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Stefan Zetzsche

dblp:277/0976 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
5since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0001-1304-0613ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program synthesis and code generation · 50% Requirements engineering and software design · 25% Program verification · 25%
Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 87% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 13%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › privacy mechanism design
differentially private mechanism
0.912025
Verified Foundations for Differential Privacy · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
0.912025
Verified Foundations for Differential Privacy · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025
Program synthesis and code generation
code generation with language models
0.912025
CLEVER: A Curated Benchmark for Formally Verified Code Generation · NeurIPS 2025
Program verification
proof assistants
0.912025
CLEVER: A Curated Benchmark for Formally Verified Code Generation · NeurIPS 2025
Requirements engineering and software design › specification
specification generation
0.912025
CLEVER: A Curated Benchmark for Formally Verified Code Generation · NeurIPS 2025
Program synthesis and code generation › formal synthesis
verified code generation
0.912025
CLEVER: A Curated Benchmark for Formally Verified Code Generation · NeurIPS 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
random number generation
0.312025
Verified Foundations for Differential Privacy · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

type checking · 0.9proof assistant (lean) · 0.9probability monad · 0.9measure theory · 0.9large language model · 0.9fourier analysis · 0.9agentic approaches · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Compiler Fuzzing in Continuous Integration: A Case Study on Dafny
abstract
We present the design of CompFuzzCI, a framework for incorporating compiler fuzzing into the continuous integration (CI) workflow of the compiler for Dafny, an open-source programming language that is increasingly used in and contributed to by industry. CompFuzzCI explores the idea of running a brief fuzzing campaign as part of the CI workflow of each pull request to a compiler project. Making this effective involved devising solutions for various challenges, including how to deduplicate bugs, how to bisect the project's revision history to find the commit responsible for a regression (challenging when project interfaces change over time), and how to ensure that fuzz testing complements existing regression testing efforts. We explain how we have engaged with the Dafny development team at Amazon to approach these and other problems in the design of CompFuzzCI, and the lessons learned in the process. As a by-product of our work with CompFuzzCI, we found and reported three previously-unknown bugs in the Dafny compiler. We also present a controlled experiment simulating the use of CompFuzzCI over time on a range of Dafny commits, to assess its ability to find historic bugs. CompFuzzCI prioritises support for the Dafny compiler and the fuzz-d fuzzer but has a generalisable design: with modest modification to its internal interfaces, it could be adapted to work with other fuzzers, and the lessons learned from our experience will be relevant to teams considering including fuzzing in the CI of other industrial software projects.
Karnbongkot Boonriong, Stefan Zetzsche, Alastair F. Donaldson
ICST2
2025 CLEVER: A Curated Benchmark for Formally Verified Code Generation
abstract
We introduce ${\rm C{\small LEVER}}$, a high-quality, manually curated benchmark of 161 problems for end-to-end verified code generation in Lean. Each problem consists of (1) the task of generating a specification that matches a held-out ground-truth specification, and (2) the task of generating a Lean implementation that provably satisfies this specification. Unlike prior benchmarks,${\rm C{\small LEVER}}$ avoids test-case supervision, LLM-generated annotations, and specifications that leak implementation logic or allow vacuous solutions. All outputs are verified post-hoc using Lean's type checker to ensure machine-checkable correctness. We use ${\rm C{\small LEVER}}$ to evaluate several few-shot and agentic approaches based on state-of-the-art language models. These methods all struggle to achieve full verification, establishing it as a challenging frontier benchmark for program synthesis and formal reasoning. Our benchmark can be found on [GitHub](https://github.com/trishullab/clever) as well as [HuggingFace](https://huggingface.co/datasets/amitayusht/clever). All our evaluation code is also available [online](https://github.com/trishullab/clever-prover).
Amitayush Thakur, Jasper Lee, George Tsoukalas, Meghana Aparna Sistla, Matthew Zhao, Stefan Zetzsche, Greg Durrett, Yisong Yue, Swarat Chaudhuri
NeurIPS6
2025 Verified Foundations for Differential Privacy
abstract
Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, but implementing it correctly has proven challenging. Prior work has focused on verifying DP at a high level, assuming either that the foundations are correct or that a perfect source of random noise is available. However, the underlying theory of differential privacy can be very complex and subtle. Flaws in basic mechanisms and random number generation have been a critical source of vulnerabilities in real-world DP systems. In this paper, we present SampCert, the first comprehensive, mechanized foundation for executable implementations of differential privacy. SampCert is written in Lean with over 12,000 lines of proof. It offers a generic and extensible notion of DP, a framework for constructing and composing DP mechanisms, and formally verified implementations of Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms. SampCert provides (1) a mechanized foundation for developing the next generation of differentially private algorithms, and (2) mechanically verified primitives that can be deployed in production systems. Indeed, SampCert’s verified algorithms power the DP offerings of Amazon Web Services, demonstrating its real-world impact. SampCert’s key innovations include: (1) A generic DP foundation that can be instantiated for various DP definitions (e.g., pure, concentrated, Rényi DP); (2) formally verified discrete Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of floating-point implementations; and (3) a simple probability monad and novel proof techniques that streamline the formalization. To enable proving complex correctness properties of DP and random number generation, SampCert makes heavy use of Lean’s extensive Mathlib library, leveraging theorems in Fourier analysis, measure and probability theory, number theory, and topology.
Markus de Medeiros, Tancrède Lepoint, Temesghen Kahsai, Tristan Ravitch, Stefan Zetzsche, Anjali Joshi, Joseph Tassarotti, Aws Albarghouthi, Jean-Baptiste Tristan
Proc. ACM Program. Lang.6
2024 Well-Behaved (Co)algebraic Semantics of Regular Expressions in Dafny
Stefan Zetzsche, Wojciech Rozowski
ICTAC1
2023 Generators and Bases for Monadic Closures
Stefan Zetzsche, Alexandra Silva 0001, Matteo Sammartino
CALCO1