Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Daniel Noble
dblp:216/6426
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0001-9449-159XORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 3 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 55% Privacy and data protection · 45% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Programming languages and type systems · 77% Compilers and program optimization · 23% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Distributed systems · 100% |
Topics — the 10 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › oblivious data structures
oblivious RAM |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Alibi: A Flaw in Cuckoo-Hashing Based Hierarchical ORAM Schemes and a Solution · EUROCRYPT (3) 2021 |
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
MPC compiler |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › privacy accounting
privacy budget |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
private aggregation |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Programming languages and type systems
domain-specific languages |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure aggregation |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019 |
Compilers and program optimization
compiler toolchain |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party Computation · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Distributed systems
data aggregation |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted core · SOSP 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
secure multi-party computation protocols · 0.8differential privacy · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Proactive Secret Sharing with Constant Communication
Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Tal Rabin |
TCC (2) | 2 |
| 2023 | DORAM Revisited: Maliciously Secure RAM-MPC with Logarithmic Overhead
Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Rafail Ostrovsky, Matan Shtepel, Jacob Zhang |
TCC (1) | 2 |
| 2021 | Alibi: A Flaw in Cuckoo-Hashing Based Hierarchical ORAM Schemes and a Solution
Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Rafail Ostrovsky |
EUROCRYPT (3) | 2 |
| 2019 | Honeycrisp: large-scale differentially private aggregation without a trusted coreabstractRecently, a number of systems have been deployed that gather sensitive statistics from user devices while giving differential privacy guarantees. One prominent example is the component in Apple's macOS and iOS devices that collects information about emoji usage and new words. However, these systems have been criticized for making unrealistic assumptions, e.g., by creating a very high "privacy budget" for answering queries, and by replenishing this budget every day, which results in a high worst-case privacy loss. However, it is not obvious whether such assumptions can be avoided if one requires a strong threat model and wishes to collect data periodically, instead of just once. Edo Roth, Daniel Noble, Brett Hemenway, Andreas Haeberlen |
SOSP | 2 |
| 2019 | SoK: General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Party ComputationabstractSecure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of mutually distrustful parties to compute a joint function on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the result of the computation. This type of computation is extremely powerful and has wide-ranging applications in academia, industry, and government. Protocols for secure computation have existed for decades, but only recently have general-purpose compilers for executing MPC on arbitrary functions been developed. These projects rapidly improved the state of the art, and began to make MPC accessible to non-expert users. However, the field is changing so rapidly that it is difficult even for experts to keep track of the varied capabilities of modern frameworks. In this work, we survey general-purpose compilers for secure multi-party computation. These tools provide high-level abstractions to describe arbitrary functions and execute secure computation protocols. We consider eleven systems: EMP-toolkit, Obliv-C, ObliVM, TinyGarble, SCALE-MAMBA (formerly SPDZ), Wysteria, Sharemind, PICCO, ABY, Frigate and CBMC-GC. We evaluate these systems on a range of criteria, including language expressibility, capabilities of the cryptographic back-end, and accessibility to developers. We advocate for improved documentation of MPC frameworks, standardization within the community, and make recommendations for future directions in compiler development. Installing and running these systems can be challenging, and for each system, we also provide a complete virtual environment (Docker container) with all the necessary dependencies to run the compiler and our example programs. Marcella Hastings, Brett Hemenway, Daniel Noble, Steve Zdancewic |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 3 |