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Gyuhong Lee

dblp:243/0124 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
2 papers
Cellular and mobile networks · 88% Physical-layer communications · 12%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › wireless network security › mobile network security › cellular network attack
fake base station attack
0.822019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019
Cellular and mobile networks
4G/LTE
0.522019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019
Network security › wireless network security › mobile network security
cellular network attack
0.412019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019
Network security › wireless network security › mobile network security
cellular network security
0.412019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019
Physical-layer communications
software-defined radio
0.112019
This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks · MobiSys 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

software-defined radio · 1.5open source LTE implementation · 0.8LTE base station · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks
abstract
4G LTE networks across the world (e.g., United States, Europe, and South Korea) use the same mechanism to broadcast emergency alerts. These alerts include AMBER, severe weather alerts, and the (unblockable) Presidential Alert in the US. We demonstrate the ability to spoof these alerts by forcing any 4G phone in the area of our malicious cell tower to receive and display a fabricated message. This demonstration uses a commercially-available software-defined radio, an LTE base station, and our modifications to the open-source NextEPC and srsLTE libraries to send the Presidential Alert to phones volunteered from the audience.
Max Hollingsworth, Gyuhong Lee, Jinsung Lee, Youngbin Im, Eric Wustrow, Dirk Grunwald, Sangtae Ha
MobiSys2
2019 This is Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE Networks
abstract
Modern cell phones are required to receive and display alerts via the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) program, under the mandate of the Warning, Alert, and Response Act of 2006. These alerts include AMBER alerts, severe weather alerts, and (unblockable) Presidential Alerts, intended to inform the public of imminent threats. Recently, a test Presidential Alert was sent to all capable phones in the United States, prompting concerns about how the underlying WEA protocol could be misused or attacked. In this paper, we investigate the details of this system, and develop and demonstrate the first practical spoofing attack on Presidential Alerts, using both commercially available hardware as well as modified open source software. Our attack can be performed using a commercially-available software defined radio, and our modifications to the open source NextEPC and srsLTE software libraries. We find that with only four malicious portable base stations of a single Watt of transmit power each, almost all of a 50,000-seat stadium can be attacked with a 90% success rate. The true impact of such an attack would of course depend on the density of cell phones in range; fake alerts in crowded cities or stadiums could potentially result in cascades of panic. Fixing this problem will require a large collaborative effort between carriers, government stakeholders, and cell phone manufacturers. To seed this effort, we also discuss several defenses to address this threat in both the short and long term.
Gyuhong Lee, Ji Hoon Lee, Jinsung Lee, Youngbin Im, Max Hollingsworth, Eric Wustrow, Dirk Grunwald, Sangtae Ha
MobiSys1