Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Senia Kalma
dblp:201/9218
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Authentication and access control · 61% Web and mobile security · 30% Usable security · 9% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Web and mobile security › online fraud
account takeover |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | The Password Reset MitM Attack · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017 |
Authentication and access control
password authentication |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | The Password Reset MitM Attack · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017 |
Authentication and access control › password security › password management
password reset |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | The Password Reset MitM Attack · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
man-in-the-middle attack · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | The Password Reset MitM AttackabstractWe present the password reset MitM (PRMitM) attack and show how it can be used to take over user accounts. The PRMitM attack exploits the similarity of the registration and password reset processes to launch a man in the middle (MitM) attack at the application level. The attacker initiates a password reset process with a website and forwards every challenge to the victim who either wishes to register in the attacking site or to access a particular resource on it. The attack has several variants, including exploitation of a password reset process that relies on the victim's mobile phone, using either SMS or phone call. We evaluated the PRMitM attacks on Google and Facebook users in several experiments, and found that their password reset process is vulnerable to the PRMitM attack. Other websites and some popular mobile applications are vulnerable as well. Although solutions seem trivial in some cases, our experiments show that the straightforward solutions are not as effective as expected. We designed and evaluated two secure password reset processes and evaluated them on users of Google and Facebook. Our results indicate a significant improvement in the security. Since millions of accounts are currently vulnerable to the PRMitM attack, we also present a list of recommendations for implementing and auditing the password reset process. Nethanel Gelernter, Senia Kalma, Bar Magnezi, Hen Porcilan |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 2 |