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Shixuan Zhao 0002

dblp:258/4274-2 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-2992-3434ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 3 first-author · 4 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
3 papers
Cloud and datacenter computing · 88% GPUs and heterogeneous computing · 8% Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 5%
Network and information security
3 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Efficient and distributed learning · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
distributed training
0.912025
GPU Travelling: Efficient Confidential Collaborative Training with TEE-Enabled GPUs · CCS 2025
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.912025
Deanonymizing Device Identities via Side-channel Attacks in Exclusive-use IoTs & Mitigation · NDSS 2025
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud security
confidential computing
0.912025
GPU Travelling: Efficient Confidential Collaborative Training with TEE-Enabled GPUs · CCS 2025
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud security
trusted execution environment
0.912025
GPU Travelling: Efficient Confidential Collaborative Training with TEE-Enabled GPUs · CCS 2025
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.822023
vSGX: Virtualizing SGX Enclaves on AMD SEV · SP 2022
Reusable Enclaves for Confidential Serverless Computing · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cloud and datacenter computing › serverless computing
confidential serverless computing
0.712023
Reusable Enclaves for Confidential Serverless Computing · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cloud and datacenter computing
serverless computing
0.712023
Reusable Enclaves for Confidential Serverless Computing · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Internet of things and sensor networks
iot security
0.312025
Deanonymizing Device Identities via Side-channel Attacks in Exclusive-use IoTs & Mitigation · NDSS 2025
Processor architecture and microarchitecture
instruction set architecture
0.212022
vSGX: Virtualizing SGX Enclaves on AMD SEV · SP 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

side-channel analysis · 1.7NVIDIA H100 · 1.7Intel TDX · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 GPU Travelling: Efficient Confidential Collaborative Training with TEE-Enabled GPUs
abstract
Confidential collaborative machine learning (ML) enables multiple mutually distrusted data holders to jointly train an ML model while preserving the confidentiality of their private datasets due to regulatory or competitive reasons. However, existing works need frequent data and model exchanges during training via slower conventional links. They face increasing challenges due to the exponentially growing sizes of models and datasets in modern training workloads like large language models (LLMs), resulting in prohibitively high communication costs. In this paper, we propose a novel mechanism called GPU Travelling that leverages recently emerged confidential GPUs. With our rigorous design, the GPU can securely travel to the specific data holder to load the dataset directly into the GPU's protected memory and then return for training, eliminating the need for data transmission while ensuring confidentiality up to a data-centre level. We developed a prototype using Intel TDX and NVIDIA H100 and evaluated its performance on llm.c, a CUDA-based LLM training project, and demonstrated the performance and feasibility while maintaining strong security guarantees. The results showed at least 4x speed improvement when transmitting a 512 MiB dataset chunk versus conventional transmission.
Shixuan Zhao 0002, Zhongshu Gu, Salman Ahmed 0001, Enriquillo Valdez, Hani Jamjoom, Zhiqiang Lin 0001
CCS1
2025 Deanonymizing Device Identities via Side-channel Attacks in Exclusive-use IoTs & Mitigation
Christopher Ellis, Yue Zhang 0025, Mohit Kumar Jangid, Shixuan Zhao 0002, Zhiqiang Lin 0001
NDSS4
2023 Reusable Enclaves for Confidential Serverless Computing
Shixuan Zhao 0002, Pinshen Xu, Guoxing Chen, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1
2022 vSGX: Virtualizing SGX Enclaves on AMD SEV
abstract
The growing need of trusted execution environment (TEE) has boomed the development of hardware enclaves. However, current TEEs and their applications are tightly bound to the hardware implementation, hindering their compatibility across different platforms. This paper presents vSGX, a novel system to virtualize the execution of an Intel SGX enclave atop AMD SEV. The key idea is to interpose the execution of enclave instructions transparently to support the SGX ISA extensions, consolidate encrypted virtual memory of separated SEV virtual machines to create a single virtualized SGX-like address space, and provide attestations for the authenticity of the TEE and the integrity of enclave software with a trust chain rooted in the SEV hardware. By design, vSGX achieves a comparable level of security guarantees on SEV as that on Intel SGX. We have implemented vSGX and demonstrated it imposes reasonable performance overhead for SGX enclave execution.
Shixuan Zhao 0002, Mengyuan Li 0004, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin 0001
SP1