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Dan Knoepfle

dblp:201/5820 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
0000-0001-8120-8898ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
market design
0.312017
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase · EC 2017
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
matching theory
0.312017
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase · EC 2017
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design
ride-hailing
0.312017
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase · EC 2017
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › dynamic pricing
surge pricing
0.312017
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase · EC 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

game theory · 0.3empirical analysis · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2017 Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase
abstract
Ride-hailing applications (apps) like Uber and Lyft introduced a matching technology and market design that recent research has found is more efficient than traditional taxi systems [2]. However, unlike traditional street-hailing taxi systems, they are prone to a failure mode first anticipated by [1]. In this paper we model and empirically establish the existence of these dynamics. We then show how surge pricing and, to a lesser extent, other market design interventions can prevent this problem from crippling a ride-hailing market.
Juan-Camilo Castillo, Dan Knoepfle, E. Glen Weyl
EC2