Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jiangyi Deng
dblp:243/3091
· DBLP profile ↗
13ranked-venue papers
6as first author
12since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-8262-7813ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 11 · 6 first-author · 11 since 2021Computer networks · 2 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
11 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 52% Digital forensics and information hiding · 11% Systems and software security · 10% | |
| Computer networks
3 papers |
Wireless sensing and localization · 93% Wireless networking · 7% | |
| Artificial intelligence
5 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 56% Language models and text generation · 24% Generative modeling · 10% | |
| Computer graphics and multimedia
1 paper |
Audio and music processing · 100% |
Topics — the 30 heaviest of 39, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
1.3 | 2 | 2024 | Alchemy: Data-Free Adversarial Training · CCS 2024 FenceSitter: Black-box, Content-Agnostic, and Synchronization-Free Enrollment-Phase Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems · CCS 2022 |
Biometric security
speaker recognition |
1.2 | 2 | 2023 | Catch You and I Can: Revealing Source Voiceprint Against Voice Conversion · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 FenceSitter: Black-box, Content-Agnostic, and Synchronization-Free Enrollment-Phase Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems · CCS 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › prompt injection
indirect prompt injection defense |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs · NDSS 2026 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs · NDSS 2026 |
Wireless sensing and localization › ranging
time difference of arrival |
1.0 | 2 | 2022 | A Nonlinearity-Based Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication for Mobile Devices · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022 NAuth: Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication via Nonlinearity · INFOCOM 2019 |
Authentication and access control
device authentication |
1.0 | 2 | 2022 | A Nonlinearity-Based Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication for Mobile Devices · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022 NAuth: Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication via Nonlinearity · INFOCOM 2019 |
Digital forensics and information hiding
watermarking |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Imprints: Mitigating Watermark Removal Attacks With Defensive Watermarks · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Digital forensics and information hiding › watermarking › watermarking security
watermarking defense |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Imprints: Mitigating Watermark Removal Attacks With Defensive Watermarks · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
watermark removal attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Imprints: Mitigating Watermark Removal Attacks With Defensive Watermarks · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Wireless sensing and localization › wifi sensing
channel state information sensing |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Dr. Defender: Proactive Detection of Autopilot Drones Based on CSI · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial robustness |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Alchemy: Data-Free Adversarial Training · CCS 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial robustness
adversarial training |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Alchemy: Data-Free Adversarial Training · CCS 2024 |
Systems and software security
content moderation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Legilimens: Practical and Unified Content Moderation for Large Language Model Services · CCS 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
generative model safety |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | SafeGen: Mitigating Sexually Explicit Content Generation in Text-to-Image Models · CCS 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Legilimens: Practical and Unified Content Moderation for Large Language Model Services · CCS 2024 |
Audio and music processing
speech processing |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | V-Cloak: Intelligibility-, Naturalness- & Timbre-Preserving Real-Time Voice Anonymization · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Audio and music processing
voice conversion |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | V-Cloak: Intelligibility-, Naturalness- & Timbre-Preserving Real-Time Voice Anonymization · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Privacy and data protection
anonymization |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | V-Cloak: Intelligibility-, Naturalness- & Timbre-Preserving Real-Time Voice Anonymization · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Privacy and data protection › anonymization › multimedia anonymization
voice anonymization |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | V-Cloak: Intelligibility-, Naturalness- & Timbre-Preserving Real-Time Voice Anonymization · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Wireless sensing and localization
acoustic sensing |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | A Nonlinearity-Based Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication for Mobile Devices · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | FenceSitter: Black-box, Content-Agnostic, and Synchronization-Free Enrollment-Phase Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems · CCS 2022 |
Authentication and access control
proximity-based authentication |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | A Nonlinearity-Based Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication for Mobile Devices · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022 |
Wireless sensing and localization › indoor localization
acoustic localization |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | NAuth: Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication via Nonlinearity · INFOCOM 2019 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs · NDSS 2026 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Imprints: Mitigating Watermark Removal Attacks With Defensive Watermarks · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning › adversarial natural language processing
adversarial prompt defense |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | SafeGen: Mitigating Sexually Explicit Content Generation in Text-to-Image Models · CCS 2024 |
Machine learning › Transfer learning and domain adaptation › foundation model adaptation
pre-trained model adaptation |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Sophon: Non-Fine-Tunable Learning to Restrain Task Transferability For Pre-trained Models · SP 2024 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model
text-to-image generation |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | SafeGen: Mitigating Sexually Explicit Content Generation in Text-to-Image Models · CCS 2024 |
Wireless sensing and localization
wifi sensing |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Dr. Defender: Proactive Detection of Autopilot Drones Based on CSI · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Wireless networking
wireless network protocols |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Dr. Defender: Proactive Detection of Autopilot Drones Based on CSI · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
optimization · 2.5attention mechanism · 2.0voice conversion · 2.0TDOA · 1.9large language model · 1.7text-agnostic visual representation elimination · 1.5conceptual feature extraction · 1.5adversarial prompt benchmarking · 1.5red-team data augmentation · 0.8motion characteristic analysis · 0.8meta-learning · 0.8fine-tuning simulation · 0.8data reconstruction · 0.8channel state information analysis · 0.8adversarial training · 0.8signal processing · 0.6acoustic nonlinearity · 0.6acoustic nonlinearity pattern · 0.4
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs
Yinan Zhong, Qianhao Miao, Yanjiao Chen, Jiangyi Deng, Yushi Cheng, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
NDSS | 4 |
| 2025 | RACONTEUR: A Knowledgeable, Insightful, and Portable LLM-Powered Shell Command Explainer
Jiangyi Deng, Xinfeng Li, Yanjiao Chen, Yijie Bai, Haiqin Weng, Yan Liu 0069, Tao Wei 0002, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2025 | Imprints: Mitigating Watermark Removal Attacks With Defensive WatermarksabstractWatermark is essential for protecting the intellectual property of private images. However, a wide range of watermark removal attacks, especially many AI-powered ones, can automatically predict and remove watermarks, posing serious concerns. In this paper, we present the design ofImprints, a defensive watermarking framework that fortifies watermarks against watermark removal attacks. By formulating an optimization problem that deters watermark removal attacks, we design image-independent/dependent defensive watermark models for effective batch/customized protection. We further enhance the watermark to be transferable to unseen watermark removal attacks and robust to editing distortions. Extensive experiments verify thatImprintsoutperforms existing baselines in terms of its immunity to 8 state-of-the-art watermark removal attacks and 3 commercial black-box watermark removal software. The source code is available athttps://github.com/Imprints-wm/Imprints. Xiaofu Chen, Jiangyi Deng, Yanjiao Chen, Chaohao Li, Cong Liu 0006, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 2 |
| 2024 | Alchemy: Data-Free Adversarial TrainingabstractMachine learning models have become integral to various aspects of daily life, prompting increased vulnerability to adversarial attacks.Adversarial training is one of the most promising and practical methods to enhance model robustness.Existing adversarial training methods, however, assume access to the original training data.But nowadays, more and more users directly download models from the open-source model platforms or tech companies, but the original training datasets are usually unreleased because of commercial interests or privacy.In such scenarios, the user cannot utilize the former adversarial training methods to improve model robustness because of the lack of original training datasets.Thus, we present the first exploration of a data-free adversarial training framework, Alchemy, which seeks to enhance model robustness without requiring access to the original training data.By addressing the notable challenges of reconstructing high-quality training data with robust features and improving the adversarial robustness to the inaccessible original dataset, our approach achieves the goals of both high accuracy maintenance and robustness improvement.Comprehensive experiments on four datasets compared with five baselines, demonstrate Alchemy 's high effectiveness.With no access to any training dataset, the average robustness improvement with Alchemy is effective in most attack scenarios.Additional evaluations underscore the framework's stability under different settings and discuss future research directions. Yijie Bai, Zhongming Ma, Yanjiao Chen, Jiangyi Deng, Shengyuan Pang, Yan Liu 0069, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
CCS | 4 |
| 2024 | SafeGen: Mitigating Sexually Explicit Content Generation in Text-to-Image ModelsabstractText-to-image (T2I) models, such as Stable Diffusion, have exhibited remarkable performance in generating high-quality images from text descriptions in recent years. However, text-to-image models may be tricked into generating not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, particularly in sexually explicit scenarios. Existing countermeasures mostly focus on filtering inappropriate inputs and outputs, or suppressing improper text embeddings, which can block sexually explicit content (e.g., naked) but may still be vulnerable to adversarial prompts -- inputs that appear innocent but are ill-intended. In this paper, we present SafeGen, a framework to mitigate sexual content generation by text-to-image models in a text-agnostic manner. The key idea is to eliminate explicit visual representations from the model regardless of the text input. In this way, the text-to-image model is resistant to adversarial prompts since such unsafe visual representations are obstructed from within. Extensive experiments conducted on four datasets and large-scale user studies demonstrate SafeGen's effectiveness in mitigating sexually explicit content generation while preserving the high-fidelity of benign images. SafeGen outperforms eight state-of-the-art baseline methods and achieves 99.4% sexual content removal performance. Furthermore, our constructed benchmark of adversarial prompts provides a basis for future development and evaluation of anti-NSFW-generation methods. Xinfeng Li, Jiangyi Deng, Chen Yan 0001, Yanjiao Chen, Xiaoyu Ji 0001, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
CCS | 3 |
| 2024 | Legilimens: Practical and Unified Content Moderation for Large Language Model ServicesabstractGiven the societal impact of unsafe content generated by large language models (LLMs), ensuring that LLM services comply with safety standards is a crucial concern for LLM service providers. Common content moderation methods are limited by an effectiveness-and-efficiency dilemma, where simple models are fragile while sophisticated models consume excessive computational resources. In this paper, we reveal for the first time that effective and efficient content moderation can be achieved by extracting conceptual features from chat-oriented LLMs, despite their initial fine-tuning for conversation rather than content moderation. We propose a practical and unified content moderation framework for LLM services, named Legilimens, which features both effectiveness and efficiency. Our red-team model-based data augmentation enhances the robustness of Legilimens against state-of-the-art jailbreaking. Additionally, we develop a framework to theoretically analyze the cost-effectiveness of Legilimens compared to other methods Jialin Wu 0001, Jiangyi Deng, Shengyuan Pang, Yanjiao Chen, Xinfeng Li, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
CCS | 2 |
| 2024 | Sophon: Non-Fine-Tunable Learning to Restrain Task Transferability For Pre-trained ModelsabstractInstead of building deep learning models from scratch, developers are more and more relying on adapting pre-trained models to their customized tasks. However, powerful pre-trained models may be misused for unethical or illegal tasks, e.g., privacy inference and unsafe content generation. In this paper, we introduce a pioneering learning paradigm, non-fine-tunable learning, which prevents the pre-trained model from being fine-tuned to indecent tasks while preserving its performance on the original task. To fulfill this goal, we propose Sophon, a protection framework that reinforces a given pre-trained model to be resistant to being fine-tuned in pre-defined restricted domains. Nonetheless, this is challenging due to a diversity of complicated fine-tuning strategies that may be adopted by adversaries. Inspired by model-agnostic meta-learning, we overcome this difficulty by designing sophisticated fine-tuning simulation and fine-tuning evaluation algorithms. In addition, we carefully design the optimization process to entrap the pre-trained model within a hard-to-escape local optimum regarding restricted domains. We have conducted extensive experiments on two deep learning modes (classification and generation), seven restricted domains, and six model architectures to verify the effectiveness of Sophon. Experiment results verify that fine-tuning Sophon-protected models incurs an overhead comparable to or even greater than training from scratch. Furthermore, we confirm the robustness of Sophon to three fine-tuning methods, five optimizers, various learning rates and batch sizes. Sophon may help boost further investigations into safe and responsible AI. Jiangyi Deng, Shengyuan Pang, Yanjiao Chen, Liangming Xia, Yijie Bai, Haiqin Weng, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
SP | 1 |
| 2024 | Dr. Defender: Proactive Detection of Autopilot Drones Based on CSIabstractThe market for consumer drones is growing and drones are becoming ever more pervasive than before in our life. However, drones have also brought about severe privacy violations and even safety issues. Especially, drones with cameras can snap pictures or take private videos. Researchers have designed drone detection mechanisms by passively inspecting the radio frequency (RF) signal in the communication channel between a drone and its controller. However, passive detection solutions shall fail when drones are in autopilot mode without control signals from controllers. In this paper, we seek to detect autopilot drones that transmit no RF signals by developing a proactive detection system named Dr. Defender. To this end, we resort to the Wi-Fi signals prevalent at each house and propose a proactive drone detection mechanism. To facilitate the detection of drones with Wi-Fi, we first study the motion characteristics of drones, including the shifting, moving, and spinning of propellers that can uniquely represent a drone. Then we investigate the physical layer information of Wi-Fi signals, i.e., the channel state information (CSI), to reveal specific motions of a drone. Finally, we implement our CSI-based proactive drone detection system, which requires no signal transmission from a drone or its controller. We extensively validate the feasibility and performance of our solution under different distances and directions of drones relative to a window. Results show that Dr. Defender can accurately detect drones 10 meters away. Jiangyi Deng, Xiaoyu Ji 0001, Beibei Wang 0001, Bin Wang 0062, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 1 |
| 2023 | Catch You and I Can: Revealing Source Voiceprint Against Voice Conversion
Jiangyi Deng, Yanjiao Chen, Yinan Zhong, Qianhao Miao, Xueluan Gong, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2023 | V-Cloak: Intelligibility-, Naturalness- & Timbre-Preserving Real-Time Voice Anonymization
Jiangyi Deng, Yanjiao Chen, Xiaofu Chen, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2022 | FenceSitter: Black-box, Content-Agnostic, and Synchronization-Free Enrollment-Phase Attacks on Speaker Recognition SystemsabstractSpeaker Recognition Systems (SRSs) grant access to legitimate users based on voiceprint. Recent research has shown that SRSs can be bypassed during the training phase (backdoor attacks) and the recognition phase (evasion attacks). In this paper, we explore a new attack surface of SRSs by presenting an enrollment-phase attack paradigm, named FenceSitter, where the adversary poisons the SRS using imperceptible adversarial ambient sound when the legitimate user registers into the SRS. The tainted voiceprint extracted by the SRS allows both the adversary and the legitimate user to access the system in all future recognition phases. To materialize such attack, we interleave carefully-designed continuous adversarial perturbations into innocent-sounding ambient sound. As computing adversarial perturbations over a long sequence of ambient sound carrier is intractable, we optimize over adversarial segments with content desensitization and physical realization. In addition, the attack is made available under the black-box settings by gradient estimation based on the natural evolution strategy. Extensive experiments have been conducted on both English and Chinese voice datasets for close-set identification (CSI), open-set identification (OSI), and speaker verification (SV) tasks. The results under various digital and physical conditions have verified the effectiveness and robustness of FenceSitter. With live enrollment experiments and user study, we further validate the practicality of FenceSitter. Our work reveals the vulnerability of SRSs during the enrollment phase, which may spur future research in improving the security of SRSs. Jiangyi Deng, Yanjiao Chen, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
CCS | 1 |
| 2022 | A Nonlinearity-Based Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication for Mobile DevicesabstractWith the proliferation of mobile devices, face-to-face device-to-device (D2D) communication has been applied to a variety of daily scenarios such as mobile payment and short distance file transfer. In D2D communications, a critical security problem is to verify the device legitimacy when they share no secrets in advance. Previous research proposed device authentication schemes based on pre-built database or exploiting physical properties. However, a remaining challenge is to secure face-to-face D2D communication even in the middle of a crowd, within which an attacker may hide. In this paper, we presentNAuth, a nonlinearity-enhanced, location-sensitive authentication mechanism. Especially, we target at the secure authentication within a limited range such as 20 cm, which is typical for face-to-face scenarios.NAuthdesigns averification schemebased on the nonlinear distortion of speaker-microphone systems and a location-basedvalidation model. The verification scheme guarantees device authentication consistency by extracting acoustic nonlinearity patterns (ANP) while the validation model ensures device legitimacy by measuring the time difference of arrival (TDOA) at two microphones. We analyze the feasibility and security ofNAuththeoretically and evaluate its performance experimentally. Results demonstrate thatNAuthcan verify the device legitimacy in the presence of nearby attackers. Xiaoyu Ji 0001, Chen Yan 0001, Jiangyi Deng, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. | 4 |
| 2019 | NAuth: Secure Face-to-Face Device Authentication via NonlinearityabstractWith the increasing prevalence of mobile devices, face-to-face device-to-device (D2D) communication has been applied to a variety of daily scenarios such as mobile payment and short distance file transfer. In D2D communications, a critical security problem is verifying the legitimacy of devices when they share no secrets in advance. Previous research addressed the problem with device authentication and pairing schemes based on user intervention or exploiting physical properties of the radio or acoustic channels. However, a remaining challenge is to secure face-to-face D2D communication even in the middle of a crowd, within which an attacker may hide. In this paper, we present Nhuth, a nonlinearity-enhanced, location-sensitive authentication mechanism for such communication. Especially, we target at the secure authentication within a limited range such as 20 cm, which is the common case for face-to-face scenarios. Nhuth contains averification scheme based on the nonlinear distortion of speaker-microphone systems and a location-based-validation model. The verification scheme guarantees device authentication consistency by extracting acoustic nonlinearity patterns (ANP) while the validation model ensures device legitimacy by measuring the time difference of arrival (TDOA) at two microphones. We analyze the security of Nhuth theoretically and evaluate its performance experimentally. Results show that Nhuth can verify the device legitimacy in the presence of nearby attackers. Xiaoyu Ji 0001, Chen Yan 0001, Jiangyi Deng, Wenyuan Xu 0001 |
INFOCOM | 4 |