Demonstrating veracity of videos is a longstanding problem that has recently become more urgent and acute. It is extremely hard to accurately detect manipulated videos using content analysis, especially in the face of subtle, yet effective, manipulations, such as frame rate changes or skin tone adjustments.

An increasing number of mobile devices are incorporating cameras, allowing users to record videos at any time, anywhere. This opens up a wide variety of applications, most notably security-critical ones, where videos are used as evidence or include sensitive content. Examples of such applications include (but are not limited to): (i) citizen journalists recording important events (e.g., protests), (ii) courts using videos as evidence, and (iii) electronic legal contract-signing platforms using videos to identify signing users [1].

An increasing number of mobile devices are incorporating cameras, allowing users to record videos at any time, anywhere. This opens up a wide variety of applications, most notably security-critical ones, where videos are used as evidence or include sensitive content. Examples of such applications include (but are not limited to): (i) citizen journalists recording important events (e.g., protests), (ii) courts using videos as evidence, and (iii) electronic legal contract-signing platforms using videos to identify signing users [1].

Security and privacy of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS) have been longstanding concerns. Recently, there is a trend to protect DNS traffic using Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, at least two major issues remain: (1) how do clients authenticate DNS-over-TLS endpoints in a scalable and extensible manner; and (2) how can clients trust endpoints to behave as expected? In this paper, we propose a novel Private DNS-over-TLS (PDoT) architecture. PDoT includes a DNS Recursive Resolver (RecRes) that operates within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Using Remote Attestation, DNS clients can authenticate, and receive strong assurance of trustworthiness of PDoT RecRes. We provide an open-source proof-of-concept implementation of PDoT and use it to experimentally demonstrate that its latency and throughput match that of the popular Unbound DNS-over-TLS resolver.

Named Data Networking (NDN) is a promising inter-networking paradigm that focus on content rather than hosts and their physical locations. In NDN Consumers issue Interests for Contents. Producers generate a content in response to each received interest and such content is routed back to the requesting consumer. When compared to IP, NDN brings advantages such as better throughput and lower latency, because routers are able to cache popular contents and satisfy interests for such contents locally. However, before being considered a viable approach, NDN should offer security services that are ideally better, but at least equivalent to current mechanisms in IP.In this regard, mechanisms to prevent DDoS are of paramount importance. In this work we propose FROG: a simple yet effective Interest Flooding Attack (IFA) detection and mitigation method. FROG runs on routers that are directly connected to NDN consumers and monitors packet hop counts. It then calculates mean and variance using stored hop counts to distinguish attackers from legitimate users. We use the NDN simulator ndnSIM to evaluate FROG's effectiveness. Our results show that FROG improves resilience against DDoS attacks. In particular, during an attack, legitimate users can still receive 75% of requested contents. Without FROG this number decreases to 50%.