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Ananya Yarramreddy

dblp:224/1534 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 50% Usable security · 50%
Computer graphics and multimedia
1 paper
Virtual and augmented reality · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security
virtual reality security
0.512021
Immersive Virtual Reality Attacks and the Human Joystick · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021
Virtual and augmented reality › virtual reality
consumer-oriented virtual reality
0.112021
Immersive Virtual Reality Attacks and the Human Joystick · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

proof-of-concept · 0.5proof of concept · 0.5human-participant study · 0.5human participant study · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Immersive Virtual Reality Attacks and the Human Joystick
abstract
This is one of the first accounts for the security analysis of consumer immersive Virtual Reality (VR) systems. This work breaks new ground, coins new terms, and constructs proof of concept implementations of attacks related to immersive VR. Our work used the two most widely adopted immersive VR systems, the HTC Vive, and the Oculus Rift. More specifically, we were able to create attacks that can potentially disorient users, turn their Head Mounted Display (HMD) camera on without their knowledge, overlay images in their field of vision, and modify VR environmental factors that force them into hitting physical objects and walls. Finally, we illustrate through a human participant deception study the success of being able to exploit VR systems to control immersed users and move them to a location in physical space without their knowledge. We term this the Human Joystick Attack. We conclude our work with future research directions and ways to enhance the security of these systems.
Peter Casey, Ibrahim M. Baggili, Ananya Yarramreddy
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.3