Abstract Given two vertex sets S and T in a graph, the ST -diameter is the maximum s - t -distance between vertices $$s \in S$$ s ∈ S and $$t \in T$$ t ∈ T . We study the problem of estimating the ST -diameter of graphs that are subject to a small number of transient edge failures. An f-edge fault-tolerant ST-diameter oracle ( f -FDO- ST ) is a data structure that preprocesses a graph G , sets S , T , and a positive integer f . When queried with a set F of at most f failing edges, the oracle returns an estimate $$\widehat{D}$$ D ^ of the ST -diameter in $$G\,{-}\,F$$ G - F . The oracle is said to have stretch $$\sigma \geqslant 1$$ σ ⩾ 1 if $${{\,\textrm{diam}\,}}(G{-}F,S,T) \leqslant \widehat{D} \leqslant \sigma \cdot {{\,\textrm{diam}\,}}(G{-}F,S,T)$$ diam ( G - F , S , T ) ⩽ D ^ ⩽ σ · diam ( G - F , S , T ) . We design new f -FDO- ST s by reducing their construction to that of all-pairs and single-source distance sensitivity oracles ( f -DSOs). These are data structures that estimate the pairwise graph distances, or respectively the distances from a distinguished source, under up to f failures. We obtain several new trade-offs between the size of the ST -diameter oracles, their stretch guarantees, query and preprocessing times by combining our black-box reductions with f -DSO results from the literature. We further provide a lower bound on the space requirement of approximate ST -diameter oracles. We prove that there exists a family of graphs for which any f -FDO- ST with sensitivity $$f \geqslant 2$$ f ⩾ 2 and stretch better than 5/3 requires $$\Omega (n^{3/2})$$ Ω ( n 3 / 2 )

We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility agents select a location on a graph to open a facility to attract as much purchasing power as possible, while client agents choose which facilities to patronize by strategically distributing their purchasing power in order to minimize their total waiting time. Here, the waiting time of a facility depends on its received total purchasing power. We show that our client stage is an atomic splittable congestion game, which implies existence, uniqueness and efficient computation of a client equilibrium. Therefore, facility agents can efficiently predict client behavior and make strategic decisions accordingly. Despite that, we prove that subgame perfect equilibria do not exist in all instances of this game and that their existence is NP-hard to decide. On the positive side, we provide a simple and efficient algorithm to compute 3-approximate subgame perfect equilibria.

The Single-Source Shortest Path problem is classically solved by applying Dijkstra's algorithm. However, the plain version of this algorithm is far too slow for real-world applications such as routing in large road networks. To amend this, many speed-up techniques have been developed that build on the idea of computing auxiliary data in a preprocessing phase, that is used to speed up the queries. One well-known example is the Arc-Flags algorithm that is based on the idea of precomputing edge flags to make the search more goal-directed. To explain the strong practical performance of such speed-up techniques, several graph parameters have been introduced. The skeleton dimension is one such parameter that has already been used to derive runtime bounds for some speed-up techniques. Moreover, it was experimentally shown to be low in real-world road networks.

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classical research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then depends on the number of agents using the same resources. This implies that there is no distinction between the agents, i.e., they are anonymous. We depart from this very general setting by proposing Resource Selection Games with heterogeneous agents that strive for a joint resource usage with similar agents. So, instead of the number of other users of a given resource, our model considers agents with different types and the decisive feature is the fraction of same-type agents among the users. More precisely, similarly to Schelling Games, there is a tolerance threshold tau in [0,1] which specifies the agents' desired minimum fraction of same-type agents on a resource. Agents strive to select resources where at least a tau-fraction of those resources' users have the same type as themselves. For tau=1, our model generalizes hedonic diversity games with single-peaked utilities with a peak at 1. For our general model, we consider the existence and quality of equilibria and the complexity of maximizing the social welfare. Additionally, we consider a bounded rationality model, where agents can only estimate the utility of a resource, since they only know the fraction of same-type agents on a given resource, but not the exact numbers. Thus, they cannot know the impact a strategy change would have on a target resource. Interestingly, we show that this type of bounded rationality yields favorable game-theoretic properties and specific equilibria closely approximate equilibria of the full knowledge setting.

An f-edge fault-tolerant distance sensitive oracle (f-DSO) with stretch σ ≥ 1 is a data structure that preprocesses a given undirected, unweighted graph G with n vertices and m edges, and a positive integer f. When queried with a pair of vertices s, t and a set F of at most f edges, it returns a σ-approximation of the s-t-distance in G−F.

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every facility location has a set of attracted clients and each client has a set of shopping locations and a weight that corresponds to its spending capacity. Facility agents selfishly select a location for opening their facility to maximize the attracted total spending capacity, whereas clients strategically decide how to distribute their spending capacity among the opened facilities in their shopping range. We focus on a natural client behavior similar to classical load balancing: our selfish clients aim for a distribution that minimizes their maximum waiting time for getting serviced, where a facility’s waiting time corresponds to its total attracted client weight. We show that subgame perfect equilibria exist and we give almost tight constant bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability, which even hold for a broader class of games with arbitrary client behavior. Since facilities and clients influence each other, it is crucial for the facilities to anticipate the selfish clients’ behavior when selecting their location. For this, we provide an efficient algorithm that also implies an efficient check for equilibrium. Finally, we show that computing a socially optimal facility placement is NP-hard and that this result holds for all feasible client weight distributions.

An estimated 30% of urban traffic is caused by search for parking spots [Shoup, 2005]. Suggesting routes along highly probable parking spots could reduce traffic. In this paper, we formalize parking search as a probabilistic problem on a road graph and show that it is NP-complete. We explore heuristics that optimize for the driving duration and the walking distance to the destination. Routes are constrained to reach a certain probability threshold of finding a spot. Empirically estimated probabilities of successful parking attempts are provided by TomTom on a per-street basis. We release these probabilities as a dataset of about 80,000 roads covering the Berlin area. This allows to evaluate parking search algorithms on a real road network with realistic probabilities for the first time. However, for many other areas, parking probabilities are not openly available. Because they are effortful to collect, we propose an algorithm that relies on conventional road attributes only. Our experiments show that this algorithm comes close to the baseline by a factor of 1.3 in our cost measure. This leads to the conclusion that conventional road attributes may be sufficient to compute reasonably good parking search routes.