Motivated by applications in online marketplaces, we propose a growth model of platforms operating as market markers in two-sided matching markets, such as between service providers and customers. The growth of these platforms, often dubbed the "chicken and egg dilemma" in the literature, poses an inherent challenge; service providers find value in joining the platform due to the presence of customers, while customers are drawn to the platform by the availability of diverse services. This endogenous network effect, created by the two sides of the market, influences the growth trajectory and propels emerging platforms towards "get big fast" strategies to rapidly achieve critical mass on both sides.

Most of the literature on online algorithms and sequential decision-making focuses on settings with “irrevocable decisions” where the algorithm’s decision upon arrival of the new input is set in stone and can never change in the future. One canonical example is the classic prophet inequality problem, where realizations of a sequence of independent random variables X1, X2,… with known distributions are drawn one by one and a decision maker decides when to stop and accept the arriving random variable, with the goal of maximizing the expected value of their pick. We consider “prophet inequalities with recourse” in the linear buyback cost setting, where after accepting a variable Xi, we can still discard Xi later and accept another variable Xj, at a buyback cost of f × Xi. The goal is to maximize the expected net reward, which is the value of the final accepted variable minus the total buyback cost. Our first main result is an optimal prophet inequality in the regime of f ≥ 1, where we prove that we can achieve an expected reward 1+f/1+2f times the expected offline optimum. The problem is still open for 0<f<1 and we give some partial results in this regime. In particular, as our second main result, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the competitive ratio for small f and provide almost matching upper and lower bounds that show a factor of 1−Θ(flog(1/f)). Our results are obtained by two fundamentally different approaches: One is inspired by various proofs of the classical prophet inequality, while the second is based on combinatorial optimization techniques involving LP duality, flows, and cuts.

Motivated by applications in cloud computing spot markets and selling banner ads on popular websites, we study the online resource allocation problem with costly buyback. To model this problem, we consider the classic edge-weighted fractional online matching problem with a tweak, where the decision maker can recall (i.e., buyback) any fraction of an offline resource that is pre-allocated to an earlier online vertex; however, by doing so not only the decision maker loses the previously allocated reward (which equates the edge-weight), it also has to pay a non-negative constant factor f of this edge-weight as an extra penalty. Parameterizing the problem by the buyback factor f, our main result is obtaining optimal competitive algorithms for all possible values of f through a novel primal-dual family of algorithms. We establish the optimality of our results by obtaining separate lower-bounds for each of small and large buyback factor regimes, and showing how our primal-dual algorithm exactly matches this lower-bound by appropriately tuning a parameter as a function of f. The optimal competitive ratio Γgen(f) and the optimal competitive ratio Γdet-int(f) of deterministic integral algorithms are as follows,