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Senia Kalma

dblp:201/9218 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Authentication and access control · 61% Web and mobile security · 30% Usable security · 9%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › online fraud
account takeover
0.312017
The Password Reset MitM Attack · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017
Authentication and access control
password authentication
0.312017
The Password Reset MitM Attack · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017
Authentication and access control › password security › password management
password reset
0.312017
The Password Reset MitM Attack · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

man-in-the-middle attack · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2017 The Password Reset MitM Attack
abstract
We present the password reset MitM (PRMitM) attack and show how it can be used to take over user accounts. The PRMitM attack exploits the similarity of the registration and password reset processes to launch a man in the middle (MitM) attack at the application level. The attacker initiates a password reset process with a website and forwards every challenge to the victim who either wishes to register in the attacking site or to access a particular resource on it. The attack has several variants, including exploitation of a password reset process that relies on the victim's mobile phone, using either SMS or phone call. We evaluated the PRMitM attacks on Google and Facebook users in several experiments, and found that their password reset process is vulnerable to the PRMitM attack. Other websites and some popular mobile applications are vulnerable as well. Although solutions seem trivial in some cases, our experiments show that the straightforward solutions are not as effective as expected. We designed and evaluated two secure password reset processes and evaluated them on users of Google and Facebook. Our results indicate a significant improvement in the security. Since millions of accounts are currently vulnerable to the PRMitM attack, we also present a list of recommendations for implementing and auditing the password reset process.
Nethanel Gelernter, Senia Kalma, Bar Magnezi, Hen Porcilan
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy2