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Vadim Levit 0001

dblp:181/2457 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 5 · 3 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
3 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Artificial intelligence
3 papers
Multi-agent systems · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Energy systems and smart grids · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
distributed constraint optimization
0.412019
Privacy preserving region optimal algorithms for symmetric and asymmetric DCOPs · Artif. Intell. 2019
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
equilibrium computation
0.312018
Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game · Artif. Intell. 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game
public goods game
0.312018
Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game · Artif. Intell. 2018
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › game theory
boolean games
0.212015
Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games · IJCAI 2015
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
incentive mechanism
0.212015
Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games · IJCAI 2015
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
congestion games
0.212014
Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium
0.212014
Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game
potential game
0.212014
Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014
Energy systems and smart grids
electric vehicle charging
0.112014
Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014
Energy systems and smart grids › electric vehicle charging
vehicle-to-grid
0.112014
Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

incentive-based search · 0.7best-response dynamics · 0.2best response dynamics · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Privacy preserving region optimal algorithms for symmetric and asymmetric DCOPs
Tal Grinshpoun, Tamir Tassa, Vadim Levit 0001, Roie Zivan
Artif. Intell.3
2018 Distributed Constrained Search by Selfish Agents for Efficient Equilibria
Vadim Levit 0001, Amnon Meisels
CP1
2018 Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game
Vadim Levit 0001, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels
Artif. Intell.1
2015 Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games
Vadim Levit 0001, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels
IJCAI1
2014 Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging
abstract
A model of the problem of charging and discharging electrical vehicles as a congestion game is presented. A generalization of congestion games - feedback congestion games (FCG) - is introduced. The charging of grid-integrated vehicles, which can also discharge energy back to the grid, is a natural FCG application. FCGs are proven to be exact potential games and therefore converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by an iterated better-response process. A compact representation and an algorithm that enable efficient best-response search are presented. A detailed empirical evaluation assesses the performance of the iterated best-response process. The evaluation considers the quality of the resulting solutions and the rate of convergence to a stable state. The effect of allowing to also discharge batteries using FCG is compared to scenarios that only include charging and is found to dramatically improve the predictability of the achieved solutions as well as the balancing of load.
Benny Lutati, Vadim Levit 0001, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels
AAAI2