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Justin Payan

dblp:289/0987 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
1as first author
5since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-7601-3500ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 1 first-author · 4 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Mathematical optimization · 58% Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 42%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Information retrieval · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
fair division
1.322024
Fair and Welfare-Efficient Constrained Multi-Matchings under Uncertainty · NeurIPS 2024
I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment · IJCAI 2022
Mathematical optimization
optimization under uncertainty
0.812024
Fair and Welfare-Efficient Constrained Multi-Matchings under Uncertainty · NeurIPS 2024
Mathematical optimization › optimization under uncertainty
robust optimization
0.812024
Fair and Welfare-Efficient Constrained Multi-Matchings under Uncertainty · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design › matching markets
reviewer assignment
0.612022
I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment · IJCAI 2022
Mathematical optimization
submodular optimization
0.612022
I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment · IJCAI 2022
Mathematical optimization › submodular optimization
weakly submodular maximization
0.612022
I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment · IJCAI 2022
Information retrieval › ranking › multi-objective ranking
fair ranking
0.512021
Online Post-Processing in Rankings for Fair Utility Maximization · WSDM 2021
Information retrieval
ranking
0.512021
Online Post-Processing in Rankings for Fair Utility Maximization · WSDM 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

stochastic optimization · 0.8machine learning · 0.8round-robin mechanism · 0.6greedy approximation · 0.6re-ranking policy · 0.5learning to search · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Fair and Welfare-Efficient Constrained Multi-Matchings under Uncertainty
abstract
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after realizing the allocation. We therefore estimate agent utilities using machine learning. Optimizing over estimates requires trading-off between mean utilities and their predictive variances. We discuss these trade-offs under two paradigms for preference modeling – in the stochastic optimization regime, the market designer has access to a probability distribution over utilities, and in the robust optimization regime they have access to an uncertainty set containing the true utilities with high probability. We discuss utilitarian and egalitarian welfare objectives, and we explore how to optimize for them under stochastic and robust paradigms. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approaches on three publicly available conference reviewer assignment datasets. The approaches presented enable scalable constrained resource allocation under uncertainty for many combinations of objectives and preference models.
Elita A. Lobo, Justin Payan, Cyrus Cousins, Yair Zick
NeurIPS2
2024 Graphical house allocation with identical valuations
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew McGregor 0001, Justin Payan, Rik Sengupta, Rohit Vaish, Vignesh Viswanathan
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst.3
2023 Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain Affinities
Cyrus Cousins, Justin Payan, Yair Zick
SAGT2
2022 I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment
abstract
We study mechanisms that allocate reviewers to papers in a fair and efficient manner. We model reviewer assignment as an instance of a fair allocation problem, presenting an extension of the classic round-robin mechanism, called Reviewer Round Robin (RRR). Round-robin mechanisms are a standard tool to ensure envy-free up to one item (EF1) allocations. However, fairness often comes at the cost of decreased efficiency. To overcome this challenge, we carefully select an approximately optimal round-robin order. Applying a relaxation of submodularity, γ-weak submodularity, we show that greedily inserting papers into an order yields a (1+γ²)-approximation to the maximum welfare attainable by our round-robin mechanism under any order. Our Greedy Reviewer Round Robin (GRRR) approach outputs highly efficient EF1 allocations for three real conference datasets, offering comparable performance to state-of-the-art paper assignment methods in fairness, efficiency, and runtime, while providing the only EF1 guarantee.
Justin Payan, Yair Zick
IJCAI1
2021 Online Post-Processing in Rankings for Fair Utility Maximization
abstract
We consider the problem of utility maximization in online ranking applications while also satisfying a pre-defined fairness constraint. We consider batches of items which arrive over time, already ranked using an existing ranking model. We propose online post-processing for re-ranking these batches to enforce adherence to the pre-defined fairness constraint, while maximizing a specific notion of utility. To achieve this goal, we propose two deterministic re-ranking policies. In addition, we learn a re-ranking policy based on a novel variation of learning to search. Extensive experiments on real world and synthetic datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed policies both in terms of adherence to the fairness constraint and utility maximization. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the performance of the proposed policies depends on the original data distribution w.r.t the fairness constraint and the notion of utility.
Ananya Gupta, Justin Payan, Aditya Kumar Roy, Ari Kobren, Swetasudha Panda, Jean-Baptiste Tristan, Michael L. Wick
WSDM3