Field-programmable gate arrays provide a flexible and easy-to-configure implementation platform that supports the development of tamper-proof networked embedded systems. Many of these systems employ the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm in order to achieve a secure mode of operation. Since this algorithm is of a high computational complexity, this paper utilizes various hardware-software co-design techniques for its implementation. These techniques vary in the degree of required design expertise, the degree of how (software) functionalities are implemented in hardware logic, and the achievable speedup, which is about 12 to approximately four thousand.

In object-oriented real-time computing scenarios, particularly where Corba is used in embedded systems with resource constraints, developers and system architects often utilize Corba object references as authorization tokens. This paper investigates the security of this method in principle, and it presents the results of the analysis of the work and computing effort necessary for a potential attacker to fabricate Corba object references to existing objects for the purpose of illegitimately gaining access to these objects at the instance of seven widely used Corba products

We present three attacks on the authentication protocol that has been proposed for the so-called global mobility network in the October 1997 issue of the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. We show that the attacks are feasible and propose corrections that make the protocol more robust and resistant against two of the presented attacks. The aim is to highlight some basic design principles for cryptographic protocols, the adherence to which would have prevented these attacks.

Presents the introductory welcome message from the conference proceedings.

The authors describe a simple logic. The logic uses the notion of channels that are generalisations of communication links with various security properties. The abstract nature of channels enables one to treat the protocol at a higher abstraction level than do most of the known logics for authentication, and thus, one can address the higher level functional properties of the system, without having to be concerned with the problems of the actual implementation. The major advantage of the proposed logic is its suitability for the design of authentication protocols. They give a set of synthetic rules that can be used by protocol designers to construct a protocol in a systematic way.