To transform cybersecurity and privacy research into a highly integrated, community-wide effort, researchers need a common, rich, representative research infrastructure that meets the needs across all members of the research community, and facilitates reproducible science. USC Information Sciences Institute and Northeastern University are meeting researcher needs, and have been funded by the NSF mid-scale research infrastructure program to build Security and Privacy Heterogeneous Environment for Reproducible Experimentation (SPHERE). SPHERE research infrastructure will offer access to an unprecedented variety of user-configurable hardware, software, and network resources, it will offer six user portals geared toward different populations of users, and it will support reproducible research via a combination of infrastructure services and community engagement activities.

The University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (Illinois), Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL), and the University of Southern California Information Sciences Institute (USC-ISI) consortium is working toward providing tools and expertise to enable collaborative research to improve security and resiliency of cyber physical systems. In this extended abstract we discuss the challenges and the solution space. We demonstrate the feasibility of some of the proposed components through a wide-area situational awareness experiment for the power grid across the three sites.

Since 2004, the DETER Cyber-security Project has worked to create an evolving infrastructure - facilities, tools, and processes - to provide a national resource for experimentation in cyber security. Building on our insights into requirements for cyber science and on lessons learned through 8 years of operation, we have made several transformative advances towards creating the next generation of DeterLab. These advances in experiment design and research methodology are yielding progressive improvements not only in experiment scale, complexity, diversity, and repeatability, but also in the ability of researchers to leverage prior experimental efforts of other researchers in the DeterLab user community. This paper describes the advances resulting in a new experimentation science and a transformed facility for cybersecurity research development and evaluation.

The SIGMA project is researching the integration and interoperation of security technologies into distributed computing environments based on CORBA, the Common Object Request Broker Architecture. The architectural results described in the paper are focused on security technologies that allow controlled, selective exchange of object oriented services among separate distributed systems that differ in security policy, mechanisms, and assurance. A central goal for our work in this area is to identify and prototype techniques that enable CORBA based application interoperation between trusted and untrusted distributed systems.

This paper describes our experiences in designing an embedded avionics system which must satisfy both real-time processing and security requirements. Our approach centers around the use of a trusted 'System Build' concept (T. Vickers Benzel et al., 1990). When the concept was first developed, the full extent to which it would drive the design of an embedded operating system was not fully appreciated. At this point, several years later, we have had experience in designing a trusted operating system within the context of a trusted System Build approach. This paper describes the lessons learned from this approach both in terms of the benefits to security which have been achieved and the challenges in designing and building the tools to support the System Build concept.>

A software development process for developing trusted systems under DOD-STD-2167A is described. The process is based on an approach that integrates trusted computer system evaluation criteria (TCSEC) requirements into the software development process required by DOD-STD-2167A. The process described focuses on development of DOD-STD-2167A data item deliverables, which have been tailored to include TCSEC deliverables. The author describes how these items can be produced in a manner which minimizes the impact on cost and budget, while increasing assurance in the product's trustworthiness.>

A state machine model is introduced for trusted processes. It makes explicit use of the notion of locking part of the state space in order to allow privileged actions to overlap. The model controls the interaction between overlapping actions by restricting the events that can change the locks, using the locks to restrict which events can change which parts of the state space, and preventing the initiation of actions that would interfere with currently executing ones.>

This paper presents a case study of the verification of the trusted software component of the SCOMP system Trusted Computing Base (TCB). The SCOMP system was developed by Honeywell and is the first system to achieve an A1 rating from the DoDCSC. A number of papers have been published that discuss the verification approach for the SCOMP system security kernel [15, 14, 12, 10]. The SCOMP system security kernel was verified using the Hierarchical Development Methodology in a manner similar to those used for previous kernel verifications [13]. Most of the research and applications to date have been directed towards verifying the security properties of kernel software. Much less is known about verifying the security properties of trusted software. This paper will present a case study of these trusted software verification in the SCOMP system. The case study will focus on defining what trusted software is in a kernelized systems, why trusted software is trusted, what are the security requirements to be proved, and how should these requirements be proven. Then a method developed at MITRE for the review of trusted software werification evidence using the Gypsy methodolgy will be presented. Finaly, area requiring futher research will be discussed.

This paper reports on the analysis and evaluation of the SCOMP kernel verification. The SCOMP system was developed by Honeywell FSD and is targeted at the Al class of the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [CSC8S]. It is currently under evaluation by the Department.of Defense Computer Security Center (DoDCSC). The work reported on here is significant in that the SCOMP system is the first commercially-available formally verified operating system. Furthermore, it is the first, system to be evaluated against.the A1 requirements for formal design specification and verification. The methods and procedures used for this analysis and evaluation will be of interest to future system designers, verifiers, and evaluators. The results of the verification, in particular the types of assurances that were gained, will also be discussed.