Demo Data from SIGIR 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Franz Ostrizek
dblp:297/4879
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-5503-1654ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
2 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › decision theory
information acquisition |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency · EC 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Screening with Frames · EC 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › contract design
screening |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Screening with Frames · EC 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › dynamic mechanism design
dynamic incentive compatibility |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Screening with Frames · EC 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
subjective envelope condition · 1.5cursed equilibrium · 1.5mechanism design · 0.5dynamic inconsistency · 0.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and TransparencyabstractAdapting cursed equilibrium to a beauty contest game, we study the impact of information policies when agents underinfer from equilibrium statistics. To model information acquisition with incorrect use, we propose a subjective envelope condition: agents correctly anticipate their actions but incorrectly deem them optimal. Franz Ostrizek, Elia Sartori |
EC | 1 |
| 2021 | Screening with FramesabstractWe analyze screening with frame-dependent valuations. The optimal extensive form has a simple three-stage structure, using changes of framing (high-low-high) to induce dynamic inconsistency and thereby relax incentive compatibility constraints. Franz Ostrizek, Denis Shishkin |
EC | 1 |