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Surya Bakshi

dblp:220/5633 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software maintenance and evolution · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
smart contract analysis
0.312018
Erays: Reverse Engineering Ethereum's Opaque Smart Contracts · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Software maintenance and evolution
reverse engineering
0.112018
Erays: Reverse Engineering Ethereum's Opaque Smart Contracts · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Pisa: Arbitration Outsourcing for State Channels
abstract
State channels are a leading approach for improving the scalability of blockchains and cryptocurrencies. They allow a group of distrustful parties to optimistically execute an application-defined program amongst themselves, while the blockchain serves as a backstop in case of a dispute or abort. This effectively bypasses the congestion, fees and performance constraints of the underlying blockchain in the typical case. However, state channels introduce a new and undesirable assumption that a party must remain online and synchronised with the blockchain at all times to defend against execution fork attacks. An execution fork can revert a state channel's history, potentially causing financial damage to a party that is innocent except for having crashed. To provide security even to parties that may go offline for an extended period of time, we present Pisa, the first protocol to propose an accountable third party who can be hired by parties to cancel execution forks on their behalf. To evaluate Pisa, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation for a simplified Sprites and we demonstrate that it is cost-efficient to deploy on the Ethereum network.
Patrick McCorry, Surya Bakshi, Iddo Bentov, Sarah Meiklejohn, Andrew Miller 0001
AFT2
2018 Erays: Reverse Engineering Ethereum's Opaque Smart Contracts
Deepak Kumar 0006, Surya Bakshi, Joshua Mason, Andrew Miller 0001, Michael D. Bailey
USENIX Security Symposium3