Abstract We put forward two natural generalizations of predicate encryption (PE), dubbed multi-key and multi-input PE. More in details, our contributions are threefold. Definitions. We formalize security of multi-key PE and multi-input PE following the standard indistinguishability paradigm, and modeling security both against malicious senders (i.e., corruption of encryption keys) and malicious receivers (i.e., collusions). Constructions. We construct adaptively secure multi-key and multi-input PE supporting the conjunction of poly-many arbitrary single-input predicates, assuming the sub-exponential hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem. Applications. We show that multi-key and multi-input PE for expressive enough predicates suffices for interesting cryptographic applications, including non-interactive multi-party computation (NI-MPC) and matchmaking encryption (ME). In particular, plugging in our constructions of multi-key and multi-input PE, under the sub-exponential LWE assumption, we obtain the first ME supporting arbitrary policies with unbounded collusions, as well as robust (resp. non-robust) NI-MPC for so-called all-or-nothing functions satisfying a non-trivial notion of reusability and supporting a constant (resp. polynomial) number of parties. Prior to our work, both of these applications required much heavier tools such as indistinguishability obfuscation or compact functional encryption.

A recent trend in multi-party computation is to achieve cryptographic fairness via monetary penalties, i.e. each honest player either obtains the output or receives a compensation in the form of a cryptocurrency. We pioneer another type of fairness, financial fairness, that is closer to the real-world valuation of financial transactions. Intuitively, a penalty protocol is financially fair if the net present cost of participation (the total value of cash inflows less cash outflows, weighted by the relative discount rate) is the same for all honest participants, even when some parties cheat. We formally define the notion, show several impossibility results based on game theory, and analyze the practical effects of (lack of) financial fairness if one was to run the protocols for real on Bitcoin using Bloomberg’s dark pool trading. For example, we show that the ladder protocol (CRYPTO’14), and its variants (CCS’15 and CCS’16), fail to achieve financial fairness both in theory and in practice, while the penalty protocols of Kumaresan and Bentov (CCS’14) and Baum, David and Dowsley (FC’20) are financially fair.