Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Minhua Lin
dblp:274/1711
· DBLP profile ↗
13ranked-venue papers
3as first author
13since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-1591-7172ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 11 · 3 first-author · 11 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 11 · 2 first-author · 11 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 3 · 3 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
10 papers |
Graph learning · 48% Trustworthy machine learning · 35% Efficient and distributed learning · 12% | |
| Network and information security
7 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Data mining · 67% Recommender systems · 33% |
Topics — the 29 heaviest of 29, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Graph learning
graph neural network |
4.3 | 6 | 2025 | Stealing Training Graphs from Graph Neural Networks · KDD (1) 2025 PreGIP: Watermarking the Pretraining of Graph Neural Networks for Deep IP Protection · KDD (2) 2025 Robustness Inspired Graph Backdoor Defense · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
2.3 | 3 | 2025 | Are You Using Reliable Graph Prompts? Trojan Prompt Attacks on Graph Neural Networks · KDD (2) 2025 Rethinking Graph Backdoor Attacks: A Distribution-Preserving Perspective · KDD 2024 Unnoticeable Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural Networks · WWW 2023 |
Machine learning › Graph learning
graph prompt learning |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | Fairness-aware Prompt Tuning for Graph Neural Networks · WWW 2025 Are You Using Reliable Graph Prompts? Trojan Prompt Attacks on Graph Neural Networks · KDD (2) 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.9 | 2 | 2024 | Certifiably Robust Graph Contrastive Learning · NeurIPS 2023 Rethinking Graph Backdoor Attacks: A Distribution-Preserving Perspective · KDD 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › fairness
fair graph learning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fairness-aware Prompt Tuning for Graph Neural Networks · WWW 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
fairness |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fairness-aware Prompt Tuning for Graph Neural Networks · WWW 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
model compression |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | A Survey on Small Language Models in the Era of Large Language Models: Architecture, Capabilities, and Trustworthiness · KDD (2) 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
robust learning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Robustness Inspired Graph Backdoor Defense · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › model compression › lightweight neural network
small language models |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | A Survey on Small Language Models in the Era of Large Language Models: Architecture, Capabilities, and Trustworthiness · KDD (2) 2025 |
Data mining › time series analysis › time series forecasting
extreme event prediction |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | xTime: Extreme Event Prediction with Hierarchical Knowledge Distillation and Expert Fusion · ICDM 2025 |
Recommender systems
mixture of experts |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | xTime: Extreme Event Prediction with Hierarchical Knowledge Distillation and Expert Fusion · ICDM 2025 |
Data mining › time series analysis
time series forecasting |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | xTime: Extreme Event Prediction with Hierarchical Knowledge Distillation and Expert Fusion · ICDM 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
backdoor defense |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Robustness Inspired Graph Backdoor Defense · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › graph neural network security
graph backdoor defense |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Robustness Inspired Graph Backdoor Defense · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Stealing Training Graphs from Graph Neural Networks · KDD (1) 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › model intellectual property protection
model watermarking |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | PreGIP: Watermarking the Pretraining of Graph Neural Networks for Deep IP Protection · KDD (2) 2025 |
Machine learning › Graph learning › graph neural network
graph neural network security |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Rethinking Graph Backdoor Attacks: A Distribution-Preserving Perspective · KDD 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
graph adversarial attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Efficient, Direct, and Restricted Black-Box Graph Evasion Attacks to Any-Layer Graph Neural Networks via Influence Function · WSDM 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
graph backdoor attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Rethinking Graph Backdoor Attacks: A Distribution-Preserving Perspective · KDD 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
certified robustness |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Certifiably Robust Graph Contrastive Learning · NeurIPS 2023 |
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › contrastive learning
graph contrastive learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Certifiably Robust Graph Contrastive Learning · NeurIPS 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
graph neural network security |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Unnoticeable Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural Networks · WWW 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
large language model trustworthiness |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | A Survey on Small Language Models in the Era of Large Language Models: Architecture, Capabilities, and Trustworthiness · KDD (2) 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Are You Using Reliable Graph Prompts? Trojan Prompt Attacks on Graph Neural Networks · KDD (2) 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
out-of-distribution detection |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Rethinking Graph Backdoor Attacks: A Distribution-Preserving Perspective · KDD 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
black-box attack |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Efficient, Direct, and Restricted Black-Box Graph Evasion Attacks to Any-Layer Graph Neural Networks via Influence Function · WSDM 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
graph adversarial attack |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Certifiably Robust Graph Contrastive Learning · NeurIPS 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
graph neural network robustness |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Certifiably Robust Graph Contrastive Learning · NeurIPS 2023 |
Machine learning › Graph learning › graph neural network
node classification |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Unnoticeable Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural Networks · WWW 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
watermarking · 1.7self-supervised pretraining · 1.7robust training · 1.7random edge dropping · 1.7prompt tuning · 1.7graph diffusion model · 1.7diffusion noise optimization · 1.7backdoor injection · 1.7proxy tuning · 0.9mixture of experts · 0.9mamba · 0.9knowledge distillation · 0.9out-of-distribution detector · 0.8adversarial learning · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | LLM and GNN Are Complementary: Distilling LLM for Multimodal Graph Learning
Zongyu Wu 0001, Minhua Lin, Xiang Zhang 0001, Suhang Wang |
IEEE Big Data | 3 |
| 2025 | xTime: Extreme Event Prediction with Hierarchical Knowledge Distillation and Expert FusionabstractExtreme events frequently occur in real-world time series and often carry significant practical implications. In domains such as climate and healthcare, these events, such as floods, heatwaves, or acute medical episodes, can lead to serious consequences. Accurate forecasting of such events is therefore of substantial importance. Most existing time series forecasting models are optimized for overall performance within the prediction window, but often struggle to accurately predict extreme events, such as high temperatures or heart rate spikes. The main challenges are data imbalance and the neglect of valuable information contained in intermediate events that precede extreme events. In this paper, we propose xTime, a novel framework for extreme event forecasting in time series. xTime leverages knowledge distillation to transfer information from models trained on lower-rarity events, thereby improving prediction performance on rarer ones. In addition, we introduce a MoE mechanism that dynamically selects and fuses outputs from expert models across different rarity levels, which further improves the forecasting performance for extreme events. Experiments on multiple datasets show that xTime achieves consistent improvements, with forecasting accuracy on extreme events improving from 3% to 78%. Wenchao Yu, Suhang Wang, Minhua Lin, Lingwei Chen, Wei Cheng 0002 |
ICDM | 4 |
| 2025 | Robustness Inspired Graph Backdoor DefenseabstractGraph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in tasks such as node classification and graph classification. However, recent studies reveal that GNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, posing a significant threat to their real-world adoption. Despite initial efforts to defend against specific graph backdoor attacks, there is no work on defending against various types of backdoor attacks where generated triggers have different properties. Hence, we first empirically verify that prediction variance under edge dropping is a crucial indicator for identifying poisoned nodes. With this observation, we propose using random edge dropping to detect backdoors and theoretically show that it can efficiently distinguish poisoned nodes from clean ones. Furthermore, we introduce a novel robust training strategy to efficiently counteract the impact of the triggers. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets show that our framework can effectively identify poisoned nodes, significantly degrade the attack success rate, and maintain clean accuracy when defending against various types of graph backdoor attacks with different properties. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zzwjames/RIGBD. Zhiwei Zhang 0028, Minhua Lin, Zongyu Wu 0001, Enyan Dai, Suhang Wang |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2025 | PreGIP: Watermarking the Pretraining of Graph Neural Networks for Deep IP ProtectionabstractPretraining on Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) has shown great power in facilitating various downstream tasks. As pretraining generally requires huge amount of data and computational resources, the pretrained GNNs are high-value Intellectual Properties (IP) of the legitimate owner. However, adversaries may illegally copy and deploy the pretrained GNN models for their downstream tasks. Though initial efforts have been made to watermark GNN classifiers for IP protection, these methods are not applicable to self-supervised pretraining of GNN models. Hence, in this work, we propose a novel framework named PreGIP to watermark the pretraining of GNN encoder for IP protection while maintaining the high-quality of the embedding space. PreGIP incorporates a task-free watermarking loss to watermark the embedding space of pretrained GNN encoder. A finetuning-resistant watermark injection is further deployed. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments show the effectiveness of PreGIP. The code can be find in https://anonymous.4open.science/r/PreGIP-semi/ and https://anonymous.4open.science/r/PreGIP-transfer/. Enyan Dai, Minhua Lin, Suhang Wang |
KDD (2) | 2 |
| 2025 | Stealing Training Graphs from Graph Neural NetworksabstractGraph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown promising results in modeling graphs in various tasks. The training of GNNs, especially on specialized tasks such as bioinformatics, demands extensive expert annotations, which are expensive and usually contain sensitive information of data providers. The trained GNN models are often shared for deployment in the real world. As neural networks can memorize the training samples, the model parameters of GNNs have a high risk of leaking private training data. Our theoretical analysis shows the strong connections between trained GNN parameters and the training graphs used, confirming the training graph leakage issue. However, explorations into training data leakage from trained GNNs are rather limited. Therefore, we investigate a novel problem of stealing graphs from trained GNNs. To obtain high-quality graphs that resemble the target training set, a graph diffusion model with diffusion noise optimization is deployed as a graph generator. Furthermore, we propose a selection method that effectively leverages GNN model parameters to identify training graphs from samples generated by the graph diffusion model. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in stealing training graphs from the trained GNN. Minhua Lin, Enyan Dai, Jinyuan Jia 0001, Xiang Zhang 0001, Suhang Wang |
KDD (1) | 1 |
| 2025 | Are You Using Reliable Graph Prompts? Trojan Prompt Attacks on Graph Neural NetworksabstractGraph Prompt Learning (GPL) has been introduced as a promising approach that uses prompts to adapt pre-trained GNN models to specific downstream tasks without requiring fine-tuning of the entire model. Despite the advantages of GPL, little attention has been given to its vulnerability to backdoor attacks, where an adversary can manipulate the model's behavior by embedding hidden triggers. Existing graph backdoor attacks rely on modifying model parameters during training, but this approach is impractical in GPL as GNN encoder parameters are frozen after pre-training. Moreover, downstream users may fine-tune their own task models on clean datasets, further complicating the attack. In this paper, we propose TGPA, a backdoor attack framework designed specifically for GPL. TGPA injects backdoors into graph prompts without modifying pre-trained GNN encoders and ensures high attack success rates and clean accuracy. To address the challenge of model fine-tuning by users, we introduce a finetuning-resistant poisoning approach that maintains the effectiveness of the backdoor even after downstream model adjustments. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets under various settings demonstrate the effectiveness of TGPA in compromising GPL models with fixed GNN encoders. Minhua Lin, Zhiwei Zhang 0028, Enyan Dai, Zongyu Wu 0001, Yilong Wang 0001, Xiang Zhang 0001, Suhang Wang |
KDD (2) | 1 |
| 2025 | A Survey on Small Language Models in the Era of Large Language Models: Architecture, Capabilities, and TrustworthinessabstractLarge language models (LLMs) based on Transformer architecture are powerful but face challenges with deployment, inference latency, and costly fine-tuning. These limitations highlight the emerging potential of small language models (SLMs), which can either replace LLMs through innovative architectures and technologies, or assist them as efficient proxy or reward models. Emerging architectures such as Mamba and xLSTM address the quadratic scaling of inference with window length in Transformers by enabling linear scaling. To maximize SLM performance, test-time compute scaling strategies reduce the performance gap with LLMs by allocating extra compute budget during test time. Beyond standalone usage, SLMs could also assist in LLMs via weak-to-strong learning, proxy tuning, and guarding, fostering secure and efficient LLM deployment. Lastly, the trustworthiness of SLMs remains a critical yet underexplored research area. However, there is a lack of tutorials on cutting-edge SLM technologies, prompting us to conduct one. Fali Wang, Minhua Lin, Yao Ma 0001, Hui Liu 0033, Qi He 0002, Xianfeng Tang, Jiliang Tang, Jian Pei 0001, Suhang Wang |
KDD (2) | 2 |
| 2025 | Fairness-aware Prompt Tuning for Graph Neural NetworksabstractGraph prompt tuning has achieved significant success for its ability to effectively adapt pre-trained graph neural networks to various downstream tasks. However, the pre-trained models may learn discriminatory representation due to the inherent prejudice in graph-structured data. Existing graph prompt tuning overlooks such unfairness, leading to biased outputs towards certain demographic groups determined by sensitive attributes such as gender, age, and political ideology. To overcome this limitation, we propose a fairness-aware graph prompt tuning method to promote fairness while enhancing the generality of any pre-trained GNNs (named FPrompt). FPrompt introduces hybrid graph prompts to augment counterfactual data while aligning the pre-training and downstream tasks. It also applies edge modification to increase sensitivity heterophily. We provide a two-fold theoretical analysis: first, we demonstrate that FPrompt possesses universal capabilities in handling pre-trained GNN models across various pre-training strategies, ensuring its adaptability in different scenarios. Second, we show that FPrompt effectively reduces the upper bound of generalized statistical parity, thereby mitigating the bias of pre-trained models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FPrompt outperforms baseline models in both accuracy and fairness (33%) on benchmark datasets. Additionally, we introduce a new benchmark for transferable evaluation, showing that FPrompt achieves state-of-the-art generalization performance. Zhengpin Li, Minhua Lin, Jian Wang 0016, Suhang Wang |
WWW | 2 |
| 2024 | Adversarial Robustness in Graph Neural Networks: Recent Advances and New FrontierabstractIn recent years, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have attracted substantial attention due to their powerful ability in modeling graph-structured data and broad applications across various domains such as social media, biology, health and finance. Despite these successes, GNNs exhibit significant vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, which poses challenges to their reliable deployment in real scenarios. In this tutorial, we will provide an in-depth exploration of existing adversarial attacks and the state-of-the-art techniques in enhancing the robustness of GNNs. Participants will gain insights into advancing attack and defense methods, along with evaluation and comparison of robust GNN models. Besides a thorough overview on current landscape, we will also cover the summary and discussion on potential future directions, aiming to inspire more researchers to engage and innovate in this field. Zhichao Hou, Minhua Lin, Mohamad Ali Torkamani, Suhang Wang |
DSAA | 2 |
| 2024 | Rethinking Graph Backdoor Attacks: A Distribution-Preserving PerspectiveabstractGraph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks. However, recent works reveal that GNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Generally, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching backdoor triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. A GNN trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes attached with trigger to the target class. Despite their effectiveness, our empirical analysis shows that triggers generated by existing methods tend to be out-of-distribution (OOD), which significantly differ from the clean data. Hence, these injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned with widely used outlier detection methods in real-world applications. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with in-distribution (ID) triggers. To generate ID triggers, we introduce an OOD detector in conjunction with an adversarial learning strategy to generate the attributes of the triggers within distribution. To ensure a high attack success rate with ID triggers, we introduce novel modules designed to enhance trigger memorization by the victim model trained on poisoned graph. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in generating in distribution triggers that can bypass various defense strategies while maintaining a high attack success rate. Zhiwei Zhang 0028, Minhua Lin, Enyan Dai, Suhang Wang |
KDD | 2 |
| 2024 | Efficient, Direct, and Restricted Black-Box Graph Evasion Attacks to Any-Layer Graph Neural Networks via Influence FunctionabstractGraph neural network (GNN), the mainstream method to learn on graph data, is vulnerable to graph evasion attacks, where an attacker slightly perturbing the graph structure can fool trained GNN models. Existing work has at least one of the following drawbacks: 1) limited to directly attack two-layer GNNs; 2) inefficient; and 3) impractical, as they need to know full or part of GNN model parameters. Binghui Wang, Minhua Lin, Tianxiang Zhou, Pan Zhou 0001, Ang Li 0005, Hai Li 0001, Yiran Chen 0001 |
WSDM | 2 |
| 2023 | Certifiably Robust Graph Contrastive LearningabstractGraph Contrastive Learning (GCL) has emerged as a popular unsupervised graph representation learning method. However, it has been shown that GCL is vulnerable to adversarial attacks on both the graph structure and node attributes. Although empirical approaches have been proposed to enhance the robustness of GCL, the certifiable robustness of GCL is still remain unexplored. In this paper, we develop the first certifiably robust framework in GCL. Specifically, we first propose a unified criteria to evaluate and certify the robustness of GCL. We then introduce a novel technique, RES (Randomized Edgedrop Smoothing), to ensure certifiable robustness for any GCL model, and this certified robustness can be provably preserved in downstream tasks. Furthermore, an effective training method is proposed for robust GCL. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in providing effective certifiable robustness and enhancing the robustness of any GCL model. The source code of RES is available at https://github.com/ventr1c/RES-GCL. Minhua Lin, Teng Xiao, Enyan Dai, Xiang Zhang 0001, Suhang Wang |
NeurIPS | 1 |
| 2023 | Unnoticeable Backdoor Attacks on Graph Neural NetworksabstractGraph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in various tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent studies find that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, effective backdoor attacks on graphs are still an open problem. In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. The backdoored GNNs trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes to target class once attached with triggers. Though there are some initial efforts in graph backdoor attacks, our empirical analysis shows that they may require a large attack budget for effective backdoor attacks and the injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget. To fully utilize the attack budget, we propose to deliberately select the nodes to inject triggers and target class labels in the poisoning phase. An adaptive trigger generator is deployed to obtain effective triggers that are difficult to be noticed. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets against various defense strategies demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in conducting effective unnoticeable backdoor attacks. Enyan Dai, Minhua Lin, Xiang Zhang 0001, Suhang Wang |
WWW | 2 |