Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Eli Goldin
dblp:258/9185
· DBLP profile ↗
11ranked-venue papers
1as first author
11since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-7975-8281ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 10 · 1 first-author · 10 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
7 papers |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 78% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 19% Privacy and data protection · 3% | |
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Quantum computing and quantum information · 74% Computational complexity · 26% |
Topics — the 14 heaviest of 16, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
hash functions |
1.5 | 2 | 2025 | Random Oracle Combiners: Merkle-Damgård Style · EUROCRYPT (1) 2025 Random Oracle Combiners: Breaking the Concatenation Barrier for Collision-Resistance · CRYPTO (2) 2023 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
encryption |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Anamorphic-Resistant Encryption; Or Why the Encryption Debate is Still Alive · CRYPTO (3) 2025 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › hash functions › iterated hash functions
merkle-damgård construction |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Random Oracle Combiners: Merkle-Damgård Style · EUROCRYPT (1) 2025 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
quantum cryptography |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | A Meta-complexity Characterization of Quantum Cryptography · EUROCRYPT (7) 2025 |
Quantum computing and quantum information
quantum complexity theory |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Translating Between the Common Haar Random State Model and the Unitary Model · CRYPTO (2) 2025 |
Quantum computing and quantum information
quantum cryptography |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | On Central Primitives for Quantum Cryptography with Classical Communication · CRYPTO (7) 2024 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › hash functions
collision-resistant hash functions |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Random Oracle Combiners: Breaking the Concatenation Barrier for Collision-Resistance · CRYPTO (2) 2023 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › randomness extraction
deterministic extractor |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Extracting Randomness from Samplable Distributions, Revisited · FOCS 2023 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
randomness extraction |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Extracting Randomness from Samplable Distributions, Revisited · FOCS 2023 |
Computational complexity › circuit complexity
circuit lower bounds |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Extracting Randomness from Samplable Distributions, Revisited · FOCS 2023 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
key transparency |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Rotatable Zero Knowledge Sets - Post Compromise Secure Auditable Dictionaries with Application to Key Transparency · ASIACRYPT (3) 2022 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Rotatable Zero Knowledge Sets - Post Compromise Secure Auditable Dictionaries with Application to Key Transparency · ASIACRYPT (3) 2022 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
zero-knowledge sets |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Rotatable Zero Knowledge Sets - Post Compromise Secure Auditable Dictionaries with Application to Key Transparency · ASIACRYPT (3) 2022 |
Quantum computing and quantum information
quantum circuit |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Extracting Randomness from Samplable Distributions, Revisited · FOCS 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
pseudorandomness · 1.3postselecting circuits · 1.3post-compromise security · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Less is More: On Copy Complexity in Quantum Cryptography
Prabhanjan Vijendra Ananth, Eli Goldin |
CRYPTO (5) | 2 |
| 2026 | Unclonable Encryption in the Haar Random Oracle Model
James Bartusek, Eli Goldin |
CRYPTO (5) | 2 |
| 2025 | Anamorphic-Resistant Encryption; Or Why the Encryption Debate is Still Alive
Yevgeniy Dodis, Eli Goldin |
CRYPTO (3) | 2 |
| 2025 | Translating Between the Common Haar Random State Model and the Unitary Model
Eli Goldin, Mark Zhandry |
CRYPTO (2) | 1 |
| 2025 | A Meta-complexity Characterization of Quantum Cryptography
Bruno Pasqualotto Cavalar, Eli Goldin, Matthew Gray |
EUROCRYPT (7) | 2 |
| 2025 | Random Oracle Combiners: Merkle-Damgård Style
Yevgeniy Dodis, Eli Goldin |
EUROCRYPT (1) | 2 |
| 2024 | On Central Primitives for Quantum Cryptography with Classical Communication
Kai-Min Chung, Eli Goldin, Matthew Gray |
CRYPTO (7) | 2 |
| 2023 | Random Oracle Combiners: Breaking the Concatenation Barrier for Collision-Resistance
Yevgeniy Dodis, Niels Ferguson, Eli Goldin, Krzysztof Pietrzak |
CRYPTO (2) | 3 |
| 2023 | Extracting Randomness from Samplable Distributions, RevisitedabstractRandomness extractors provide a generic way of converting sources of randomness that are merely unpredictable into almost uniformly random bits. While in general, deterministic randomness extraction is impossible, it is possible if the source has some structural constraints.While much of the literature on deterministic extraction has focused on sources with strong independence properties, a natural class where deterministic extraction is possible is sources that can sampled by a polynomial size circuit, Levin [SIAM J Comp’86]. Trevisan and Vadhan [FOCS’00] explicitly constructed deterministic randomness extractors for this class of sources, assuming very strong circuit lower bounds.We suggest that there is perhaps an even more reasonable model of natural sources of randomness than Levin’s: sources sampled by polynomial size quantum circuits. Under a suitable circuit lower bound, we show that Trevisan and Vadhan’s extractor indeed works for this class.Along the way, we substantially improve their analysis in the classical case, showing that a circuit lower bound against NP-circuits suffice in the classical case (as opposed to a lower bounds on $\Sigma_{5}$-circuits, as shown by Trevisan and Vadhan). Moreover, we show that under this assumption, it is possible to handle sources sampled by postselecting circuits (a variant of nondeterministic circuits). We show that this model is sufficient to capture randomness extraction in the presence of efficiently computable leakage. Marshall Ball, Eli Goldin, Dana Dachman-Soled, Saachi Mutreja |
FOCS | 2 |
| 2023 | Immunizing Backdoored PRGs
Marshall Ball, Yevgeniy Dodis, Eli Goldin |
TCC (3) | 3 |
| 2022 | Rotatable Zero Knowledge Sets - Post Compromise Secure Auditable Dictionaries with Application to Key Transparency
Yevgeniy Dodis, Esha Ghosh, Eli Goldin, Balachandar Kesavan, Antonio Marcedone, Merry Ember Mou |
ASIACRYPT (3) | 4 |