Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Linxi Jiang
dblp:239/4866
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Systems and software security · 70% Security and privacy of machine learning · 30% | |
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 78% Video understanding and tracking · 22% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security
binary analysis |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Beyond Classification: Inferring Function Names in Stripped Binaries via Domain Adapted LLMs · NDSS 2025 |
Systems and software security › binary analysis
function name prediction |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Beyond Classification: Inferring Function Names in Stripped Binaries via Domain Adapted LLMs · NDSS 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Heuristic Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition Models · AAAI 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial attack
black-box adversarial attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Heuristic Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition Models · AAAI 2020 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition Models · ACM Multimedia 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition Models · ACM Multimedia 2019 |
Computer vision › Video understanding and tracking
video classification |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition Models · ACM Multimedia 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
large language model · 0.9domain adaptation · 0.9transferable perturbation · 0.8subspace projection · 0.8NES gradient estimation · 0.8salient region perturbation · 0.4query-efficient black-box attack · 0.4heuristic frame selection · 0.4
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Beyond Classification: Inferring Function Names in Stripped Binaries via Domain Adapted LLMs
Linxi Jiang, Zhiqiang Lin 0001 |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2024 | Imbalanced gradients: a subtle cause of overestimated adversarial robustness
Xingjun Ma, Linxi Jiang, Hanxun Huang, Zejia Weng, James Bailey 0001, Yu-Gang Jiang 0001 |
Mach. Learn. | 2 |
| 2022 | Adaptive Temporal Grouping for Black-box Adversarial Attacks on VideosabstractDeep-learning based video models, which have remarkable performance on action recognition tasks, are recently proved to be vulnerable to adversarial samples, even those generated in the black-box setting. However, these black-box attack methods are insufficient to attack videos models in real-world applications due to the requirement of lots of queries. To this end, we propose to boost the efficiency of black-box attacks on video recognition models. Although videos carry rich temporal information, they include redundant spatial information from adjacent frames. This motivates us to introduce the adaptive temporal grouping (ATG) method, which groups video frames by the similarity of their features extracted from the ImageNet-pretrained image model. By selecting one key-frame from each group, ATG helps any black-box attack methods to optimize the adversarial perturbations over key-frames instead of all frames, where the estimated gradient of key-frame is shared with other frames in each group. To balance the efficiency and precision of estimated gradients, ATG adaptively adjusts the group number by the magnitude of the current perturbation and the current query number. Through extensive experiments on the HMDB-51 dataset and the UCF-101 dataset, we demonstrate that ATG can significantly reduce the number of queries by more than 10% for the targeted attack. Zhipeng Wei 0001, Jingjing Chen 0001, Hao Zhang 0047, Linxi Jiang, Yu-Gang Jiang 0001 |
ICMR | 4 |
| 2020 | Heuristic Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition ModelsabstractWe study the problem of attacking video recognition models in the black-box setting, where the model information is unknown and the adversary can only make queries to detect the predicted top-1 class and its probability. Compared with the black-box attack on images, attacking videos is more challenging as the computation cost for searching the adversarial perturbations on a video is much higher due to its high dimensionality. To overcome this challenge, we propose a heuristic black-box attack model that generates adversarial perturbations only on the selected frames and regions. More specifically, a heuristic-based algorithm is proposed to measure the importance of each frame in the video towards generating the adversarial examples. Based on the frames' importance, the proposed algorithm heuristically searches a subset of frames where the generated adversarial example has strong adversarial attack ability while keeps the perturbations lower than the given bound. Besides, to further boost the attack efficiency, we propose to generate the perturbations only on the salient regions of the selected frames. In this way, the generated perturbations are sparse in both temporal and spatial domains. Experimental results of attacking two mainstream video recognition methods on the UCF-101 dataset and the HMDB-51 dataset demonstrate that the proposed heuristic black-box adversarial attack method can significantly reduce the computation cost and lead to more than 28% reduction in query numbers for the untargeted attack on both datasets. Zhipeng Wei 0001, Jingjing Chen 0001, Linxi Jiang, Tat-Seng Chua, Fengfeng Zhou, Yu-Gang Jiang 0001 |
AAAI | 4 |
| 2019 | Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition ModelsabstractDeep neural networks (DNNs) are known for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. These are examples that have undergone small, carefully crafted perturbations, and which can easily fool a DNN into making misclassifications at test time. Thus far, the field of adversarial research has mainly focused on image models, under either a white-box setting, where an adversary has full access to model parameters, or a black-box setting where an adversary can only query the target model for probabilities or labels. Whilst several white-box attacks have been proposed for video models, black-box video attacks are still unexplored. To close this gap, we propose the first black-box video attack framework, called V-BAD. V-BAD utilizestentative perturbations transferred from image models andpartition-based rectifications found by the NES to obtain good adversarial gradient estimates with fewer queries to the target model. V-BAD is equivalent to estimating the projection of the adversarial gradient on a selected subspace. Using three benchmark video datasets, we demonstrate that V-BAD can craft both untargeted and targeted attacks to fool two state-of-the-art deep video recognition models. For the targeted attack, it achieves $>$93% success rate using only an average of $3.4 \sim 8.4 \times 10^4$ queries, a similar number of queries to state-of-the-art black-box image attacks. This is despite the fact that videos often have two orders of magnitude higher dimensionality than static images. We believe that V-BAD is a promising new tool to evaluate and improve the robustness of video recognition models to black-box adversarial attacks. Linxi Jiang, Xingjun Ma, Shaoxiang Chen 0001, James Bailey 0001, Yu-Gang Jiang 0001 |
ACM Multimedia | 1 |