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Eric Hennenfent

dblp:224/9359 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 50% Software testing · 50%
Network and information security
2 papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 43% Biometric security · 43% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 15%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Software testing › test coverage
code coverage
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Program analysis
dynamic analysis
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Program analysis
symbolic execution
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Software testing
test generation
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Biometric security
speaker verification
0.312018
Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Cyber-physical and IoT security
voice assistant security
0.312018
Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
smart contract security
0.112019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

constraint solving · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Efficient Proofs of Software Exploitability for Real-world Processors
abstract
We consider the problem of proving in zero-knowledge the existence of vulnerabilities in executables compiled to run on real-world processors. We demonstrate that it is practical to prove knowledge of real exploits for real-world processor architectures without the need for source code and without limiting our consideration to narrow vulnerability classes. To achieve this, we devise a novel circuit compiler and a toolchain that produces highly optimized, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for programs executed on the MSP430, an ISA commonly used in embedded hardware. Our toolchain employs a highly optimized circuit compiler and a number of novel optimizations to construct efficient proofs for program binaries. To demonstrate the capability of our system, we test our toolchain by constructing proofs for challenges in the Microcorruption capture the flag exercises.
Matthew Green 0001, Mathias Hall-Andersen, Eric Hennenfent, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Benjamin Perez, Gijs Van Laer
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.3
2019 Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts
abstract
An effective way to maximize code coverage in software tests is through dynamic symbolic execution-a technique that uses constraint solving to systematically explore a program's state space. We introduce an open-source dynamic symbolic execution framework called Manticore for analyzing binaries and Ethereum smart contracts. Manticore's flexible architecture allows it to support both traditional and exotic execution environments, and its API allows users to customize their analysis. Here, we discuss Manticore's architecture and demonstrate the capabilities we have used to find bugs and verify the correctness of code for our commercial clients.
Mark Mossberg, Felipe Manzano, Eric Hennenfent, Alex Groce, Gustavo Grieco, Josselin Feist, Trent Brunson, Artem Dinaburg
ASE3
2018 Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa
Deepak Kumar 0006, Riccardo Paccagnella, Paul Murley, Eric Hennenfent, Joshua Mason, Adam Bates 0001, Michael D. Bailey
USENIX Security Symposium4