Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sahil Bhat
dblp:241/4299
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 70% Malware analysis · 23% Hardware security and side channels · 7% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Attack on Microarchitectural Events based Malware Detectors · DAC 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial machine learning |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Attack on Microarchitectural Events based Malware Detectors · DAC 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
evasion attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Attack on Microarchitectural Events based Malware Detectors · DAC 2019 |
Malware analysis › malware detection
hardware-based malware detection |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Attack on Microarchitectural Events based Malware Detectors · DAC 2019 |
Hardware security and side channels › hardware monitoring
hardware performance counter-based detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Attack on Microarchitectural Events based Malware Detectors · DAC 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
machine learning · 0.4adversarial sample generation · 0.4
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Adversarial Attack on Microarchitectural Events based Malware DetectorsabstractTo overcome the performance overheads incurred by the traditional software-based malware detection techniques, Hardware-assisted Malware Detection (HMD) using machine learning (ML) classifiers has emerged as a panacea to detect malicious applications and secure the systems. To classify benign and malicious applications, HMD primarily relies on the generated low-level microarchitectural events captured through Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs). This work creates an adversarial attack on the HMD systems to tamper the security by introducing the perturbations in the HPC traces with the aid of an adversarial sample generator application. To craft the attack, we first deploy an adversarial sample predictor to predict the adversarial HPC pattern for a given application to be misclassified by the deployed ML classifier in the HMD. Further, as the attacker has no direct access to manipulate the HPCs generated during runtime, based on the output of the adversarial sample predictor, we devise an adversarial sample generator wrapped around a normal application to produce HPC patterns similar to the adversarial predictor HPC trace. As the crafted adversarial sample generator application does not have any malicious operations, it is not detectable with traditional signature-based malware detection solutions. With the proposed attack, malware detection accuracy has been reduced to 18.04% from 82.76%. Sai Manoj Pudukotai Dinakarrao, Sairaj Amberkar, Sahil Bhat, Abhijitt Dhavlle, Hossein Sayadi, Avesta Sasan, Houman Homayoun, Setareh Rafatirad |
DAC | 3 |