Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jan Pennekamp
dblp:182/4743
· DBLP profile ↗
41ranked-venue papers
9as first author
28since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0003-0398-6904ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 14 · 2 first-author · 9 since 2021Computer networks · 10 · 2 first-author · 4 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 7 · 1 first-author · 7 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
12 papers |
Network security · 62% Privacy and data protection · 8% Digital forensics and information hiding · 7% | |
| Computer networks
4 papers |
Internet architecture and protocols · 42% Network measurement and analytics · 21% Internet of things and sensor networks · 18% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
2 papers |
Computational social science and digital humanities · 60% Smart cities and intelligent transportation · 40% |
Topics — the 22 heaviest of 26, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security
anonymity networks |
1.8 | 6 | 2021 | TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting · CCS 2020 Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing · ICNP 2019 Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments · ICNP 2019 |
Network security
traffic analysis |
1.6 | 4 | 2021 | POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of Webpages · CCS 2021 TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting · CCS 2020 POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting · CCS 2019 |
Network security › traffic analysis
website fingerprinting |
1.6 | 4 | 2021 | POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of Webpages · CCS 2021 TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting · CCS 2020 POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting · CCS 2019 |
Privacy and data protection
information disclosure |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints · SP 2026 |
Digital forensics and information hiding
information hiding |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints · SP 2026 |
Network security › anonymity networks
tor |
1.0 | 3 | 2021 | TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting · CCS 2020 POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting · CCS 2019 POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of Webpages · CCS 2021 |
Internet architecture and protocols
domain name system |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Poster: Transport Security Orchestration Using DNS · ICNP 2025 |
Malware analysis › ransomware
ransomware detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Detecting Ransomware Despite I/O Overhead: A Practical Multi-Staged Approach · NDSS 2025 |
Network security › secure communication › secure communication protocol
TLS |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Poster: Transport Security Orchestration Using DNS · ICNP 2025 |
Network security › traffic analysis
website fingerprinting defense |
0.8 | 2 | 2020 | TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting · CCS 2020 POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting · CCS 2019 |
Network security › anonymity networks
onion routing |
0.8 | 2 | 2019 | Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing · ICNP 2019 Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments · ICNP 2019 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
blockchain applications |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Poster: Accountable Processing of Reported Street Problems · CCS 2023 |
Network measurement and analytics › active measurement
internet-wide scanning |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments · Internet Measurement Conference 2020 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
industrial control system security |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments · Internet Measurement Conference 2020 |
Internet of things and sensor networks
iot security |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments · ICNP 2019 |
Routing and switching
multipath routing |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing · ICNP 2019 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
oblivious transfer |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Privacy-Preserving Remote Knowledge System · ICNP 2019 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
private set intersection |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Privacy-Preserving Remote Knowledge System · ICNP 2019 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher
lightweight block cipher |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Poster: Transport Security Orchestration Using DNS · ICNP 2025 |
Storage systems
storage reliability |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Detecting Ransomware Despite I/O Overhead: A Practical Multi-Staged Approach · NDSS 2025 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
end-to-end security |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments · ICNP 2019 |
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving query processing |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Privacy-Preserving Remote Knowledge System · ICNP 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
source file analysis · 2.0metadata extraction · 2.0DNS embedding · 1.7blockchain · 1.3traffic splitting · 1.2active scanning · 0.9cryptographic offloading · 0.8sequence-based fingerprinting · 0.5tor · 0.4private set intersection · 0.4oblivious transfer · 0.4
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprintsabstract3891 Jan Pennekamp, Johannes Lohmöller, David Schütte, Joscha Loos, Martin Henze |
SP | 1 |
| 2026 | PRepChain: A versatile privacy-preserving reputation system for dynamic supply chain environmentsabstractDespite their significant added value in the context of consumer-oriented e-commerce, reputation systems have seen limited adoption in other business settings and models these days. Yet, reliable reputation scores are essential in such settings for easing the establishment of new business relationships—an aspect that is particularly crucial in dynamic supply chain environments, where business partners change frequently. Existing approaches, however, usually target other application domains and fall short in addressing the specific challenges of dynamic supply chains—–especially with respect to reliability (incl. availability) and privacy preservation (incl. confidentiality). To close this research gap and to support novel directions in this important research area, we propose PRepChain, our highly-configurable approach that leverages fully homomorphic encryption and distributed competences to provide businesses with a versatile reputation-enriched ecosystem. PRepChain is specifically designed to operate in dynamic environments by also offering a trade-off between data availability and confidentiality guarantees. We make contributions in four primary directions: (i) It offers performant privacy preservation even in large-scale settings, (ii) ensures availability of computed reputation scores, (iii) seamlessly integrates with existing supply chain information systems, and (iv) in addition to subjective reputation scores, it also supports reliably-calculated, i.e., objective, ones, thereby strengthening the reliability of third-party-sourced information. Our evaluation of PRepChain documents its performance—based on a real-world use case—, security, and privacy preservation, hence, its applicability. We conclude that it is indeed destined for practical deployments in modern supply networks. Jan Pennekamp, Lennart Bader, Emildeon Thevaraj, Stefanie Berninger, Martin Perau, Tobias Schröer, Wolfgang Boos, Salil S. Kanhere, Klaus Wehrle |
Future Gener. Comput. Syst. | 1 |
| 2025 | Supporting Artifact Evaluation with LLMs: A Study with Published Security Research PapersabstractArtifact Evaluation (AE) is essential for ensuring the transparency and reliability of research, closing the gap between exploratory work and real-world deployment is particularly important in cybersecurity, particularly in IoT and CPSs, where large-scale, heterogeneous, and privacy-sensitive data meet safety-critical actuation. Yet, manual reproducibility checks are time-consuming and do not scale with growing submission volumes. In this work, we demonstrate that Large Language Models (LLMs) can provide powerful support for AE tasks: (i) text-based reproducibility rating, (ii) autonomous sandboxed execution environment preparation, and (iii) assessment of methodological pitfalls. Our reproducibility-assessment toolkit yields an accuracy of over 72% and autonomously sets up execution environments for 28% of runnable cybersecurity artifacts. Our automated pitfall assessment detects seven prevalent pitfalls with high accuracy ($F_1$ > 92%). Hence, the toolkit significantly reduces reviewer effort and, when integrated into established AE processes, could incentivize authors to submit higher-quality and more reproducible artifacts. IoT, CPS, and cybersecurity conferences and workshops may integrate the toolkit into their peer-review processes to support reviewers' decisions on awarding artifact badges, improving the overall sustainability of the process. David Heye, Karl Kindermann, Robin Decker, Johannes Lohmöller, Anastasiia Belova, Sandra Geisler, Klaus Wehrle, Jan Pennekamp |
IEEE Big Data | 8 |
| 2025 | Dataspaces for Collaborative Researchabstract3835 Soo-Yon Kim, Liam Tirpitz, Max Wagels, Benedikt T. Arnold, Christian Rennert, István Koren, Janik Rapp, Mario Moser, Wil M. P. van der Aalst, Bernhard Rumpe, Robert H. Schmitt, Jan Pennekamp, Sandra Geisler |
IEEE Big Data | 12 |
| 2025 | Poster: Transport Security Orchestration Using DNSabstractCommunication networks enable the exchange of data with varying sensitivity, from non-sensitive public files to highly confidential healthcare or financial records. Cryptographic protection introduces significant computational and communication overhead. While lightweight ciphers have been proposed to reduce this burden, they compromise security and are unsuitable for sensitive data. We propose a system that enables adaptive security by embedding service sensitivity information in the Domain Name System (DNS), allowing peers to select appropriate cryptographic primitives based on data requirements. This approach ensures adequate protection while minimizing overhead. Additionally, it can be seamlessly integrated into existing networks without additional hardware. Initial results indicate improved throughput and reduced computational load on hosts. David Heye, Sahi Islam, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle |
ICNP | 3 |
| 2025 | Detecting Ransomware Despite I/O Overhead: A Practical Multi-Staged Approach
Christian van Sloun, Vincent Woeste, Konrad Wolsing, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle |
NDSS | 4 |
| 2025 | Advancing Network Monitoring with Packet-Level Records and Selective Flow AggregationabstractDue to its superior efficiency, network operators frequently prefer flow monitoring over full packet captures. However, packet-level information is crucial for the timely and reliable detection, investigation, and mitigation of security incidents. Currently, no solution effectively balances these two contradicting approaches, forcing network operators to compromise between efficiency and accuracy. In this paper, we thus propose HybridMon, a hybrid solution that combines condensed packet-level monitoring with selective flow-based aggregation to strike a new balance between efficiency and accuracy. Operating on the data plane of P4-programmable switches, HybridMon enables fine-grained, practical, and flexible network monitoring at Tbps speeds. We validate the effectiveness of HybridMon through extensive evaluations using Internet backbone and university campus traffic traces, demonstrating its reliability and performance in network forensics and intrusion detection contexts. Our results show that HybridMon reliably monitors all flows while reducing the output bandwidth to 12% to 20% compared to packet monitoring when exporting standard features. Ina Berenice Fink, Ike Kunze, Pascal Hein, Jan Pennekamp, Benjamin Standaert, Klaus Wehrle, Jan Rüth |
NOMS | 4 |
| 2025 | Congestion-Responsive Queuing for Internet FlowsabstractInternet congestion management is once again undergoing radical change: QUIC has ignited a cambrian explosion in congestion control (CC) implementations while the many versions of BBR alone have increased the diversity in algorithms used with TCP, both making the congestion landscape more complex. At the same time, the interplay of CC and AQM is also evolving but congestion unresponsiveness remains a threat. In particular, L4S crucially requires a fine-grained CC and AQM interaction to provide its benefits and suffers from unresponsive traffic. Overall, we need more responsive traffic on the Internet as well as mechanisms that can cope with unresponsiveness. We present Congestion-Responsive Queuing (CRQ), our L4S-inspired system which is designed to promote responsive CC, manage unresponsive traffic, and handle QUIC and TCP flows alike. Similar to L4S, CRQ uses two queues for flow isolation. Yet, in contrast to L4S, we isolate flows based on their actual congestion responsiveness, moving responsive flows to one queue and leaving the remaining flows in the other. Our evaluation with an eBPF prototype highlights the efficacy of our design and shows that CRQ can provide effective incentives for responsive CC. Ike Kunze, Constantin Sander, Mike Kosek, Lars Tissen, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle |
NOMS | 5 |
| 2025 | ConfMod: A Simple Modeling of Confidentiality Requirements for Inter-Organizational Data SharingabstractExploiting data and information is known to be essential for tapping into unrealized (business) potential. In the context of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), concerns related to the sensitivity of data frequently hinder its sharing (across organizations). Despite this situation, universal approaches that account for and appropriately model the confidentiality needs of stakeholders are still missing. In this paper, we address this research gap by proposing ConfMod, a middleware that simplifies the fine-granular modeling of confidentiality requirements while striving for interoperability with other tools and standardization in the area. We evaluate ConfMod in a diverse set of twelve real-world use cases from industry and show its general feasibility. Hence, we are confident that the functionality and simplicity of ConfMod facilitate an important building block for the IIoT, which will fuel inter-organizational data sharing in the future. Jan Pennekamp, Paul Weiler, Matthias Bodenbenner, Maximilian Sudmann, István Koren, Ike Kunze, Marcel Fey, Dominik Wolfschläger, Christian Brecher, Robert H. Schmitt, Klaus Wehrle |
NOMS | 1 |
| 2024 | Unconsidered Installations: Discovering IoT Deployments in the IPv6 InternetabstractInternet-wide studies provide extremely valuable insight into how operators manage their Internet of Things (IoT) deployments in reality and often reveal grievances, e.g., significant security issues. However, while IoT devices often use IPv6, past studies resorted to comprehensively scan the IPv4 address space. To fully understand how the IoT and all its services and devices is operated, including IPv6-reachable deployments is inevitable—although scanning the entire IPv6 address space is infeasible.In this paper, we close this gap and examine how to discover IPv6-reachable IoT deployments. Using three sources of active IPv6 addresses and eleven address generators, we discovered 6658 IoT deployments. We derive that the available address sources are a good starting point for finding IoT deployments. Additionally, we show that using two address generators is sufficient to cover most found deployments. Assessing the security of the deployments, we surprisingly find similar issues as in the IPv4 Internet, although IPv6 deployments might be newer and generally more up-to-date: Only 39% of deployments have access control in place and only 6.2% make use of TLS inviting attackers, e.g., to eavesdrop sensitive data. Markus Dahlmanns, Felix Heidenreich, Johannes Lohmöller, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze |
NOMS | 4 |
| 2024 | Evolving the Industrial Internet of Things: The Advent of Secure CollaborationsabstractThe Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) leads to increasingly-interconnected industrial processes and environments, which, in turn, result in stakeholders collecting a plethora of information. Even though the global sharing of information and industrial collaborations in the IIoT promise significant improvements concerning productivity, sustainability, and product quality, among others, the majority of stakeholders is hesitant to implement them due to confidentiality and reliability concerns. However, strong technical guarantees could convince them of the contrary. Thus, to address these concerns, our interdisciplinary efforts focus on establishing and realizing secure industrial collaborations in the IIoT. By applying private computing, we are indeed able to reliably secure collaborations that not only scale to industry-sized applications but also allow for use case-specific confidentiality guarantees. Hence, improvements that follow from industrial collaborations with (strong) technical guarantees are within reach, even when dealing with cautious stakeholders. Still, until we can fully exploit these benefits, several challenges remain, primarily regarding collaboration management, introduced overhead, interoperability, and universality of proposed protocols. Jan Pennekamp |
NOMS | 1 |
| 2024 | scE(match): Privacy-Preserving Cluster Matching of Single-Cell DataabstractAdvances in single-cell RNA sequencing (scRNA-seq) have dramatically enhanced our understanding of cellular functions and disease mechanisms. Despite its potential, scRNA-seq faces significant challenges related to data privacy, cost, and Intellectual Property (IP) protection, which hinder the sharing and collaborative use of these sensitive datasets. In this paper, we introduce a novel method, scE(match), a privacy-preserving tool that facilitates the matching of single-cell clusters between different datasets by relying on scmap as an established projection tool, but without compromising data privacy or IP. scE(match) utilizes homomorphic encryption to ensure that data and unique cell clusters remain confidential while enabling the identification of overlapping cell types for further collaboration and downstream analysis. Our evaluation shows that scE(match) performantly matches cell types across datasets with high precision, addressing both practical and ethical concerns in sharing scRNA-seq data. This approach not only supports secure data collaboration but also fosters advances in biomedical research by reliably protecting sensitive information and IP rights. Johannes Lohmöller, Jannis Scheiber, Rafael Kramann, Klaus Wehrle, Sikander Hayat, Jan Pennekamp |
TrustCom | 6 |
| 2024 | The unresolved need for dependable guarantees on security, sovereignty, and trust in data ecosystemsabstractData ecosystems emerged as a new paradigm to facilitate the automated and massive exchange of data from heterogeneous information sources between different stakeholders. However, the corresponding benefits come with unforeseen risks as sensitive information is potentially exposed, questioning their reliability. Consequently, data security is of utmost importance and, thus, a central requirement for successfully realizing data ecosystems. Academia has recognized this requirement, and current initiatives foster sovereign participation via a federated infrastructure where participants retain local control over what data they offer to whom. However, recent proposals place significant trust in remote infrastructure by implementing organizational security measures such as certification processes before the admission of a participant. At the same time, the data sensitivity incentivizes participants to bypass the organizational security measures to maximize their benefit. This issue significantly weakens security, sovereignty, and trust guarantees and highlights that organizational security measures are insufficient in this context. In this paper, we argue that data ecosystems must be extended with technical means to (re)establish dependable guarantees. We underpin this need with three representative use cases for data ecosystems, which cover personal, economic, and governmental data, and systematically map the lack of dependable guarantees in related work. To this end, we identify three enablers of dependable guarantees, namely trusted remote policy enforcement, verifiable data tracking, and integration of resource-constrained participants. These enablers are critical for securely implementing data ecosystems in data-sensitive contexts. Johannes Lohmöller, Jan Pennekamp, Roman Matzutt, Carolin Victoria Schneider, Eduard Vlad, Christian Trautwein, Klaus Wehrle |
Data Knowl. Eng. | 2 |
| 2023 | Designing Secure and Privacy-Preserving Information Systems for Industry Benchmarking
Jan Pennekamp, Johannes Lohmöller, Eduard Vlad, Joscha Loos, Niklas Rodemann, Patrick Sapel, Ina Berenice Fink, Seth Schmitz, Christian Hopmann, Matthias Jarke, Günther Schuh, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze |
CAiSE | 1 |
| 2023 | Poster: Accountable Processing of Reported Street ProblemsabstractMunicipalities increasingly depend on citizens to file digital reports about issues such as potholes or illegal trash dumps to improve their response time. However, the responsible authorities may be incentivized to ignore certain reports, e.g., when addressing them inflicts high costs. In this work, we explore the applicability of blockchain technology to hold authorities accountable regarding filed reports. Our initial assessment indicates that our approach can be extended to benefit citizens and authorities in the future. Roman Matzutt, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle |
CCS | 2 |
| 2023 | One IDS Is Not Enough! Exploring Ensemble Learning for Industrial Intrusion Detection
Konrad Wolsing, Dominik Kus, Eric Wagner 0003, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze |
ESORICS (2) | 4 |
| 2023 | FAIR Sensor Ecosystem: Long-Term (Re-)Usability of FAIR Sensor Data through ContextualizationabstractThe long-term utility and reusability of measurement data from production processes depend on the appropriate contextualization of the measured values. These requirements further mandate that modifications to the context need to be recorded. To be (re-)used at all, the data must be easily findable in the first place, which requires arbitrary filtering and searching routines. Following the FAIR guiding principles, fostering findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable (FAIR) data, in this paper, the FAIR Sensor Ecosystem is proposed, which provides a contextualization middleware based on a unified data metamodel. All information and relations which might change over time are versioned and associated with temporal validity intervals to enable full reconstruction of a system’s state at any point in time. A technical validation demonstrates the correctness of the FAIR Sensor Ecosystem, including its contextualization model and filtering techniques. State-of-the-art FAIRness assessment frameworks rate the proposed FAIR Sensor Ecosystem with an average FAIRness of 71%. The obtained rating can be considered remarkable, as deductions mainly result from the lack of fully appropriate FAIRness metrics and the absence of relevant community standards for the domain of the manufacturing industry. Matthias Bodenbenner, Jan Pennekamp, Benjamin Montavon, Klaus Wehrle, Robert H. Schmitt |
INDIN | 2 |
| 2023 | Reputation Systems for Supply Chains: The Challenge of Achieving Privacy Preservation
Lennart Bader, Jan Pennekamp, Emildeon Thevaraj, Maria Spiß, Salil S. Kanhere, Klaus Wehrle |
MobiQuitous (1) | 2 |
| 2023 | Offering Two-way Privacy for Evolved Purchase InquiriesabstractDynamic and flexible business relationships are expected to become more important in the future to accommodate specialized change requests or small-batch production. Today, buyers and sellers must disclose sensitive information on products upfront before the actual manufacturing. However, without a trust relation, this situation is precarious for the involved companies as they fear for their competitiveness. Related work overlooks this issue so far: existing approaches protect the information of a single party only, hindering dynamic and on-demand business relationships. To account for the corresponding research gap of inadequately privacy-protected information and to deal with companies without an established trust relation, we pursue the direction of innovative privacy-preserving purchase inquiries that seamlessly integrate into today’s established supplier management and procurement processes. Utilizing well-established building blocks from private computing, such as private set intersection and homomorphic encryption, we propose two designs with slightly different privacy and performance implications to securely realize purchase inquiries over the Internet. In particular, we allow buyers to consider more potential sellers without sharing sensitive information and relieve sellers of the burden of repeatedly preparing elaborate yet discarded offers. We demonstrate our approaches’ scalability using two real-world use cases from the domain of production technology. Overall, we present deployable designs that offer two-way privacy for purchase inquiries and, in turn, fill a gap that currently hinders establishing dynamic and flexible business relationships. In the future, we expect significantly increasing research activity in this overlooked area to address the needs of an evolving production landscape. Jan Pennekamp, Markus Dahlmanns, Frederik Fuhrmann, Timo Heutmann, Alexander Kreppein, Dennis Grunert, Christoph Lange 0002, Robert H. Schmitt, Klaus Wehrle |
ACM Trans. Internet Techn. | 1 |
| 2022 | Missed Opportunities: Measuring the Untapped TLS Support in the Industrial Internet of ThingsabstractThe ongoing trend to move industrial appliances from previously isolated networks to the Internet requires fundamental changes in security to uphold secure and safe operation. Consequently, to ensure end-to-end secure communication and authentication, (i) traditional industrial protocols, e.g., Modbus, are retrofitted with TLS support, and (ii) modern protocols, e.g., MQTT, are directly designed to use TLS. To understand whether these changes indeed lead to secure Industrial Internet of Things deployments, i.e., using TLS-based protocols, which are configured according to security best practices, we perform an Internet-wide security assessment of ten industrial protocols covering the complete IPv4 address space. Markus Dahlmanns, Johannes Lohmöller, Jan Pennekamp, Jörn Bodenhausen, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze |
AsiaCCS | 3 |
| 2022 | A Moderation Framework for the Swift and Transparent Removal of Illicit Blockchain ContentabstractBlockchains gained tremendous attention for their capability to provide immutable and decentralized event ledgers that can facilitate interactions between mutually distrusting parties. However, precisely this immutability and the openness of permissionless blockchains raised concerns about the consequences of illicit content being irreversibly stored on them. Related work coined the notion of redactable blockchains, which allow for removing illicit content from their history without affecting the blockchain's integrity. While honest users can safely prune identified content, current approaches either create trust issues by empowering fixed third parties to rewrite history, cannot react quickly to reported content due to using lengthy public votings, or create large per-redaction overheads.In this paper, we instead propose to outsource redactions to small and periodically exchanged juries, whose members can only jointly redact transactions using chameleon hash functions and threshold cryptography. Multiple juries are active at the same time to swiftly redact reported content. They oversee their activities via a global redaction log, which provides transparency and allows for appealing and reversing a rogue jury's decisions. Hence, our approach establishes a framework for the swift and transparent moderation of blockchain content. Our evaluation shows that our moderation scheme can be realized with feasible per-block and per-redaction overheads, i.e., the redaction capabilities do not impede the blockchain's normal operation. Roman Matzutt, Vincent Ahlrichs, Jan Pennekamp, Roman Karwacik, Klaus Wehrle |
ICBC | 3 |
| 2022 | Scalable and Privacy-Focused Company-Centric Supply Chain ManagementabstractBlockchain technology promises to overcome trust and privacy concerns inherent to centralized information sharing. However, current decentralized supply chain management systems do either not meet privacy and scalability requirements or require a trustworthy consortium, which is challenging for increasingly dynamic supply chains with constantly changing participants. In this paper, we propose CCChain, a scalable and privacy-aware supply chain management system that stores all information locally to give companies complete sovereignty over who accesses their data. Still, tamper protection of all data through a permissionless blockchain enables on-demand tracking and tracing of products as well as reliable information sharing while affording the detection of data inconsistencies. Our evaluation confirms that CCChain offers superior scalability in comparison to alternatives while also enabling near real-time tracking and tracing for many, less complex products. Eric Wagner 0003, Roman Matzutt, Jan Pennekamp, Lennart Bader, Irakli Bajelidze, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze |
ICBC | 3 |
| 2022 | A Computer Science Perspective on Digital Transformation in ProductionabstractThe Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT) promises significant improvements for the manufacturing industry by facilitating the integration of manufacturing systems by Digital Twins. However, ecological and economic demands also require a cross-domain linkage of multiple scientific perspectives from material sciences, engineering, operations, business, and ergonomics, as optimization opportunities can be derived from any of these perspectives. To extend the IIoT to a trueInternet of Production, two concepts are required: first, a complex, interrelated network of Digital Shadows which combine domain-specific models with data-driven AI methods; and second, the integration of a large number of research labs, engineering, and production sites as a World Wide Lab which offers controlled exchange of selected, innovation-relevant data even across company boundaries. In this article, we define the underlying Computer Science challenges implied by these novel concepts in four layers:Smart human interfacesprovide access to information that has been generated bymodel-integrated AI. Given the large variety of manufacturing data, newdata modelingtechniques should enable efficient management of Digital Shadows, which is supported by aninterconnected infrastructure. Based on a detailed analysis of these challenges, we derive a systematized research roadmap to make the vision of the Internet of Production a reality. Philipp Brauner, Manuela Dalibor, Matthias Jarke, Ike Kunze, István Koren, Gerhard Lakemeyer, Martin Liebenberg, Judith Michael, Jan Pennekamp, Christoph Quix, Bernhard Rumpe, Wil M. P. van der Aalst, Klaus Wehrle, Andreas Wortmann 0001, Martina Ziefle |
ACM Trans. Internet Things | 9 |
| 2021 | POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of WebpagesabstractWebsite fingerprinting (WFP) is a special case of traffic analysis, where a passive attacker infers information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows. Although modern WFP attacks pose a serious threat to online privacy of users, including Tor users, they usually aim to detect single pages only. By ignoring the browsing behavior of users, the attacker excludes valuable information: users visit multiple pages of a single website consecutively, e.g., by following links. In this paper, we propose two novel methods that can take advantage of the consecutive visits of multiple pages to detect websites. We show that two up to three clicks within a site allow attackers to boost the accuracy by more than 20% and to dramatically increase the threat to users' privacy. We argue that WFP defenses have to consider this new dimension of the attack surface. Asya Mitseva, Jan Pennekamp, Johannes Lohmöller, Torsten Ziemann, Carl Hoerchner, Klaus Wehrle, Andriy Panchenko 0001 |
CCS | 2 |
| 2021 | Data Reliability and Trustworthiness Through Digital Transmission Contracts
Simon Mangel, Lars Christoph Gleim, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle, Stefan Decker |
ESWC | 3 |
| 2021 | Blockchain-based privacy preservation for supply chains supporting lightweight multi-hop information accountability
Lennart Bader, Jan Pennekamp, Roman Matzutt, David Hedderich, Markus Kowalski, Volker Lücken, Klaus Wehrle |
Inf. Process. Manag. | 2 |
| 2021 | CoinPrune: Shrinking Bitcoin's Blockchain RetrospectivelyabstractPopular cryptocurrencies continue to face serious scalability issues due to their ever-growing blockchains. Thus, modern blockchain designs began to prune old blocks and rely on recent snapshots for their bootstrapping processes instead. Unfortunately, established systems are often considered incapable of adopting these improvements. In this work, we present CoinPrune, our block-pruning scheme with full Bitcoin compatibility, to revise this popular belief. CoinPrune bootstraps joining nodes via snapshots that are periodically created from Bitcoin's set of unspent transaction outputs (UTXO set). Our scheme establishes trust in these snapshots by relying on CoinPrunesupporting miners to mutually reaffirm a snapshot's correctness on the blockchain. This way, snapshots remain trustworthy even if adversaries attempt to tamper with them. Our scheme maintains its retrospective deployability by relying on positive feedback only, i.e., blocks containing invalid reaffirmations are not rejected, but invalid reaffirmations are outpaced by the benign ones created by an honest majority among CoinPrunesupporting miners. Already today, CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements for Bitcoin nodes by two orders of magnitude, as joining nodes need to fetch and process only 6 GiB instead of 271 GiB of data in our evaluation, reducing the synchronization time of powerful devices from currently 7 h to 51 min, with even larger potential drops for less powerful devices. CoinPrune is further aware of higher-level application data, i.e., it conserves otherwise pruned application data and allows nodes to obfuscate objectionable and potentially illegal blockchain content from their UTXO set and the snapshots they distribute. Roman Matzutt, Benedikt Kalde, Jan Pennekamp, Arthur Drichel, Martin Henze, Klaus Wehrle |
IEEE Trans. Netw. Serv. Manag. | 3 |
| 2021 | Cookie Banners and Privacy Policies: Measuring the Impact of the GDPR on the WebabstractThe General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is in effect since May of 2018. As one of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation concerning privacy, it sparked a lot of discussion on the effect it would have on users and providers of online services in particular, due to the large amount of personal data processed in this context. Almost three years later, we are interested in revisiting this question to summarize the impact this new regulation has had on actors in the World Wide Web. Using Scopus, we obtain a vast corpus of academic work to survey studies related to changes on websites since and around the time the GDPR went into force. Our findings show that the emphasis on privacy increased w.r.t. online services, but plenty potential for improvements remains. Although online services are on average more transparent regarding data processing practices in their public data policies, a majority of these policies still either lack information required by the GDPR (e.g., contact information for users to file privacy inquiries) or do not provide this information in a user-friendly form. Additionally, we summarize that online services more often provide means for their users to opt out of data processing, but regularly obstruct convenient access to such means through unnecessarily complex and sometimes illegitimate interface design. Our survey further details that this situation contradicts the preferences expressed by users both verbally and through their actions, and researchers have proposed multiple approaches to facilitate GDPR-conform data processing without negatively impacting the user experience. Thus, we compiled reoccurring points of criticism by privacy researchers and data protection authorities into a list of four guidelines for service providers to consider. Michael Kretschmer, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle |
ACM Trans. Web | 2 |
| 2020 | Privacy-Preserving Production Process Parameter ExchangeabstractNowadays, collaborations between industrial companies always go hand in hand with trust issues, i.e., exchanging valuable production data entails the risk of improper use of potentially sensitive information. Therefore, companies hesitate to offer their production data, e.g., process parameters that would allow other companies to establish new production lines faster, against a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the expected benefits of industrial collaboration, data exchanges, and the utilization of external knowledge are significant. Jan Pennekamp, Erik Buchholz, Yannik Lockner, Markus Dahlmanns, Tiandong Xi, Marcel Fey, Christian Brecher, Christian Hopmann, Klaus Wehrle |
ACSAC | 1 |
| 2020 | TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic SplittingabstractWebsite fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node --- one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor --- a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only. Wladimir De la Cadena, Asya Mitseva, Jens Hiller, Jan Pennekamp, Sebastian Reuter, Julian Filter, Thomas Engel 0001, Klaus Wehrle, Andriy Panchenko 0001 |
CCS | 4 |
| 2020 | Utilizing Public Blockchains for the Sybil-Resistant Bootstrapping of Distributed Anonymity ServicesabstractDistributed anonymity services, such as onion routing networks or cryptocurrency tumblers, promise privacy protection without trusted third parties. While the security of these services is often well-researched, security implications of their required bootstrapping processes are usually neglected: Users either jointly conduct the anonymization themselves, or they need to rely on a set of non-colluding privacy peers. However, the typically small number of privacy peers enable single adversaries to mimic distributed services. We thus present AnonBoot, a Sybil-resistant medium to securely bootstrap distributed anonymity services via public blockchains. AnonBoot enforces that peers periodically create a small proof of work to refresh their eligibility for providing secure anonymity services. A pseudo-random, locally replicable bootstrapping process using on-chain entropy then prevents biasing the election of eligible peers. Our evaluation using Bitcoin as AnonBoot's underlying blockchain shows its feasibility to maintain a trustworthy repository of 1000 peers with only a small storage footprint while supporting arbitrarily large user bases on top of most blockchains. Roman Matzutt, Jan Pennekamp, Erik Buchholz, Klaus Wehrle |
AsiaCCS | 2 |
| 2020 | Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure DeploymentsabstractDue to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25%) on in total 92% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols. Markus Dahlmanns, Johannes Lohmöller, Ina Berenice Fink, Jan Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze |
Internet Measurement Conference | 4 |
| 2020 | How to Securely Prune Bitcoin's Blockchain
Roman Matzutt, Benedikt Kalde, Jan Pennekamp, Arthur Drichel, Martin Henze, Klaus Wehrle |
Networking | 3 |
| 2020 | FactDAG: Formalizing Data Interoperability in an Internet of ProductionabstractIn the production industry, the volume, variety, and velocity of data as well as the number of deployed protocols increase exponentially due to the influences of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) advances. While hundreds of isolated solutions exist to utilize these data, e.g., optimizing processes or monitoring machine conditions, the lack of a unified data handling and exchange mechanism hinders the implementation of approaches to improve the quality of decisions and processes in such an interconnected environment. The vision of anInternet of Productionpromises the establishment of aWorldwide Lab, where data from every process in the network can be utilized, even interorganizational and across domains. While numerous existing approaches consider interoperability from an interface and communication system perspective, fundamental questions of data and information interoperability remain insufficiently addressed. In this article, we identifytenkey issues, derived from three distinctive real-world use cases that hinder large-scale data interoperability for industrial processes. Based on these issues, we derive a set offivekey requirements for future (IoT) data layers, building upon the FAIR data principles. We propose to address them by creatingFactDAG, a conceptual data layer model for maintaining a provenance-based, directed acyclic graph of facts, inspired by successful distributed version-control and collaboration systems. Eventually, such a standardization should greatly shape the future of interoperability in an interconnected production industry. Lars Christoph Gleim, Jan Pennekamp, Martin Liebenberg, Melanie Buchsbaum, Philipp Niemietz, Simon Knape, Alexander Epple, Simon Storms, Daniel Trauth, Thomas Bergs, Christian Brecher, Stefan Decker, Gerhard Lakemeyer, Klaus Wehrle |
IEEE Internet Things J. | 2 |
| 2019 | POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website FingerprintingabstractWebsite fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95% to less than 35% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. Wladimir De la Cadena, Asya Mitseva, Jan Pennekamp, Jens Hiller, Fabian Lanze, Thomas Engel 0001, Klaus Wehrle, Andriy Panchenko 0001 |
CCS | 3 |
| 2019 | Privacy-Preserving Remote Knowledge SystemabstractMore and more traditional services, such as malware detectors or collaboration services in industrial scenarios, move to the cloud. However, this behavior poses a risk for the privacy of clients since these services are able to generate profiles containing very sensitive information, e.g., vulnerability information or collaboration partners. Hence, a rising need for protocols that enable clients to obtain knowledge without revealing their requests exists. To address this issue, we propose a protocol that enables clients (i) to query large cloud-based knowledge systems in a privacy-preserving manner using Private Set Intersection and (ii) to subsequently obtain individual knowledge items without leaking the client's requests via few Oblivious Transfers. With our preliminary design, we allow clients to save a significant amount of time in comparison to performing Oblivious Transfers only. Markus Dahlmanns, Chris Dax, Roman Matzutt, Jan Pennekamp, Jens Hiller, Klaus Wehrle |
ICNP | 4 |
| 2019 | Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted EnvironmentsabstractAn increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-to-end security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices. Jens Hiller, Jan Pennekamp, Markus Dahlmanns, Martin Henze, Andriy Panchenko 0001, Klaus Wehrle |
ICNP | 2 |
| 2019 | Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion RoutingabstractUsers of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client's identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation. Jan Pennekamp, Jens Hiller, Sebastian Reuter, Wladimir De la Cadena, Asya Mitseva, Martin Henze, Thomas Engel 0001, Klaus Wehrle, Andriy Panchenko 0001 |
ICNP | 1 |
| 2017 | CloudAnalyzer: Uncovering the Cloud Usage of Mobile AppsabstractDevelopers of smartphone apps increasingly rely on cloud services for ready-made functionalities, e.g., to track app usage, to store data, or to integrate social networks. At the same time, mobile apps have access to various private information, ranging from users' contact lists to their precise locations. As a result, app deployment models and data flows have become too complex and entangled for users to understand. We present CloudAnalyzer, a transparency technology that reveals the cloud usage of smartphone apps and hence provides users with the means to reclaim informational self-determination. We apply CloudAnalyzer to study the cloud exposure of 29 volunteers over the course of 19 days. In addition, we analyze the cloud usage of the 5000 most accessed mobile websites as well as 500 popular apps from five different countries. Our results reveal an excessive exposure to cloud services: 90 % of apps use cloud services and 36 % of apps used by volunteers solely communicate with cloud services. Given the information provided by CloudAnalyzer, users can critically review the cloud usage of their apps. Martin Henze, Jan Pennekamp, David Hellmanns, Erik Mühmer, Jan Henrik Ziegeldorf, Arthur Drichel, Klaus Wehrle |
MobiQuitous | 2 |
| 2017 | A survey on the evolution of privacy enforcement on smartphones and the road ahead
Jan Pennekamp, Martin Henze, Klaus Wehrle |
Pervasive Mob. Comput. | 1 |
| 2016 | Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Andriy Panchenko 0001, Fabian Lanze, Jan Pennekamp, Thomas Engel 0001, Andreas Zinnen, Martin Henze, Klaus Wehrle |
NDSS | 3 |