Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Matthew V. Mahoney 0001
dblp:25/1792
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2005
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 3 · 2 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
2 papers |
Data mining · 90% Data stream processing · 10% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Network security · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Data mining
anomaly detection |
0.1 | 2 | 2005 | Modeling Multiple Time Series for Anomaly Detection · ICDM 2005 Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection of Hostile Network Traffic · ICDM 2003 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection
anomaly detection |
0.1 | 2 | 2003 | Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection of Hostile Network Traffic · ICDM 2003 Learning nonstationary models of normal network traffic for detecting novel attacks · KDD 2002 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection |
0.1 | 2 | 2003 | Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection of Hostile Network Traffic · ICDM 2003 Learning nonstationary models of normal network traffic for detecting novel attacks · KDD 2002 |
Data mining
time series analysis |
0.1 | 1 | 2005 | Modeling Multiple Time Series for Anomaly Detection · ICDM 2005 |
Data stream processing
online monitoring |
0.0 | 1 | 2005 | Modeling Multiple Time Series for Anomaly Detection · ICDM 2005 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
time series analysis · 0.1rule learning · 0.1online anomaly scoring · 0.1feature space construction · 0.1protocol vocabulary learning · 0.0probabilistic modeling · 0.0non-homogeneous poisson process · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | Modeling Multiple Time Series for Anomaly DetectionabstractOur goal is to generate comprehensible and accurate models from multiple time series for anomaly detection. The models need to produce anomaly scores in an online manner for real-life monitoring tasks. We introduce three algorithms that work in a constructed feature space and evaluate them with a real data set from the NASA shuttle program. Our offline and online evaluations indicate that our algorithms can be more accurate than two existing algorithms. Philip Chan 0001, Matthew V. Mahoney 0001 |
ICDM | 2 |
| 2003 | Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection of Hostile Network TrafficabstractWe introduce an algorithm called LERAD that learns rules for finding rare events in nominal time-series data with long range dependencies. We use LERAD to find anomalies in network packets and TCP sessions to detect novel intrusions. We evaluated LERAD on the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln Laboratory intrusion detection evaluation data set and on traffic collected in a university departmental server environment. Matthew V. Mahoney 0001, Philip Chan 0001 |
ICDM | 1 |
| 2003 | An Analysis of the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln Laboratory Evaluation Data for Network Anomaly Detection
Matthew V. Mahoney 0001, Philip Chan 0001 |
RAID | 1 |
| 2002 | Learning nonstationary models of normal network traffic for detecting novel attacksabstractTraditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) detect attacks by comparing current behavior to signatures of known attacks. One main drawback is the inability of detecting new attacks which do not have known signatures. In this paper we propose a learning algorithm that constructs models of normal behavior from attack-free network traffic. Behavior that deviates from the learned normal model signals possible novel attacks. Our IDS is unique in two respects. First, it is nonstationary, modeling probabilities based on the time since the last event rather than on average rate. This prevents alarm floods. Second, the IDS learns protocol vocabularies (at the data link through application layers) in order to detect unknown attacks that attempt to exploit implementation errors in poorly tested features of the target software. On the 1999 DARPA IDS evaluation data set [9], we detect 70 of 180 attacks (with 100 false alarms), about evenly divided between user behavioral anomalies (IP addresses and ports, as modeled by most other systems) and protocol anomalies. Because our methods are unconventional there is a significant non-overlap of our IDS with the original DARPA participants, which implies that they could be combined to increase coverage. Matthew V. Mahoney 0001, Philip Chan 0001 |
KDD | 1 |