Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Chloe Martindale
dblp:194/2820
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-3045-8544ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
4 papers |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 88% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 12% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Quantum computing and quantum information · 100% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography
isogeny-based cryptography |
1.9 | 4 | 2023 | A Direct Key Recovery Attack on SIDH · EUROCRYPT (5) 2023 Improved Torsion-Point Attacks on SIDH Variants · CRYPTO (3) 2021 Quantum Circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing Quantum Evaluation of Isogenies · EUROCRYPT (2) 2019 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
post-quantum cryptography |
1.9 | 4 | 2023 | A Direct Key Recovery Attack on SIDH · EUROCRYPT (5) 2023 Improved Torsion-Point Attacks on SIDH Variants · CRYPTO (3) 2021 Quantum Circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing Quantum Evaluation of Isogenies · EUROCRYPT (2) 2019 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › isogeny-based cryptography
supersingular isogeny diffie-hellman |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Improved Torsion-Point Attacks on SIDH Variants · CRYPTO (3) 2021 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography › isogeny-based cryptography
CSIDH |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Quantum Circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing Quantum Evaluation of Isogenies · EUROCRYPT (2) 2019 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key exchange |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | CSIDH: An Efficient Post-Quantum Commutative Group Action · ASIACRYPT (3) 2018 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange
non-interactive key exchange |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | CSIDH: An Efficient Post-Quantum Commutative Group Action · ASIACRYPT (3) 2018 |
Quantum computing and quantum information
quantum algorithms |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Quantum Circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing Quantum Evaluation of Isogenies · EUROCRYPT (2) 2019 |
Quantum computing and quantum information
quantum cryptanalysis |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Quantum Circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing Quantum Evaluation of Isogenies · EUROCRYPT (2) 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
quantum circuit synthesis · 0.8isogeny evaluation · 0.8supersingular elliptic curves · 0.3commutative group action · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | A Direct Key Recovery Attack on SIDH
Luciano Maino, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny, Giacomo Pope, Benjamin Wesolowski |
EUROCRYPT (5) | 2 |
| 2021 | Improved Torsion-Point Attacks on SIDH Variants
Victoria de Quehen, Péter Kutas, Chris Leonardi, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny, Christophe Petit 0001, Katherine E. Stange |
CRYPTO (3) | 4 |
| 2019 | Quantum Circuits for the CSIDH: Optimizing Quantum Evaluation of Isogenies
Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange 0001, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny |
EUROCRYPT (2) | 3 |
| 2018 | CSIDH: An Efficient Post-Quantum Commutative Group ActionabstractWe propose an efficient commutative group action suitable for non-interactive key exchange in a post-quantum setting. Our construction follows the layout of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov cryptosystem, but we apply it to supersingular elliptic curves defined over a large prime field $$\mathbb F_p$$ , rather than to ordinary elliptic curves. The Diffie–Hellman scheme resulting from the group action allows for public-key validation at very little cost, runs reasonably fast in practice, and has public keys of only 64 bytes at a conjectured AES-128 security level, matching NIST’s post-quantum security category I. Wouter Castryck, Tanja Lange 0001, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny, Joost Renes |
ASIACRYPT (3) | 3 |