Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Vadim Levit 0001
dblp:181/2457
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 5 · 3 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Multi-agent systems · 100% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Energy systems and smart grids · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Privacy and data protection · 100% |
Topics — the 10 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
distributed constraint optimization |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Privacy preserving region optimal algorithms for symmetric and asymmetric DCOPs · Artif. Intell. 2019 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
equilibrium computation |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game · Artif. Intell. 2018 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game
public goods game |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game · Artif. Intell. 2018 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › game theory
boolean games |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games · IJCAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
incentive mechanism |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games · IJCAI 2015 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
congestion games |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game
potential game |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014 |
Energy systems and smart grids
electric vehicle charging |
0.1 | 1 | 2014 | Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014 |
Energy systems and smart grids › electric vehicle charging
vehicle-to-grid |
0.1 | 1 | 2014 | Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV Charging · AAAI 2014 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
incentive-based search · 0.7best-response dynamics · 0.2best response dynamics · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Privacy preserving region optimal algorithms for symmetric and asymmetric DCOPs
Tal Grinshpoun, Tamir Tassa, Vadim Levit 0001, Roie Zivan |
Artif. Intell. | 3 |
| 2018 | Distributed Constrained Search by Selfish Agents for Efficient Equilibria
Vadim Levit 0001, Amnon Meisels |
CP | 1 |
| 2018 | Incentive-based search for efficient equilibria of the public goods game
Vadim Levit 0001, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels |
Artif. Intell. | 1 |
| 2015 | Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games
Vadim Levit 0001, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 2014 | Congestion Games for V2G-Enabled EV ChargingabstractA model of the problem of charging and discharging electrical vehicles as a congestion game is presented. A generalization of congestion games - feedback congestion games (FCG) - is introduced. The charging of grid-integrated vehicles, which can also discharge energy back to the grid, is a natural FCG application. FCGs are proven to be exact potential games and therefore converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by an iterated better-response process. A compact representation and an algorithm that enable efficient best-response search are presented. A detailed empirical evaluation assesses the performance of the iterated best-response process. The evaluation considers the quality of the resulting solutions and the rate of convergence to a stable state. The effect of allowing to also discharge batteries using FCG is compared to scenarios that only include charging and is found to dramatically improve the predictability of the achieved solutions as well as the balancing of load. Benny Lutati, Vadim Levit 0001, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels |
AAAI | 2 |