What happens when generative machine learning models are pretrained on web-scale datasets containing data generated by earlier models? Some prior work warns of “model collapse” as the web is overwhelmed by synthetic data; other work suggests the problem can be contained (i.e. collapse can be avoided) by managing how available data are used in pretraining. In this paper, we report experiments on three ways of using data (training-workflows), across three generative model task-settings (multivariate Gaussian estimation, kernel density estimation, and language-model fine-tuning) to further confirm the possibility of containment: (a) we confirm that the training-workflow of {\it replacing} all real data by successive generations of purely synthetic data indeed suffers model collapse in all task-settings studied; (b) we consider the training-workflow of {\it accumulating} synthetic data alongside real data and training on all data combined and confirming that, although the proportion of real data eventually becomes zero, models remain stable and their test losses do not diverge under this training-workflow; (c) we consider a training-workflow where real and synthetic data accumulate together but successive generations of pretraining are constrained to use fixed-size data subsets each generation. In this workflow, we observe slow and gradual rather than explosive degradation of test loss performance across generations. Our insights are particularly important when forecasting whether future frontier generative models will collapse or thrive, and our results open avenues for empirically and mathematically studying the context-dependent value of synthetic data.

Science progresses by iteratively advancing and correcting humanity's understanding of the world. In machine learning (ML) research, rapid advancements have led to an explosion of publications, but have also led to misleading, incorrect, flawed or perhaps even fraudulent studies being accepted and sometimes highlighted at ML conferences due to the fallibility of peer review. While such mistakes are understandable, ML conferences do not offer robust processes to help the field systematically correct when such errors are made.This position paper argues that ML conferences should establish a dedicated "Refutations and Critiques" (R&C) Track. This R&C Track would provide a high-profile, reputable platform to support vital research that critically challenges prior research, thereby fostering a dynamic self-correcting research ecosystem.We discuss key considerations including track design, review principles, potential pitfalls, and provide an illustrative example submission concerning a recent ICLR 2025 Oral.We conclude that ML conferences should create official, reputable mechanisms to help ML research self-correct.

Omar Shaikh, Kristina Gligoric, Ashna Khetan, Matthias Gerstgrasser, Diyi Yang, Dan Jurafsky. Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2024.

Stackelberg equilibria arise naturally in a range of popular learning problems, such as in security games or indirect mechanism design, and have received increasing attention in the reinforcement learning literature. We present a general framework for implementing Stackelberg equilibria search as a multi-agent RL problem, allowing a wide range of algorithmic design choices. We discuss how previous approaches can be seen as specific instantiations of this framework. As a key insight, we note that the design space allows for approaches not previously seen in the literature, for instance by leveraging multitask and meta-RL techniques for follower convergence. We propose one such approach using contextual policies, and evaluate it experimentally on both standard and novel benchmark domains, showing greatly improved sample efficiency compared to previous approaches. Finally, we explore the effect of adopting algorithm designs outside the borders of our framework.

We present a novel multi-agent RL approach, Selective Multi-Agent Prioritized Experience Relay, in which agents share with other agents a limited number of transitions they observe during training. The intuition behind this is that even a small number of relevant experiences from other agents could help each agent learn. Unlike many other multi-agent RL algorithms, this approach allows for largely decentralized training, requiring only a limited communication channel between agents. We show that our approach outperforms baseline no-sharing decentralized training and state-of-the art multi-agent RL algorithms. Further, sharing only a small number of highly relevant experiences outperforms sharing all experiences between agents, and the performance uplift from selective experience sharing is robust across a range of hyperparameters and DQN variants.

We introduce the use of reinforcement learning for indirect mechanisms, working with the existing class of sequential price mechanisms, which generalizes both serial dictatorship and posted price mechanisms and essentially characterizes all strongly obviously strategyproof mechanisms. Learning an optimal mechanism within this class forms a partially-observable Markov decision process. We provide rigorous conditions for when this class of mechanisms is more powerful than simpler static mechanisms, for sufficiency or insufficiency of observation statistics for learning, and for the necessity of complex (deep) policies. We show that our approach can learn optimal or near-optimal mechanisms in several experimental settings.

We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific class of valuations that are increasing and submodular.Furthermore, we present some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1 − e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting.