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Hejun Wang

dblp:266/5714 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-8086-6693ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
complexity of fair division
0.412020
Fair Division Through Information Withholding · AAAI 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
envy-freeness
0.412020
Fair Division Through Information Withholding · AAAI 2020
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
fair division
0.412020
Fair Division Through Information Withholding · AAAI 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

synthetic and real-world preference data experiments · 0.4approximation algorithm · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 From Sample Generation to Efficacy Transfer: Optimization of Privacy-Preserving LLMs for Content Moderation
Mingyong Yin, Hejun Wang
TrustCom3
2023 Adaptive CNN-Based Image Compression Model for Improved Remote Desktop Experience
Hejun Wang, Yubing Duan, Mingyong Yin, Fanzhi Meng
ICONIP (8)1
2021 Ternate Chinese Medicines Alleviate Joint Pain via Inhibiting Rheumatoid Arthritis Pathway
abstract
Pain in rheumatoid arthritis (RA) joints is the most significant symptom which is a multifactor process that may link to peripheral joint inflammation, disease progression, structural change, and the dysregulation of the central nervous system. In clinical practices, a ternate Chinese medicine (e.g. PAEONIAE RADIX ALBA/ 白芍, CHUANXIONG RHIZOMA/ 川芎, and CORYDALIS RHIZOMA/ 延胡索) can alleviate pain significantly. However, due to the complexity of multi-constituent, multi-compound, multi-target, and multi-regulation, the mechanism is not clear. In this study, targeting the RA pain pathways, bioinformatics and network pharmacology analysis were deployed to explore the pain alleviation mechanism. As a result, this study delivered a candidate mechanism network: 6 bioactive compounds of the ternate Chinese medicines inhibit 24 target proteins (e.g. IL4/6/1B, NFKB1/2, MAPK8, et a1) which also further regulate 14 downstream proteins (e.g., CXCLS, CCL2, TRAF6, et al.). The mechanism network was also validated with the RNA transcript microarray data with samples of a normal control group, joint pain group, and RA group.
Hongtao Guo, Hejun Wang, Guang Zheng
BIBM2
2021 Optimization of Remote Desktop with CNN-based Image Compression Model
Hejun Wang, Hongjun Dai, Meikang Qiu, Meiqin Liu 0001
KSEM1
2020 Fair Division Through Information Withholding
abstract
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a different good, resulting in a weak aggregate guarantee. We study allocations that are nearly envy-free in aggregate, and define a novel fairness notion based on information withholding. Under this notion, an agent can withhold (or hide) some of the goods in its bundle and reveal the remaining goods to the other agents. We observe that in practice, envy-freeness can be achieved by withholding only a small number of goods overall. We show that finding allocations that withhold an optimal number of goods is computationally hard even for highly restricted classes of valuations. In contrast to the worst-case results, our experiments on synthetic and real-world preference data show that existing algorithms for finding EF1 allocations withhold a close-to-optimal amount of information.
Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish, Hejun Wang, Lirong Xia
AAAI4