Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Xurong Li
dblp:218/8819
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 53% Representation and self-supervised learning · 27% Generative modeling · 8% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 67% Systems and software security · 33% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
deepfake detection |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Spatio-Temporal Catcher: A Self-Supervised Transformer for Deepfake Video Detection · ACM Multimedia 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › deepfake detection
deepfake video detection |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Spatio-Temporal Catcher: A Self-Supervised Transformer for Deepfake Video Detection · ACM Multimedia 2023 |
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › representation learning › unsupervised representation learning › self-supervised representation learning › reconstruction-based learning
self-supervised reconstruction |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Spatio-Temporal Catcher: A Self-Supervised Transformer for Deepfake Video Detection · ACM Multimedia 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial example |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Examples versus Cloud-Based Detectors: A Black-Box Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Examples versus Cloud-Based Detectors: A Black-Box Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021 |
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Examples versus Cloud-Based Detectors: A Black-Box Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › video generation › video frame synthesis
video synthesis |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Spatio-Temporal Catcher: A Self-Supervised Transformer for Deepfake Video Detection · ACM Multimedia 2023 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
image classification |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Examples versus Cloud-Based Detectors: A Black-Box Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021 |
Computer vision › Segmentation and scene understanding
semantic segmentation |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Examples versus Cloud-Based Detectors: A Black-Box Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
semantic segmentation · 1.0black-box API interaction · 1.0transformer · 0.7diversity loss · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Spatio-Temporal Catcher: A Self-Supervised Transformer for Deepfake Video DetectionabstractAs deepfake technology has become increasingly sophisticated and accessible, making it easier for individuals with malicious intent to create convincing fake content, which has raised considerable concern in the multimedia and computer vision community. Despite significant advances in deepfake video detection, most existing methods mainly focused on model architecture and training processes with little focus on data perspectives. In this paper, we argue that data quality has become the main bottleneck of current research. To be specific, in the pre-training phase, the domain shift between pre-training and target datasets may lead to poor generalization ability. Meanwhile, in the training phase, the low fidelity of the existing datasets leads to detectors relying on specific low-level visual artifacts or inconsistency. To overcome the shortcomings, (1). In the pre-training phase, pre-train our model on high-quality facial videos by utilizing data-efficient reconstruction-based self-supervised learning to solve domain shift. (2). In the training phase, we develop a novel spatio-temporal generator that can synthesize various high-quality "fake" videos in large quantities at a low cost, which enables our model to learn more general spatio-temporal representations in a self-supervised manner. (3). Additinally, to take full advantage of synthetic "fake" videos, we adopt diversity losses at both frame and video levels to explore the diversity of clues in "fake" videos. Our proposed framework is data-efficient and does not require any real-world deepfake videos. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly improves the generalization capability. Particularly on the most challenging CDF and DFDC datasets, our method outperforms the baselines by 8.88% and 7.73% points, respectively. Maosen Li, Xurong Li, Cheng Deng 0002, Heng Huang 0001, Feng Mao, Hui Xue 0001, Minghao Li 0008 |
ACM Multimedia | 2 |
| 2021 | Adversarial Examples versus Cloud-Based Detectors: A Black-Box Empirical StudyabstractDeep learning has been broadly leveraged by major cloud providers, such as Google, AWS and Baidu, to offer various computer vision related services including image classification, object identification, illegal image detection, etc. While recent works extensively demonstrated that deep learning classification models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, cloud-based image detection models, which are more complicated than classifiers, may also have similar security concern but not get enough attention yet. In this paper, we mainly focus on the security issues of real-world cloud-based image detectors. Specifically, (1) based on effective semantic segmentation, we propose four attacks to generate semantics-aware adversarial examples via only interacting with black-box APIs; and (2) we make the first attempt to conduct an extensive empirical study of black-box attacks against real-world cloud-based image detectors. Through the comprehensive evaluations on five major cloud platforms: AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Baidu Cloud, and Alibaba Cloud, we demonstrate that our image processing based attacks can reach a success rate of approximately 100 percent, and the semantic segmentation based attacks have a success rate over 90 percent among different detection services, such as violence, politician, and pornography detection. We also proposed several possible defense strategies for these security challenges in the real-life situation. Xurong Li, Shouling Ji, Juntao Ji, Zhenyu Ren, Yushan Liu 0004, Chunming Wu 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 1 |
| 2020 | Adversarial examples detection through the sensitivity in space mappingsabstractAdversarial examples (AEs) against deep neural networks (DNNs) raise wide concerns about the robustness of DNNs. Existing detection mechanisms are often limited to a given attack algorithm. Therefore, it is highly desirable to develop a robust detection approach that remains effective for a large group of attack algorithms. In addition, most of the existing defences only perform well for small images (e.g. MNIST and Canadian institute for advanced research (CIFAR)) rather than large images (e.g. ImageNet). In this paper, the authors propose a robust and effective defence method for analysing the sensitivity of various AEs, especially in a much harder case (large images). Their method first creates a feature map from the input space to the new feature space, by utilising 19 different feature mapping methods. Then, a detector is learned with the machine‐learning algorithm to recognise the unique distribution of AEs. Their extensive evaluations on their proposed detector show that their detector can achieve: (i) low false‐positive rate (<1%), (ii) high true‐positive rate (higher than 98%), (iii) low overhead (<0.1 s per input), and (iv) good robustness (work well across different learning models, attack algorithms, and parameters), which demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed detector in practise. Xurong Li, Shouling Ji, Juntao Ji, Zhenyu Ren, Chunming Wu 0001, Bo Li 0026, Ting Wang 0006 |
IET Comput. Vis. | 1 |
| 2017 | HSTS Measurement and an Enhanced Stripping Attack Against HTTPS
Xurong Li, Chunming Wu 0001, Shouling Ji, Qinchen Gu, Raheem A. Beyah |
SecureComm | 1 |