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Khadija Baig

dblp:217/2755 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0001-5167-5580ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 3 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Privacy and data protection · 72% Malware analysis · 21% Usable security · 6%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
2 papers
Usability and user experience research · 59% Human-robot interaction · 41%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection
privacy perceptions
1.012026
The privacy triad: Understanding the influence of perceived social agency on privacy attitudes · Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud. 2026
Malware analysis
ransomware
0.312018
The aftermath of a crypto-ransomware attack at a large academic institution · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Human-robot interaction
social agents
0.312026
The privacy triad: Understanding the influence of perceived social agency on privacy attitudes · Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud. 2026
Privacy and data protection › health data privacy
genomic privacy
0.112020
"I'm hoping they're an ethical company that won't do anything that I'll regret": Users Perceptions of At-home DNA Testing Companies · CHI 2020
Usable security › security operations
incident response
0.112018
The aftermath of a crypto-ransomware attack at a large academic institution · USENIX Security Symposium 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

survey · 2.0grounded theory · 2.0semi-structured interviews · 0.9qualitative analysis · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 The privacy triad: Understanding the influence of perceived social agency on privacy attitudes
abstract
The Computers Are Social Actors (CASA) paradigm proposes that users’ interactions with computers follow the same social psychology principles as their interactions with people. CASA has potential value in guiding privacy design and research, but this has never been explicitly studied. To investigate how CASA may affect users’ privacy attitudes towards computers, smartphones, and digital assistants, we conducted a two-part investigation. First, we surveyed 400 participants. We identify that CASA is relevant in some, but not all, privacy contexts. Next, we interviewed 12 participants using Grounded Theory methods to understand to what extent CASA shaped their privacy attitudes. Overall, our study revealed that CASA by itself is insufficient to explain users’ privacy attitudes. Interpreting our results, we propose the Privacy Triad: users either consider their device to be a social agent , a conduit for outside actors, or a tool over which they have full control. These roles impact users’ privacy attitudes and expectations towards the device. We describe the practical applications of the Privacy Triad for designers. The triad can help designers implement privacy systems and technologies that foster interactions that naturally align with users’ expectations. It can also help designers think through potential risks arising from these interactions (e.g., phishing or inadvertent privacy disclosures).
Maxwell Keleher, Khadija Baig, Sonia Chiasson
Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud.2
2022 Understanding individual differences: factors affecting secure computer behaviour
abstract
Understanding users' individual differences may provide clues to help identify computer users who are prone to act insecurely. We examine factors that impact home users' reported computer security behaviour. We conducted two online surveys with a total of 650 participants to investigate the relationship between self-reported security behaviour and users' knowledge, motivation, confidence, risk propensity and sex-typed characteristics. We found that all of these factors impacted security behaviour, with knowledge as the most important predictor. We further show that a user's affinity to feminine or masculine characteristics is a better determinant of security behaviour than using binary male/female descriptors. Our study enabled us to confirm earlier results in the literature in a non-organisational setting, and to extend the literature by studying additional factors and by comparing the relative importance of each factor as a predictor of security behaviour.
Matthew Hull, Leah Zhang-Kennedy, Khadija Baig, Sonia Chiasson
Behav. Inf. Technol.3
2020 "I'm hoping they're an ethical company that won't do anything that I'll regret": Users Perceptions of At-home DNA Testing Companies
abstract
At-home DNA testing has become increasingly popular due to the ability to be able to gain both ancestry and health information, as well as connect with others who share your DNA. Do users have reasonable mental models of how these systems work? Do users have privacy concerns and what do they understand as the benefits and risks involved? We conducted 27 interviews with Canadian users of at-home DNA testing companies. Our interviews covered perceived and desired data use, data management, data sharing practices, control over data, and any regrets. Our qualitative analysis revealed that many users have inconsistencies in their mental models and liken their DNA data to their data stored with existing technologies, such as social media, rather than health data. They are generally either dismissive of privacy concerns towards themselves or their relatives or they had not considered privacy in their choice. We discuss our findings and propose possible future work in this area.
Khadija Baig, Reham Mohamed 0001, Anna-Lena Theus, Sonia Chiasson
CHI1
2018 The aftermath of a crypto-ransomware attack at a large academic institution
Leah Zhang-Kennedy, Hala Assal, Jessica Nicole Rocheleau, Reham Mohamed 0001, Khadija Baig, Sonia Chiasson
USENIX Security Symposium5