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Daniel Noble

dblp:216/6426 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0001-9449-159XORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 3 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 55% Privacy and data protection · 45%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Programming languages and type systems · 77% Compilers and program optimization · 23%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Distributed systems · 100%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › oblivious data structures
oblivious RAM
0.512021
Alibi: A Flaw in Cuckoo-Hashing Based Hierarchical ORAM Schemes and a Solution · EUROCRYPT (3) 2021
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
0.412019
Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
MPC compiler
0.412019
SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › privacy accounting
privacy budget
0.412019
Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
private aggregation
0.412019
Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.412019
SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Programming languages and type systems
domain-specific languages
0.412019
SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure aggregation
0.112019
Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019
Compilers and program optimization
compiler toolchain
0.112019
SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Distributed systems
data aggregation
0.112019
Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

secure multi-party computation protocols · 0.8differential privacy · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Proactive Secret Sharing with Constant Communication
Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Tal Rabin
TCC (2)2
2023 DORAM Revisited: Maliciously Secure RAM-MPC with Logarithmic Overhead
Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Rafail Ostrovsky, Matan Shtepel, Jacob Zhang
TCC (1)2
2021 Alibi: A Flaw in Cuckoo-Hashing Based Hierarchical ORAM Schemes and a Solution
Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Rafail Ostrovsky
EUROCRYPT (3)2
2019 Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core
abstract
Recently, a number of systems have been deployed that gather sensitive statistics from user devices while giving differential privacy guarantees. One prominent example is the component in Apple's macOS and iOS devices that collects information about emoji usage and new words. However, these systems have been criticized for making unrealistic assumptions, e.g., by creating a very high "privacy budget" for answering queries, and by replenishing this budget every day, which results in a high worst-case privacy loss. However, it is not obvious whether such assumptions can be avoided if one requires a strong threat model and wishes to collect data periodically, instead of just once.
Edo Roth, Daniel Noble, Brett Hemenway, Andreas Haeberlen
SOSP2
2019 SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation
abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of mutually distrustful parties to compute a joint function on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the result of the computation. This type of computation is extremely powerful and has wide-ranging applications in academia, industry, and government. Protocols for secure computation have existed for decades, but only recently have general-purpose compilers for executing MPC on arbitrary functions been developed. These projects rapidly improved the state of the art, and began to make MPC accessible to non-expert users. However, the field is changing so rapidly that it is difficult even for experts to keep track of the varied capabilities of modern frameworks. In this work, we survey general-purpose compilers for secure multi-party computation. These tools provide high-level abstractions to describe arbitrary functions and execute secure computation protocols. We consider eleven systems: EMP-toolkit, Obliv-C, ObliVM, TinyGarble, SCALE-MAMBA (formerly SPDZ), Wysteria, Sharemind, PICCO, ABY, Frigate and CBMC-GC. We evaluate these systems on a range of criteria, including language expressibility, capabilities of the cryptographic back-end, and accessibility to developers. We advocate for improved documentation of MPC frameworks, standardization within the community, and make recommendations for future directions in compiler development. Installing and running these systems can be challenging, and for each system, we also provide a complete virtual environment (Docker container) with all the necessary dependencies to run the compiler and our example programs.
Marcella Hastings, Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Steve Zdancewic
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy3