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Philipp Jeitner

dblp:271/6045 · DBLP profile ↗
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8ranked-venue papers
3as first author
7since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-5290-6328ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 6 · 3 first-author · 5 since 2021Computer networks · 2 · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
7 papers
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
7 papers
Routing and switching · 76% Internet architecture and protocols · 24%

Topics — the 12 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security
routing security		 1.832023
Beyond Limits: How to Disable Validators in Secure Networks · SIGCOMM 2023
Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack · USENIX Security Symposium 2022
Behind the Scenes of RPKI · CCS 2022
Network security › routing security
RPKI		 1.122022
Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack · USENIX Security Symposium 2022
Behind the Scenes of RPKI · CCS 2022
Network security › protocol security
DNS security		 1.022021
Injection Attacks Reloaded: Tunnelling Malicious Payloads over DNS · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
From IP to transport and beyond: cross-layer attacks against applications · SIGCOMM 2021
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing › BGP
BGP security		 0.822023
Beyond Limits: How to Disable Validators in Secure Networks · SIGCOMM 2023
Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack · USENIX Security Symposium 2022
Routing and switching › fault-tolerant routing
router failure resilience		 0.612022
XDRI Attacks - and - How to Enhance Resilience of Residential Routers · USENIX Security Symposium 2022
Internet architecture and protocols
domain name system		 0.512021
Injection Attacks Reloaded: Tunnelling Malicious Payloads over DNS · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Network security › wireless network security
cross-layer attack		 0.512021
From IP to transport and beyond: cross-layer attacks against applications · SIGCOMM 2021
Network security › protocol security › DNS security
DNS cache poisoning		 0.512021
From IP to transport and beyond: cross-layer attacks against applications · SIGCOMM 2021
Network security
off-path attack		 0.512021
The Hijackers Guide To The Galaxy: Off-Path Taking Over Internet Resources · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Routing and switching
inter-domain routing		 0.322022
Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack · USENIX Security Symposium 2022
From IP to transport and beyond: cross-layer attacks against applications · SIGCOMM 2021
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing
BGP		 0.212022
Behind the Scenes of RPKI · CCS 2022
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing › inter-domain routing security
BGP hijacking		 0.112021
From IP to transport and beyond: cross-layer attacks against applications · SIGCOMM 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

vulnerability analysis · 1.1measurement study · 1.1attack analysis · 1.1DNS tunneling · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Beyond Limits: How to Disable Validators in Secure Networks
abstract
Relying party validator is a critical component of RPKI: it fetches and validates signed authorizations mapping prefixes to their owners. Routers use this information to block bogus BGP routes.
Tomas Hlavacek, Philipp Jeitner, Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
 SIGCOMM2
2022 Behind the Scenes of RPKI
abstract
Best practices for making RPKI resilient to failures and attacks recommend using multiple URLs and certificates for publication points as well as multiple relying parties. We find that these recommendations are already supported by 63% of the ASes with RPKI.
Tomas Hlavacek, Philipp Jeitner, Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
 CCS2
2022 Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack
Tomas Hlavacek, Philipp Jeitner, Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
 USENIX Security Symposium2
2022 XDRI Attacks - and - How to Enhance Resilience of Residential Routers
Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Lucas Teichmann, Michael Waidner
 USENIX Security Symposium1
2021 From IP to transport and beyond: cross-layer attacks against applications
abstract
We perform the first analysis of methodologies for launching DNS cache poisoning: manipulation at the IP layer, hijack of the inter-domain routing and probing open ports via side channels. We evaluate these methodologies against DNS resolvers in the Internet and compare them with respect to effectiveness, applicability and stealth. Our study shows that DNS cache poisoning is a practical and pervasive threat.
Tianxiang Dai, Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
 SIGCOMM2
2021 The Hijackers Guide To The Galaxy: Off-Path Taking Over Internet Resources
Tianxiang Dai, Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
 USENIX Security Symposium2
2021 Injection Attacks Reloaded: Tunnelling Malicious Payloads over DNS
Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann
 USENIX Security Symposium1
2020 The Impact of DNS Insecurity on Time
abstract
We demonstrate the first practical off-path time shifting attacks against NTP as well as against Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) secure Chronos-enhanced NTP. Our attacks exploit the insecurity of DNS allowing us to redirect the NTP clients to attacker controlled servers. We perform large scale measurements of the attack surface in NTP clients and demonstrate the threats to NTP due to vulnerable DNS.
Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
 DSN1