Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Lukas Burkhalter
dblp:188/9265
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 3 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 2 · 1 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
7 papers |
Authentication and access control · 39% Security and privacy of machine learning · 23% Privacy and data protection · 17% | |
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Efficient and distributed learning · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Cloud and datacenter computing · 100% |
Topics — the 19 heaviest of 22, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack defense |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | RoFL: Robustness of Secure Federated Learning · SP 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › federated learning security
robust federated learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | RoFL: Robustness of Secure Federated Learning · SP 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure aggregation |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | RoFL: Robustness of Secure Federated Learning · SP 2023 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning
client selection |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | VF-PS: How to Select Important Participants in Vertical Federated Learning, Efficiently and Securely? · NeurIPS 2022 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning › federated learning architecture
vertical federated learning |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | VF-PS: How to Select Important Participants in Vertical Federated Learning, Efficiently and Securely? · NeurIPS 2022 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving computation
encrypted data processing |
0.5 | 2 | 2017 | Secure Sharing of Partially Homomorphic Encrypted IoT Data · SenSys 2017 Talos a Platform for Processing Encrypted IoT Data: Demo Abstract · SenSys 2016 |
Authentication and access control › access control › access control mechanisms
cryptographic enforcement |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Zeph: Cryptographic Enforcement of End-to-End Data Privacy · OSDI 2021 |
Authentication and access control
access control |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Droplet: Decentralized Authorization and Access Control for Encrypted Data Streams · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Authentication and access control › access control
cryptographic access control |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | TimeCrypt: Encrypted Data Stream Processing at Scale with Cryptographic Access Control · NSDI 2020 |
Authentication and access control › authorization
decentralized authorization |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Droplet: Decentralized Authorization and Access Control for Encrypted Data Streams · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Authentication and access control › access control › cryptographic access control
encryption-based access control |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Droplet: Decentralized Authorization and Access Control for Encrypted Data Streams · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving data sharing
encrypted data sharing |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Secure Sharing of Partially Homomorphic Encrypted IoT Data · SenSys 2017 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
partially homomorphic encryption |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Secure Sharing of Partially Homomorphic Encrypted IoT Data · SenSys 2017 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
homomorphic encryption |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Talos a Platform for Processing Encrypted IoT Data: Demo Abstract · SenSys 2016 |
Cloud and datacenter computing
cloud storage |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Talos a Platform for Processing Encrypted IoT Data: Demo Abstract · SenSys 2016 |
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud storage
encrypted data sharing |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Talos a Platform for Processing Encrypted IoT Data: Demo Abstract · SenSys 2016 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | RoFL: Robustness of Secure Federated Learning · SP 2023 |
Internet of things and sensor networks › iot security
iot data security |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | Secure Sharing of Partially Homomorphic Encrypted IoT Data · SenSys 2017 |
Internet of things and sensor networks › iot data management
iot data processing |
0.1 | 1 | 2016 | Talos a Platform for Processing Encrypted IoT Data: Demo Abstract · SenSys 2016 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
re-encryption · 1.3partially homomorphic encryption · 1.3secure aggregation · 1.3norm bounds · 1.3mutual information estimation · 1.1group testing · 1.1fagin's algorithm · 1.1cryptography · 0.5cryptographic access control · 0.4attribute-based encryption · 0.4key-update · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | RoFL: Robustness of Secure Federated LearningabstractEven though recent years have seen many attacks exposing severe vulnerabilities in Federated Learning (FL), a holistic understanding of what enables these attacks and how they can be mitigated effectively is still lacking. In this work, we demystify the inner workings of existing (targeted) attacks. We provide new insights into why these attacks are possible and why a definitive solution to FL robustness is challenging. We show that the need for ML algorithms to memorize tail data has significant implications for FL integrity. This phenomenon has largely been studied in the context of privacy; our analysis sheds light on its implications for ML integrity. We show that certain classes of severe attacks can be mitigated effectively by enforcing constraints such as norm bounds on clients’ updates. We investigate how to efficiently incorporate these constraints into secure FL protocols in the single-server setting. Based on this, we propose RoFL, a new secure FL system that extends secure aggregation with privacy-preserving input validation. Specifically, RoFL can enforce constraints such as L2and L∞bounds on high-dimensional encrypted model updates. Hidde Lycklama, Lukas Burkhalter, Alexander Viand, Nicolas Küchler, Anwar Hithnawi |
SP | 2 |
| 2022 | VF-PS: How to Select Important Participants in Vertical Federated Learning, Efficiently and Securely?abstractVertical Federated Learning (VFL), that trains federated models over vertically partitioned data, has emerged as an important learning paradigm. However, existing VFL methods are facing two challenges: (1) scalability when # participants grows to even modest scale and (2) diminishing return w.r.t. # participants: not all participants are equally important and many will not introduce quality improvement in a large consortium. Inspired by these two challenges, in this paper, we ask: How can we select l out of m participants, where l ≪ m, that are most important?We call this problem Vertically Federated Participant Selection, and model it with a principled mutual information-based view. Our first technical contribution is VF-MINE—a Vertically Federated Mutual INformation Estimator—that uses one of the most celebrated algorithms in database theory—Fagin’s algorithm as a building block. Our second contribution is to further optimize VF-MINE to enable VF-PS, a group testing-based participant selection framework. We empirically show that vertically federated participation selection can be orders of magnitude faster than training a full-fledged VFL model, while being able to identify the most important subset of participants that often lead to a VFL model of similar quality. Jiawei Jiang 0001, Lukas Burkhalter, Fangcheng Fu, Bolin Ding, Bo Du 0001, Anwar Hithnawi, Bo Li 0026, Ce Zhang 0001 |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2021 | Zeph: Cryptographic Enforcement of End-to-End Data Privacy
Lukas Burkhalter, Nicolas Küchler, Alexander Viand, Hossein Shafagh, Anwar Hithnawi |
OSDI | 1 |
| 2020 | TimeCrypt: Encrypted Data Stream Processing at Scale with Cryptographic Access Control
Lukas Burkhalter, Anwar Hithnawi, Alexander Viand, Hossein Shafagh, Sylvia Ratnasamy |
NSDI | 1 |
| 2020 | Droplet: Decentralized Authorization and Access Control for Encrypted Data Streams
Hossein Shafagh, Lukas Burkhalter, Sylvia Ratnasamy, Anwar Hithnawi |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2017 | Secure Sharing of Partially Homomorphic Encrypted IoT DataabstractIoT applications often utilize the cloud to store and provide ubiquitous access to collected data. This naturally facilitates data sharing with third-party services and other users, but bears privacy risks, due to data breaches or unauthorized trades with user data. To address these concerns, we present Pilatus, a data protection platform where the cloud stores only encrypted data, yet is still able to process certain queries (e.g., range, sum). More importantly, Pilatus features a novel encrypted data sharing scheme based on re-encryption, with revocation capabilities and in situ key-update. Our solution includes a suite of novel techniques that enable efficient partially homomorphic encryption, decryption, and sharing. We present performance optimizations that render these cryptographic tools practical for mobile platforms. We implement a prototype of Pilatus and evaluate it thoroughly. Our optimizations achieve a performance gain within one order of magnitude compared to state-of-the-art realizations; mobile devices can decrypt hundreds of data points in a few hundred milliseconds. Moreover, we discuss practical considerations through two example mobile applications (Fitbit and Ava) that run Pilatus on real-world data. Hossein Shafagh, Anwar Hithnawi, Lukas Burkhalter, Pascal Fischli, Simon Duquennoy |
SenSys | 3 |
| 2016 | Talos a Platform for Processing Encrypted IoT Data: Demo AbstractabstractInternet of Things (IoT) applications today often utilize the cloud to provide storage and ubiquitous access to collected data. Leaving such granular, sensitive, and personal data unprotected on the cloud and vulnerable to system breaches or curious administrators is critical. In this extended abstract, we present Talos [3], a framework that embraces the computational resources available in the cloud and exploits them for encrypted data processing (e.g., using partially homomorphic encryption schemes). We have developed Talos further to enable encrypted data sharing, such that users can securely share their homomorphically encrypted data with add-on services and other users. We demonstrate a prototype implementation of a real-world application utilizing Talos. Talos enables applications to efficiently store and interact with encrypted sensory data in the cloud. With our prototype application, we show that with Talos in place the user experience remains unchanged (i.e., response time below 1 s) although all operations over data in the cloud incorporate encrypted data processing. Moreover, we demonstrate how Talos can be smoothly integrated into IoT apps (currently supporting Contiki and Android). Hence, we hope to encourage the development of secure IoT applications on top of the Talos framework. Hossein Shafagh, Lukas Burkhalter, Anwar Hithnawi |
SenSys | 2 |