states without platform intervention; 2. offline experiments employing our proposed intervention mechanisms on diverse datasets; and 3. results from a three-week online experiment conducted on Instagram Reels short-video recommendation platform.

On User-Generated Content (UGC) platforms, recommendation algorithms significantly impact creators' motivation to produce content as they compete for algorithmically allocated user traffic. This phenomenon subtly shapes the volume and diversity of the content pool, which is crucial for the platform's sustainability. In this work, we demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that a purely relevance-driven policy with low exploration strength boosts short-term user satisfaction but undermines the long-term richness of the content pool. In contrast, a more aggressive exploration policy may slightly compromise user satisfaction but promote higher content creation volume. Our findings reveal a fundamental trade-off between immediate user satisfaction and overall content production on UGC platforms. Building on this finding, we propose an efficient optimization method to identify the optimal exploration strength, balancing user and creator engagement. Our model can serve as a pre-deployment audit tool for recommendation algorithms on UGC platforms, helping to align their immediate objectives with sustainable, long-term goals.

The past decade has witnessed the flourishing of a new profession as media content creators, who rely on revenue streams from online content recommendation platforms. The reward mechanism employed by these platforms creates a competitive environment among creators which affects their production choices and, consequently, content distribution and system welfare. It is thus crucial to design the platform's reward mechanism in order to steer the creators' competition towards a desirable welfare outcome in the long run. This work makes two major contributions in this regard: first, we uncover a fundamental limit about a class of widely adopted mechanisms, coined \emph{Merit-based Monotone Mechanisms}, by showing that they inevitably lead to a constant fraction loss of the optimal welfare. To circumvent this limitation, we introduce \emph{Backward Rewarding Mechanisms} (BRMs) and show that the competition game resultant from BRMs possesses a potential game structure. BRMs thus naturally induce strategic creators' collective behaviors towards optimizing the potential function, which can be designed to match any given welfare metric. In addition, the class of BRM can be parameterized so that it allows the platform to directly optimize welfare within the feasible mechanism space even when the welfare metric is not explicitly defined.

Following recent successes in exploiting both latent factor and word embedding models in recommendation, we propose a novel Regularized Multi-Embedding (RME) based recommendation model that simultaneously encapsulates the following ideas via decomposition: (1) which items a user likes, (2) which two users co-like the same items, (3) which two items users often co-liked, and (4) which two items users often co-disliked. In experimental validation, the RME outperforms competing state-of-the-art models in both explicit and implicit feedback datasets, significantly improving [email protected] by 5.9~7.0%, [email protected] by 4.3~5.6%, and [email protected] by 7.9~8.9%. In addition, under the cold-start scenario for users with the lowest number of interactions, against the competing models, the RME outperforms [email protected] by 20.2% and 29.4% in MovieLens-10M and MovieLens-20M datasets, respectively. Our datasets and source code are available at: https://github.com/thanhdtran/RME.git.