profile page URLs, and can become a trademark for popular accounts, with people referring to celebrities by their real name and their profile name, interchangeably. Twitter, however, has chosen to not permanently link profile names to their corresponding user accounts. In fact, Twitter allows users to change their profile name, and afterwards makes the old profile names available for other users to take.
Enrico Mariconti, Jeremiah Onaolapo, Syed Sharique Ahmad, Nicolas Nikiforou, Manuel Egele, Nick Nikiforakis, Gianluca Stringhini
WWW2
2016 What's Your Major Threat? On the Differences between the Network Behavior of Targeted and Commodity Malware
abstract
This work uses statistical classification techniques to learn about the different network behavior patterns demonstrated by targeted malware and generic malware. Targeted malware is a recent type of threat, involving bespoke software that has been created to target a specific victim. It is considered a more dangerous threat than generic malware, because a targeted attack can cause more serious damage to the victim. Our work aims to automatically distinguish between the network activity generated by the two types of malware, which then allows samples of malware to be classified as being either targeted or generic. For a network administrator, such knowledge can be important because it assists to understand which threats require particular attention. Because a network administrator usually manages more than an alarm simultaneously, the aim of the work is particularly relevant. We set up a sandbox and infected virtual machines with malware, recording all resulting malware activity on the network. Using the network packets produced by the malware samples, we extract features to classify their behavior. Before performing classification, we carefully analyze the features and the dataset to study all their details and gain a deeper understanding of the malware under study. Our use of statistical classifiers is shown to give excellent results in some cases, where we achieved an accuracy of almost 96% in distinguishing between the two types of malware. We can conclude that the network behaviors of the two types of malicious code are very different.
Enrico Mariconti, Jeremiah Onaolapo, Gordon J. Ross, Gianluca Stringhini
ARES2
2016 What Happens After You Are Pwnd: Understanding the Use of Leaked Webmail Credentials in the Wild
Jeremiah Onaolapo, Enrico Mariconti, Gianluca Stringhini
Internet Measurement Conference1