Building robust ways to outwit MEV strategies by network validators in cryptocurrency applications is garnering rapid interests now. Encrypting mempools with (varieties of) threshold encryption systems is seen as one of the leading solutions to this problem. Particularly, the notion of Batched Threshold Encryption (BTE) proposed in multiple recent papers by Choudhuri et al. [USENIX 2024, 2025] and Agarwal et al. [CRYPTO 2025] gives promising approaches to build scalable encrypted mempools. However, the existing BTE does not address collusion among (potentially malicious) validators (leaking confidential information).

The rising commerciality of cryptocurrencies and blockchains in DeFi applications raises the importance of implementing robust methods to protect its regular users against parties with enormous amounts of resources that allows them to balefully influence the market through various Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) strategies. There are typical situations in such scenarios where an end-user may want to hide its transaction details till it has been executed. Ensuring the privacy of pending mempool transactions thus becomes an important goal. To this end, various decentralized versions of threshold encryption (TE) systems have been recently shown particularly effective.